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discretion when it instructed the jury not to open the package. See Goger, Daniel’s Georgia Criminal Trial Practice (2006 ed.), § 24-18, p. 1109 n. 1, quoting American Bar Association Standards, Trial by Jury, Vol. III, Standard 15-4.1 (trial court ‘in its discretion’ may allow evidence, including exhibits, to go out with the jury, taking into account ‘whether the material may be subjected to improper use’).” MMMM. PLAIN ERROR Gipson v. State, 332 Ga.App. 309, 772 S.E.2d 402 (May 6, 2015). Convictions for aggravated assault with intent to murder, and related offenses, affirmed. 1. Under the 2013 Evidence Code, rulings on evidence, though not objected to at trial, may be reviewed for plain error. Citing Fraser v. State, 329 Ga.App. 1, 2, 763 S.E.2d 359 (2014); “OCGA § 24–1– 103(d); Rembert v. State, 324 Ga.App. 146, 152(2), n. 8, 749 S.E.2d 744 (2013). To rise to the high level of plain error, the error must be ‘one that is so clearly erroneous that it creates a likelihood of a grave miscarriage of justice or seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceeding,’ and the ‘appellant must show that the error caused him harm, i.e., that the error likely affected the outcome at trial.’ (Footnote omitted.) Perez v. State, 331 Ga.App. 164(1), 770 S.E.2d 260 (March 13, 2015).” 2. No plain error, or error at all, in qualifying executive director of local domestic violence shelter as an expert “regarding the typical characteristics of domestic abuse victims and the cyclical pattern of domestic abuse.” 3. Prosecutor’s cross-examination of defendant, implying that he was a hypocrite for wearing a Christian cross “ in light of his abusive conduct towards the victim … was argumentative and improper,” but not plain error. “Gipson has failed to show that the questions, when viewed in the context of the trial as a whole, seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings or likely affected the outcome.” NNNN. PLEA NEGOTIATIONS See subheading STATEMENTS BY DEFENDANT – PLEA NEGOTIATIONS, below. OOOO. POLICE REPORTS See new OCGA § 24-8-803(8) Brown v. State, 295 Ga. 804, 764 S.E.2d 376 (October 6, 2014). Murder and firearms convictions affirmed; trial court properly excluded police reports allegedly showing prior violent acts of alleged aggressor in the gun battle involving co-defendants Brown and McKinney. Defendants Brown and McKinney sought “to introduce evidence of Richardson's prior acts of violence in support of their justification defense.” Brown and McKinney contended that they were merely defending themselves from Richardson in the gun battle which killed a child bystander; Richardson faced his own trial in the incident the following month. Richardson’s attorney announced Richardson’s intention to “invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as to any questions about those prior acts.” Proferred police reports didn’t clearly identify Richardson as the subject of the reports; further, “the only information about violent acts contained in the police reports of the first two incidents was double hearsay—the statements of victims and witnesses recounted in those reports.” Finally, “an officer's account of the perpetrator's violence toward him,” contained in a written incident report, is not admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. “See, e.g., Brown v. State, 274 Ga. 31, 33–36 (549 S.E.2d 107) (2001) (explaining that the narrative portion of a police report ‘does not have the reliability inherent in other documents that courts have traditionally considered to be business records,’ and concluding that ‘the narratives contained in police reports generated in connection with police investigations are not the appropriate subject of an exception to the hearsay rule.’).” Jackson v. State, 306 Ga.App. 33, 701 S.E.2d 481 (August 3, 2010). Evidence did not support co-defendant Royal’s conviction for possession of cocaine: officer’s testimony “that he conducted an ‘independent investigation’ that gave him ‘reason to believe’ that Royal was selling drugs out of the apartment … constitutes hearsay, which has no probative value. ‘Hearsay testimony is not only inadmissible but wholly without probative value, and its introduction without objection does not give it any weight or force whatever in establishing a fact.’ (Citation and footnote omitted.) Patterson v. State, 287 Ga.App. 100, 103(2)(a) (650 S.E.2d 770) (2007) (officer's testimony concerning statements made to him by defendant's mother was inadmissible hearsay); accord Brown v. State, 294 Ga.App. 1, 5(2) (668 S.E.2d 490) (2008) (officer's testimony concerning informant's statements held hearsay, requiring reversal of probation revocation). And even if the hearsay had been properly admitted to explain the officer's conduct in obtaining the warrant, ‘such evidence is admissible as original evidence solely to explain conduct and not as original evidence of guilt.’ (Citations omitted.) Brown v. State, 274 Ga. 31, 37(2) (549 S.E.2d 107) (2001).” Goss v. State, 305 Ga.App. 497, 699 S.E.2d 819 (August 3, 2010). Defendant’s child molestation conviction affirmed. Police report narrative of defendant’s statement to officer was hearsay, but no ineffective assistance shown in failing to