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some cases mistrials are required when a witness mentions a polygraph test, reversal is not always warranted.’ Here, it does not appear that the State intentionally solicited the statement [that the defendant refused to take a polygraph], and although it was inadmissible, ‘the trial court’s swift, emphatic action in instructing the jury to ignore the statement sufficiently remedied the situation.’” Thompson v. State, 257 Ga.App. 426, 571 S.E.2d 158 (August 12, 2002). Child molestation and related convictions affirmed. Defendant agreed to take a polygraph exam and stipulated to the admissibility of the results, but objected to testimony from the GBI agent who administered the test as to the reliability of the results. Held, where the parties have stipulated to their admission, “‘the results of a lie detector test shall be admissible as evidence for the jury to attach to them whatever probative value they may find them to have.’ The ‘results’ of a lie detector test can be interpreted to be (1) the charts resulting from a graphing of the responses of the person tested, and/or (2) the opinion of an expert based on those charts.” Reversed on other grounds, 277 Ga. 102, 586 S.E.2d 231 (September 15, 2003). Rucker v. State, 272 Ga. 750, 534 S.E.2d 71 (September 11, 2000). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in excluding co-defendant Lackey’s polygraph results from evidence. “[T]here was no evidence of a stipulation as to the admissibility of the polygraph results in Lackey’s case much less at Rucker’s trial, and a stipulation is a prerequisite to admissibility. Robertson v. State, 268 Ga. 772, 779(21), 493 S.E.2d 697 (1997); Forehand v. State, 267 Ga. 254, 256(5), 477 S.E.2d 560 (1996).” Contrary to defendant’s argument, there is no exception to this rule for “evidence which tends to prove a defendant’s sole defense,” citing Walker v. State, 264 Ga. 79, 80(2), 440 S.E.2d 637 (1994) ([other suspect] Burk’s polygraph properly excluded “even though ‘there was a stipulation between the State and Burks to use the test results at [Burks’s] trial.’”). Slakman v. State, 272 Ga. 662, 533 S.E.2d 383 (July 13, 2000). Malice murder and related convictions reversed on other grounds. “The trial court did not err in refusing to allow defense counsel to comment in closing argument on that portion of Slakman's statement to police in which he offered to take a polygraph test absent a stipulation that results of the test would be admissible. Holland v. State, 221 Ga.App. 821(2), 472 S.E.2d 711 (1996); Durham v. State, 240 Ga. 203, 204(3), 240 S.E.2d 14 (1977).” Lyons v. State, 271 Ga. 639, 522 S.E.2d 225 (October 18, 1999). At defendant’s capital murder trial, no abuse of discretion “in denying a defense motion for mistrial after a law enforcement officer in a nonresponsive answer during examination stated, ‘that ... was after he had taken the polygraph test.’ ‘“(T)he mere fact that the jury [was] apprised that a lie detector test was taken is not necessarily prejudicial if no inference as to [the] result is raised.”’ White v. State, 255 Ga. 210, 213(6), 336 S.E.2d 777 (1985). No such inference was raised here. And because the grant of a mistrial was not ‘essential to preserve the right to a fair trial,’ Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 803(15), 312 S.E.2d 40 (1983), we will not disturb the trial court's exercise of its discretion.” Accord, Parrott (November 15, 2012), above; Slaughter v. State , 295 Ga. 298, 759 S.E.2d 533 (June 2, 2014). Cook v. State, 270 Ga. 820, 514 S.E.2d 657 (March 19, 1999). Capital murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court did not err by ruling that Cook could not introduce, absent a stipulation by the state, testimony about the use of police lie detector tests to exclude certain suspects. Robertson v. State, 268 Ga. 772, 779(21), 493 S.E.2d 697 (1997); Ward v. State, 262 Ga. 293, 296(5), 417 S.E.2d 130 (1992).” QQQQ. PORNOGRAPHY Seminal case: Simpson v. State, 271 Ga. 772, 523 S.E.2d 320 (November 1, 1999), below. Beaver v. State, 330 Ga.App. 496, 767 S.E.2d 503 (December 18, 2014). Convictions for sexual exploitation for children affirmed; trial court properly admitted 10-12 second clips of child pornography found on defendant’s computer over defendant’s objection “that showing video clips rather than still shots was unfairly prejudicial.” “In Simpson v. State, 271 Ga. 772 (523 S.E.2d 320) (1999), the Supreme Court clarified that in a prosecution for a sexual offense, sexually explicit material can only be admitted if it can be linked to the crime charged. Id. at 774(1). Here, the videos presented were clearly directly relevant to the specific offenses charged. And where the trial court limited their prejudicial impact by significantly restricting the State's use of the videos that were themselves the subject of the charges against Beaver, we find no abuse of discretion. [FN8. We also note that Beaver does not argue that the content of the 10–12 second video clips was unrepresentative of what was depicted on the videos, or that the specific content shown was more prejudicial than what would be portrayed in corresponding still shots, other than making the unsupported assertion that moving video is always more prejudicial than still shots. ] ”