☢ test - Í

‘between [her] bookcase and [her] bathroom.’ She explained that Peppers ‘never touched [her] guns.’ The roommate stated further that when she heard Peppers tell the officers that he did not have any weapons, she retrieved two weapons she owned from her bedroom and put them by the front door, and that Peppers asked her if he could hand the guns to the officers. She explained that she and Peppers had separate bedrooms but that they ‘share the—- all the kitchen and stuff and the bathroom ... [w]e split our rent and we split our bills.’” Brown v. State, A11314 Ga.App. 212, 723 S.E.2d 504 (February 17, 2012). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for possession of cocaine. “The state presented evidence other than Brown's mere spatial proximity to the pipe containing cocaine to show that he had constructive possession over it. The pipe was dry, although it had been raining and the surrounding area was ‘soaked’; from this evidence the court as factfinder could infer that the pipe had been on the ground for a very short period of time. See Wright v. State, 302 Ga.App. 332, 334 (690 S.E.2d 654) (2010) (jury could infer that bag containing drugs, which was found in the wheel well of a car within an arm's reach of defendant hiding beneath the car, had recently been placed there because it was not ‘dirty, weathered, or damp’; this evidence established a meaningful connection between the defendant and the contraband which authorized the jury to find defendant had constructive possession of drugs).” Accord, Mallard v. State , 321 Ga.App. 650, 742 S.E.2d 164 (April 26, 2013). Dennis v. State, 313 Ga.App. 595, 722 S.E.2d 190 (January 18, 2012). Evidence was sufficient to convict co-defendants Dennis and Brown, passengers in vehicle in which marijuana was located at several places. “The evidence showed that Dennis and Brown knew that marijuana was inside the minivan. Their co-defendants had been smoking marijuana prior to the stop, and the strong odor of marijuana was obvious inside the minivan. See Vines v. State, 296 Ga.App. 543, 546(1) (675 S.E.2d 260) (2009) (ruling that the strong odor of marijuana inside the vehicle allowed an inference that the vehicle's occupants knowingly shared the power and intention to exercise dominion or control over it). Furthermore, after the school resource officer initiated the stop, he observed everyone moving inside the minivan. When questioned about the passengers' movements, the driver informed the school resource officer that the passengers were hiding marijuana inside the minivan. Dennis and Brown had been passengers in the back of the minivan, and an officer who searched the minivan testified that the back passengers had access to the driver's seat belt compartment where a portion of the marijuana was found.” Gray v. State, 313 Ga.App. 470, 722 S.E.2d 98 (December 29, 2011). Evidence didn’t support superior court’s revocation of defendant’s probation. Evidence didn’t support finding that defendant possessed marijuana found in residence. Police executing search warrant at drug dealer’s residence found Gray there; no evidence indicated that Gray lived there. Gray was seated near open front door, said he didn’t live there, and was just there to get his gaming console from residents. Officers found 1.9 grams of marijuana in a sandwich bag inside a black plastic bag in a bedroom closet. “‘A finding of constructive possession of contraband cannot rest upon mere spatial proximity to the contraband, especially where, as here, the contraband is hidden. [Cits.]’ Mitchell v. State, 268 Ga. 592, 593 (492 S.E.2d 204) (1997). And ‘[e]vidence merely showing that contraband was found in a residence occupied by the defendant is not sufficient to support a conviction, especially where other persons had equal access to the contraband and therefore an equal opportunity to commit the offense.’ (Citation and footnote omitted.) Johnson v. State, 282 Ga.App. 52, 54(1) (637 S.E.2d 775) (2006). The same rule applies in a probation revocation. See Brown v. State, 294 Ga.App. 1, 5–6(2) (668 S.E.2d 490) (2008) (evidence that probationer sitting outside house and cocaine visible through glass storm door slight evidence of possession but not preponderance sufficient to revoke probation); Anderson v. State, 212 Ga.App. 329, 329– 330 (442 S.E.2d 268) (1994) (defendant's presence in mother's house when drugs found in her bedroom slight evidence of possession but not preponderance). Here, the State showed only that Gray was at the open front door of a trailer and that a sandwich bag of marijuana was found in a closed container inside a closet in a bedroom. The evidence showed that other individuals had access to the trailer, including a man who sold drugs to the confidential informant. While the State contends that Gray's ‘claimed ownership of some of the personal property found at the residence’ supports a finding of constructive possession, under the evidence presented here, that claim did not demonstrate Gray's residence at the trailer to the exclusion of any other reasonable hypothesis. Ordinarily, property supporting an inference of residence for the purposes of constructive possession consists of clothing, banking or business records, or other personal items customarily kept in ones living quarters. See, e.g. Cox v. State, 300 Ga.App. 109, 110 (684 S.E.2d 147) (2009) (bedroom night stand contained many items with defendant's name on them, including paperwork, insurance documents and several picture identification cards); Aguey–Zinsou v. State, 296 Ga.App. 319, 324(2) (674 S.E.2d 366) (2009) (bank statement, bill, and envelope all bearing appellant's name and address found in bedroom at that address); McWhorter v. State, 275 Ga.App. 624, 626(1) (621 S.E.2d 571) (2005) (personal items found in bedroom with methamphetamine manufacturing equipment included prescription bottle, notebook, letters, and handgun); Daniels v. State, 192 Ga.App. 446(1) (385 S.E.2d 107) (1989) (men's clothing as well as business records and cancelled checks of two businesses owned