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directly underneath where he sat, with the bed skirt messily pushed up as though it was done in a hurry. Upon being handcuffed, Smith spontaneously denied that he had any drugs on his person despite not yet being searched. Smith testified at trial that the woman in the bed was pregnant at the time, and she did not use drugs. Further, Smith possessed a pocket sized set of digital scales with something that looked like drug residue on them at the time of his arrest.” Stewart v. State, 328 Ga.App. 78, 761 S.E.2d 497 (July 9, 2014). Evidence didn’t support conviction for possession of cocaine. Defendant rented hotel room, but no evidence connected her to the cocaine her husband hid in the room, nor was she present when it was visible in the room. Maddox v. State, 322 Ga.App. 811, 746 S.E.2d 280 (July 11, 2013). Whole court opinion affirming convictions for possession of cocaine and marijuana. Overruling line of cases holding that “[w]hen more than one occupant has equal access to hidden contraband, but only one occupant is prosecuted for possession of the contraband, the State has the burden of proving that the prosecuted occupant ‘was in sole constructive possession’ of the contraband,” quoting and overruling Reid v. State, 212 Ga.App. 787 (442 S.E.2d 852) (1994). “Circumstantial evidence that multiple occupants of a car had equal access to hidden contraband may support the theory that all the occupants were guilty as parties to the crime and had joint constructive possession of the contraband. Castillo v. State, 166 Ga.App. 817, 822 (305 S.E.2d 629) (1983). [fn] Under these circumstances, the State may elect to prosecute the occupants jointly or separately ( Kennemore v. State, 222 Ga. 252 (149 S.E.2d 471) (1966)), or may elect to prosecute only one of the occupants for directly committing the crime, but nevertheless prove the sole prosecuted occupant was guilty as a party to the crime. Trumpler v. State, 261 Ga.App. 499, 500–501 (583 S.E.2d 184) (2003); Brinson v. State, 261 Ga. 884 (413 S.E.2d 443) (1992).” “‘[T]he settled rule [is] that the failure of the State to prosecute one party to a crime ordinarily offers no defense to other parties to the crime. See OCGA § 16–2–21 (party to a crime can be convicted even if the principal has not been prosecuted); Davis v. State, 163 Ga. 247, 248 (135 SE 916) (1926) (“Failure to prosecute the principle will in no wise relieve the accessory.”); see also Grimes v. State, 245 Ga.App. 277, 278(2) (537 S.E.2d 720) (2000) (“A party to a crime may be prosecuted and convicted for the commission of the offense regardless of whether anyone else was prosecuted.”),’” quoting Holiman v. State, 313 Ga.App. 76, 79 (720 S.E.2d 363) (2011). State v. Al-Khayyal, 322 Ga.App. 718, 744 S.E.2d 885 (June 19, 2013). In prosecution for sexual exploitation of children, based on possession of digital child pornography, trial court’s order granting plea in bar affirmed in part and reversed in part. “In 2009, while Al–Khayyal, a professor at the Georgia Institute of Technology, was abroad teaching in China, he became the target of an investigation into child pornography. When he returned to the United States on August 5, 2009, bringing his laptop computer, immigration control officers detained him in the Atlanta airport (in Clayton County) and seized that computer.” 1. Forensics located 29 digital files that had been moved to trash file and then deleted again (“double-deleted”), thus inaccessible to the user and recoverable only with special software not possessed by defendant. Forensics found 20 other digital files that had been moved to the trash file but not double-deleted; these were still accessible using an unzipping program located on the computer. The trial court granted defendant’s plea in bar and motion to dismiss on grounds that the State couldn’t prove that defendant “possessed” any of the files in Clayton County. State concedes that the defendant didn’t possess the double-deleted files in Clayton County, but Court of Appeals reverses as to the 20 files in the trash file. “Despite his undisputed physical possession of the computer in Clayton County, Al–Khayyal contends that the State cannot prove that he possessed the contraband at issue in that venue because, while he was in the county, he lacked the ability to access the illegal images stored on his computer. He relies in part on evidence that the software required to view the prohibited visual depictions was not loaded on his computer at the same time. We find no support in Georgia law, however, for the proposition that possession of prohibited material under OCGA § 16–12– 100(b)(8) exists only in conjunction with the defendant's present ability to view illegal visual depictions, especially given the evidence that the needed software was readily available to the public. See Veats v. State, 300 Ga.App. 600, 602(1), 685 S.E.2d 416 (2009) (A defendant knowingly had constructive possession of a pornographic videotape even when he could not view the content because he did not have a videocassette player or electricity.).” 2. Factfinder could infer that defendant possessed the digital files knowingly. “[T]he evidence, including evidence that he actively manipulated the .rar files by deleting them, authorizes an inference that he was aware that the files were saved to his hard drive. Evidence that Al–Khayyal had double-deleted other files authorizes an inference that he knew that deleting a file moves it to the trash folder and that, without further action, a deleted file remains stored there. By extension, this evidence also authorizes an inference that he knew that the .rar files at issue in this case were in the trash folder and still accessible. Evidence that he had used other unzipping software authorizes an inference that he knew about the kind of software needed to access and manipulate compressed files. In addition, all of this evidence must be viewed in light of Al–Khayyal's educational background and professional expertise. … Under the facts presented, the question of whether Al–Khayyal's efforts to abandon the illegal files were successful remains a question of fact for the jury and