☢ test - Í

character evidence. “Evidence that [defendant’s wife/victim] followed her husband [defendant] and then confronted him at the motel in front of his girl friend is relevant to prove that Massey had a motive for committing the crime, and is not rendered inadmissible by the fact that it may have incidentally placed Massey's character in issue. See Johnson v. State, 260 Ga. 457(2), 396 S.E.2d 888 (1990).” Leon v. State, 237 Ga.App. 99, 513 S.E.2d 227 (February 24, 1999). At defendant’s child molestation trial, defense counsel opened door to testimony about defendant’s spousal abuse “when he asked the victim, ‘Did you talk with your mother about Mr. Leon leaving the house?’ When the victim replied that she had had such discussions with her mother, trial counsel asked if it was ‘just because you didn't like the way he punished, or for any other reason? ’ (Emphasis supplied.) On cross-examination, the State followed up on this inquiry by asking the victim, ‘What were those reasons you discussed with your mom about leaving Mr. Leon?’ The victim answered ‘He hit me a lot and he hit....’ When trial counsel objected, the trial court held that trial counsel had ‘brought up conduct within the household dynamics among the parties.... You have undertaken to establish that she had other motives’ for trying to get Leon to leave the house.” Held, “the trial court properly found that trial counsel had opened up the issue of the victim’s motivations regarding the molestation allegations and that Leon repeatedly interjected such motivations during his testimony. See Jordan v. State, 267 Ga. 442, 447(4), 480 S.E.2d 18 (1997); Smith v. State, 258 Ga. 181, 182(1), 366 S.E.2d 763 (1988).” 17. OFFICERS’ PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF DEFENDANT Dunham v. State, 315 Ga.App. 901, 729 S.E.2d 45 (May 17, 2012). Aggravated battery conviction affirmed; mistrial not required despite bounty hunter’s testimony that defendant had “run from us before.” “The witness's non-responsive answer, that Dunham had ‘run from [them] before,’ was fleeting, and the State interrupted immediately to forestall any further testimony along that line, after which the trial court gave curative instructions. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial.” Arnold v. State, 274 Ga.App. 187, 617 S.E.2d 169 (July 7, 2005), reversed on other grounds, 280 Ga. 487, 629 S.E.2d 807 (May 8, 2006). “Contrary to Arnold’s complaint, ‘[t]he statement that the officer knew [him] does not, in and of itself, place his character in evidence by raising an inference that [Arnold] is a malefactor or criminal.’ (Citation omitted.) Choat v. State, 246 Ga.App. 475, 478(3) (540 S.E.2d 289) (2000). The prosecutor’s question excluded any reference to the manner in which the officer previously made Arnold’s acquaintance and went solely to the issue of identification. Thus, this allegation of error is without merit.” Carter v. State, 261 Ga.App. 204, 583 S.E.2d 126 (May 9, 2003). Defendant’s character not put in issue by drug task force officer’s testimony that he knew defendant’s street name, or that he was familiar with defendant. No evidence as to how officer knew defendant or that defendant had history with drug task force. Accord, Jones v. State , 279 Ga.App. 139, 630 S.E.2d 643 (April 28, 2006); Gartrell v. State , 291 Ga.App. 21, 660 S.E.2d 886 (April 10, 2008) (officer’s brief reference that he knew defendant from officer’s experience in law enforcement not prejudicial, cured by explanation that he knew him as an outstanding local football player); Rucker v. State , 304 Ga.App. 184, 695 S.E.2d 711 (May 25, 2010); Moore v. State , 310 Ga.App. 106, 712 S.E.2d 126 (June 16, 2011). Forrester v. State, 255 Ga.App. 456, 565 S.E.2d 825 (May 21, 2002). Detective’s testimony that he knew defendant’s address because “During the course of the investigation, that was the address that I found on him. Not the night that we served the search warrant. Through other investigations I had obtained that address on him” did not improperly place his character in issue, as “the detective could have known [defendant] ‘in a multitude of ways’ that did not necessarily implicate him in criminal activity.” Accord, Jarrett v. State , 299 Ga.App. 525, 683 S.E.2d 116 (August 5, 2009) (“‘[t]estimony that a defendant is known to the police does not impermissibly place the defendant's character into issue,’” quoting Sanders v. State, 245 Ga.App. 701, 702(3) (538 S.E.2d 772) (2000).); Amica v. State , 307 Ga.App. 276, 704 S.E.2d 831 (November 19, 2010). Holmes v. State , 272 Ga. 517, 529 S.E.2d 879 (May 8, 2000). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no mistrial required where officer referenced prior police knowledge of defendant. “[A] police investigator, testified he learned from the woman who owned the vehicle used in the shooting that she gave the vehicle to someone named Terry; the investigation then led police to appellant because another investigator recalled appellant's name from a previous investigation in that neighborhood. The witness' statement appears to have been inadvertent and conveyed to the jury only that appellant had been involved in some capacity in a previous case. It was not clear from the challenged testimony whether appellant was a suspect or witness in the previous investigation and there was nothing in the statement indicating that appellant had been convicted of a crime. Considering the nature of the statement, the