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State is not required to prove which conspirator actually took the victim’s property, see Welch v. State, 235 Ga. 243, 244– 245 (219 S.E.2d 151) (1975); and proof that a victim was shot and killed during the robbery is sufficient to support a felony murder conviction regardless of which conspirator fired the fatal shot, see Williams v. State, 276 Ga. 384, 384–385 (578 S.E.2d 858) (2003).” Lucas v. State, 331 Ga.App. 455, 771 S.E.2d 142 (March 23, 2015). Evidence supported defendant’s convictions as a party to the crimes of attempted marijuana possession and attempted armed robbery. “The evidence … shows Lucas, who procured a weapon and acted as a lookout, was a party to the group's plan to rob a drug dealer. Lucas's conduct before, during and after the shooting, along with his co-defendant's attempts to enter the Acura, sufficiently constitutes a substantial step sufficient to convict him of attempting to possess marijuana as a party to the crime.” Contrary to defendant’s argument, State wasn’t required to prove that the substance was, in fact, marijuana, citing “ Watson v. State, 256 Ga.App. 789, 790(2), 570 S.E.2d 30 (2002) (the fact that substance sold to defendant was not actually cocaine does not relieve him of culpability for attempting to traffic cocaine where there was no evidence he was aware the substance was not cocaine), reversed on other grounds by Watson v. State, 276 Ga. 212, 576 S.E.2d 897 (2003); Durfee v. State, 221 Ga.App. 211, 212(2), 471 S.E.2d 32 (1996) (rejecting defendant's argument that because the informant supplied her with ‘sham’ cocaine, the evidence of attempted trafficking was insufficient).” McNeely v. State, 296 Ga. 422, 768 S.E.2d 751 (January 20, 2015). Evidence supported passenger’s convictions for felony murder, fleeing and eluding, reckless driving, and related offenses. Contrary to defendant’s assertion, convictions weren’t based solely on testimony of accomplice/driver, but were supported by at least slight circumstantial evidence. Driver was recklessly speeding away from officers pursuing defendant, who had been caught shoplifting. Defendant assaulted an officer in her escape, and was on parole for prior shoplifting offenses. These circumstances corroborated driver’s testimony that defendant demanded that she not stop for police or stop at intersections, resulting in a fatal collision. “Evidence connecting the defendant with the crime, in satisfaction of OCGA § 24–4–8, may be slight and it may be entirely circumstantial. Sutton v. State, 295 Ga. 350, 351–352(1) (759 S.E.2d 846) (2014).” Davis v. State, 296 Ga. 126, 765 S.E.2d 336 (November 3, 2014). Murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly denied motion for new trial. After Davis’s trial, his co-defendant Babbitt was acquitted at his separate trial. Davis now contends that he should be entitled to a new trial at which he can introduce into evidence Babbitt’s acquittal. Supreme Court disagrees, distinguishing and casting doubt on White v. State, 257 Ga. 236, 356 S.E.2d 875 (1987). “By its own terms, White concerns prosecutions in which a defendant is charged distinctly and exclusively as an accessory to an identified principal, such that the theory of liability asserted by the State necessarily makes the factual guilt of the identified principal an essential part of the case against the accessory. That is not how Davis was charged or tried. That Babbitt was guilty of murder as a principal was not an essential element of the case against Davis, and Davis is not entitled under White to a new trial at which he can present evidence that Babbitt was acquitted of the murder. See Harrison v. State, 257 Ga. 528, 531(3), 361 S.E.2d 149 (1987) (distinguishing White on similar grounds).” “Noting that the great weight of authority would exclude the acquittal of the principal at the trial of an accessory, Justice Hunt—joined by Justice Weltner—dissented in White. See 257 Ga. at 237, 356 S.E.2d 875 (Hunt, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). The position that Justice Hunt staked out in his dissent appears to accurately reflect the general rule in American law. See 23 CJS Criminal Law § 1336 (‘Evidence of acquittal of one jointly indicted with the accused is not admissible on behalf of the accused as tending to establish that he or she is also innocent.’) (citation omitted). See also State v. Weaver, 873 S2d 909, 915–916 (La.App., 2004); State v. Scott, 619 N.W.2d 371, 374–375(III) (Iowa 2000); Commonwealth v. Howard, 46 Mass.App.Ct. 366, 706 N.E.2d 303, 306(2) (Mass.App., 1999); Miller v. State, 650 S2d 940, 945–946(VI) (Ala.Crim.App., 1993), rev'd on other grounds, Ex parte Miller, 650 S2d 947 (Ala., 1994). Nevertheless, because White is distinguishable, we have no occasion in this case to reconsider its holding.” Accord, Griffin v. State , 331 Ga.App. 550, 769 S.E.2d 514 (February 12, 2015) (trial court properly excluded evidence of two codefendants’ prior acquittals). Slaton v. State, 296 Ga. 122, 765 S.E.2d 332 (November 3, 2014). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; evidence supported defendant’s conviction as a party to the crimes. “‘Proof that the defendant shares a common criminal intent with the actual perpetrators is necessary.’ Eckman v. State, 274 Ga. 63, 65(1), 548 S.E.2d 310 (2001). But such shared criminal intent ‘may be inferred from the defendant's conduct before, during, and after the crime.’ Id. See also Brown v. State, 291 Ga. 887(1), 734 S.E.2d 41 (2012) (where defendant asked to be picked up by a friend to go looking for those he believed had shot at him, and the driver of the car that came to pick him up fired a shot toward the victim and others the defendant identified as the ones who shot at him, killing the victim, the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction for murder and other charges as a party to the crimes). Similarly to the facts in Brown, here, a jury could reasonably infer from the evidence concerning Slaton's conduct before, during, and after the shooting that