☢ test - Í

Kerdpoka v. State, 314 Ga.App. 400, 724 S.E.2d 419 (February 28, 2012). Child molestation conviction affirmed; no mistrial required where defense witness mentioned defendant’s unrelated DUI conviction. “Kerdpoka's DUI was not related to the charges against him, the statement appeared to be inadvertent, and the court gave a prompt curative instruction. For these reasons, we find no abuse of discretion. See also Sims v. State, 268 Ga. 381, 382(2) (489 S.E.2d 809) (1997) (inadvertent mention of probation). Cases such as Lancaster v. State, 189 Ga.App. 149 (375 S.E.2d 281) (1988), are distinguishable because the inadvertent testimony that the defendant had a prior DUI was relevant to the pending charges of DUI and driving on a suspended license.” Accord, Bunnell v. State , 292 Ga. 253, 735 S.E.2d 281 (January 7, 2013) (murder conviction affirmed; no mistrial required “when a police officer testified that he ran Bunnell's ‘information[ ] through dispatch and ... Mr. Bunnell returned with a DUI suspension.’”). Vandall v. State, 290 Ga. 36, 717 S.E.2d 461 (November 7, 2011). Murder conviction affirmed; mistrial wasn’t required although “the prosecutor violated a pretrial order by asking Vandall's mother about outstanding warrants. The trial court denied the motion for a mistrial, but agreed that the question was improper and gave a curative instruction to the jury. We have previously held that curative instructions are sufficient to cure any potential prejudice that results from a witness's reference to an outstanding warrant. See Brown v. State, 268 Ga. 455, 456(1) (490 S.E.2d 379) (1997); see also Height v. State, 281 Ga. 727, 729–730(4) (642 S.E.2d 812) (2007) (trial court's curative instruction to disregard any evidence related to prior conduct remedied any prejudicial impact of the officer's statement). Since the trial court immediately instructed the jury that the prosecutor's question about warrants did not establish a fact in the case and the jury should disregard the question during its deliberations, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial.” Myers v. State, 311 Ga.App. 668, 716 S.E.2d 772 (September 14, 2011). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; evidence that defendant was wanted by U.S. Marshal Service was admissible to explain motive for fleeing and eluding police. Note, “[t]he jury was not told why Myers was a fugitive or what charges he faced.” Collins v. State, 310 Ga.App. 613, 714 S.E.2d 249 (July 7, 2011). Convictions for child molestation and aggravated child molestation affirmed; mistrial not required where DFCS investigator “testified that Collins had sex with some of [victim’s] friends. It is true that the DFACS investigator's testimony constituted inadmissible double hearsay. See OCGA § 24–3–1(a) (defining hearsay); Sullivan v. State, 295 Ga.App. 145, 151(4) (671 S.E.2d 180) (2008). Nevertheless, the record reflects that the DFACS investigator's improper remark was fleeting, unsolicited, and unresponsive to the prosecutor's examination question. See Boatright v. State, 308 Ga.App. 266, 268(1)(a) (707 S.E.2d 158) (2011) (a motion for a mistrial was not required since the improper remarks were fleeting, unsolicited, and unresponsive to the prosecutor's questions); Quimbley v. State, 276 Ga.App. 174, 175(1)(a) (622 S.E.2d 879) (2005) (same).” Russell v. State, 308 Ga.App. 328, 707 S.E.2d 543 (March 9, 2011). Convictions for selling cocaine affirmed; no mistrial required where police officer, called as a witness by defendant, testified that defendant’s picture in photo line-up was “pulled from the website of the State Board of Pardons and Paroles.” Although clearly improper, no mistrial required: “[Officer] McCowan's answer was not purposefully elicited by the prosecutor, and although his answer implied some prior conviction, it did not identify any specific crime of which Russell had been convicted. Moreover, the trial court immediately gave a curative instruction, in which the trial court told the jury to ‘disregard’ the answer “in all respects” and not to consider it ‘in any form or manner.’ In these circumstances, we think that the curative instruction was sufficient to remedy any prejudice arising from McCowan's answer.” “The record does not reflect whether any lawyer reminded McCowan before he testified that his testimony should not touch upon Russell's criminal history. But if anyone had an obligation to do so, it was the defense lawyer who called McCowan as a witness, not the prosecutor. Although it is not dispositive, and although we do not give it substantial weight, we think the identity of the party that called McCowan as a witness is a relevant circumstance for the purposes of our inquiry.” Ferguson v. State, 307 Ga.App. 232, 704 S.E.2d 470 (December 1, 2010). Motor vehicle theft convictions affirmed; letter to defendant, found in bag near stolen vehicle, was properly admitted to prove his identity, although that letter was addressed to him at Dooly State Prison. Rainly v. State, 307 Ga.App. 467, 705 S.E.2d 246 (November 30, 2010). Convictions for armed robbery and related offenses affirmed; evidence of prior robbery of same store six days earlier was properly admitted to extent relevant, improperly admitted (but harmless error) and irrelevant otherwise. Defendants were not charged in first robbery. Prior robbery was relevant to second robbery to some extent because business card given to store clerk by investigating officer in first robbery was found in defendants’ possession, with other items stolen in second robbery. “To the