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drugs, accompanied Clayton to the hotel, knew that Clayton was going to the hotel room to sell drugs to someone there, and had agreed to hold the bag of drugs while Clayton went to the room with the engine of the car still running. [fn] In light of this evidence, the jury could have found that Haywood actively participated in the attempted drug dealing activity by guarding the drug stash and by staying with the still running vehicle to facilitate a quick getaway if necessary.” Valentine v. State, 301 Ga.App. 630, 689 S.E.2d 76 (December 15, 2009). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction as a party to molestation of her children where she made the children sleep in same bed with perpetrator, “a circumstance from which the jury could infer that she shared in [perpetrator] Neal's criminal intent. … By doing so, Valentine facilitated Neal's acts of child molestation and aggravated child molestation against her children. Further, although J.V. told his mother that Neal had put his penis in his anus after the third of four incidents, Valentine did nothing to protect her son or isolate him from Neal. As a result, her actions amounted to acquiescence in Neal's continuing criminal acts against her son. See Wyatt v. State, 243 Ga.App. 882, 883(4) (534 S.E.2d 431) (2000) (if defendant was at scene of crime and did not ‘disapprove of or oppose the commission of the offense,’ the jury could consider such conduct in connection with prior knowledge and conclude that he ‘assented to the commission of the offense, that he lent his approval to it, thereby aiding and abetting the commission of the crime’) (citation omitted). There also was evidence that Valentine reprimanded V.V. for pleading with Neal to ‘stop’ after Neal stormed out of the bedroom which Valentine had directed V.V. to enter.” Jackson v. State, 301 Ga.App. 406, 687 S.E.2d 666 (December 3, 2009). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction as a party to interference with government property. “‘While an individual's presence when a crime is committed will not be sufficient, in and of itself, to convict that individual as a party to the crime, if the individual is present and assists in the commission of the crime or shares in the criminal intent of the actual perpetrator of the crime, the individual may be convicted as a party to the crime.’ (Citation omitted.) Grace v. State, 262 Ga. 746, 748(4) (425 S.E.2d 865) (1993). ‘Proof that the defendant shares a common criminal intent with the actual perpetrators is necessary and may be inferred from the defendant's conduct before, during, and after the crime.’ (Citations omitted.) Eckman v. State, 274 Ga. 63, 65(1) (548 S.E.2d 310) (2001).” Before : defendant moved into house despite notice from owner that she shouldn’t; applied for and was turned down for water service. During: “[a]lthough the eyewitness's testimony also established that she did not see Jackson physically interacting with the meter, the jury was entitled to conclude that when the witness referred to ‘them’ and ‘they’ as having ‘mess[ed]’ with the water meter she was conveying an accurate impression that Jackson and her roommate shared a common purpose.” After: defendant lived in the house and received water services; locks placed on the meter by the water department were found inside the house. “‘Since there was evidence that [Jackson] was present when the crimes were committed and the jury could infer from her conduct before [, during] and after the crime[ ] that she shared the criminal intent of the actual perpetrators, the evidence was sufficient to authorize her convictions as a party to those crimes.’ (Citations omitted.) Id. at 65(1).” Accord, Luke v. State , 324 Ga.App. 531, 751 S.E.2d 180 (November 7, 2013) (common criminal intent may be inferred from conduct before, during and after the crime). Cooper v. State, 286 Ga. 66, 685 S.E.2d 285 (November 2, 2009). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for felony murder although co-defendant was the person who choked and beat the victim. “Cooper actively participated in the planning and execution of the home-invasion robbery, and that he was fully aware that his accomplice was choking the victim when he fled from the scene. Moreover, the evidence shows that after leaving the scene, Cooper took all the money out of the wallet, threw the wallet into a sewer, and then went back to the scene to see the burning house. Accordingly, Cooper was not merely present at the scene, but was a party to the crimes.” McGordon v. State, 298 Ga.App. 161, 679 S.E.2d 743 (June 2, 2009). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for armed robbery: “the evidence showed that McGordon rode with his brother as he drove by the target location several times, that he switched places with his brother and drove him there, dropping his brother off in the parking lot of the location his brother told him he was planning to rob, that he drove to the getaway location at his brother's instruction, waited there for his brother instead of leaving, re-entered the vehicle when his brother returned with the fruits of his crime as well as the weapon used to commit it, and attempted to drive away. This evidence was sufficient to authorize his conviction as a party to the crimes charged pursuant to OCGA § 16-2-20(b)(3). See, e.g., Bailey v. State, 295 Ga.App. 480, 482(1) (672 S.E.2d 450) (2009); Buruca v. State, 278 Ga.App. at 652(1); Cantrell v. State, 230 Ga.App. 693, 695(1) (498 S.E.2d 90) (1998).” Compare Benitez (January 23, 2009), below. Benitez v. State, 295 Ga.App. 658, 673 S.E.2d 46 (January 23, 2009). Defendant’s conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine reversed; evidence was insufficient to prove that defendant was knowingly in joint possession of drugs carried by his companion. Defendant drove Garduno from Marietta to a hotel in Cartersville, where Garduno