☢ test - Í

Bailey v. State, 294 Ga.App. 437, 669 S.E.2d 453 (November 7, 2008). Evidence was sufficient to establish defendant’s contructive possession of sawed-off shotgun found in his office. “‘Possession may be either actual or constructive. Constructive possession exists where a person though not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jackson v. State, 284 Ga.App. 619, 620(1) (644 S.E.2d 491) (2007).” “[T]he sawed-off shotgun was found in an office containing personal items belonging to Bailey. Moreover, entry into the office had been made more difficult by installation of a steel pad-locked door and the office door was locked when officers arrived to conduct the search. And Bailey admitted that he installed surveillance equipment which allowed monitoring of those who came onto the premises but testified he installed it because his shop had been broken into a number of times. And although Bailey disputed Agent Cobb's testimony, Cobb testified that Bailey admitted that the ‘guns’ found inside the house and in the office were his. ‘As long as there is slight evidence of access, power, and intention to exercise control or dominion over an instrumentality, the question of fact regarding constructive possession remains within the domain of the trier of fact.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Wright v. State, 279 Ga.App. 299, 300(1) (630 S.E.2d 774) 2006).” Swicord v. State, 293 Ga.App. 545, 667 S.E.2d 401 (September 15, 2008). Conviction for trafficking in cocaine reversed; evidence was insufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than guilt. Cocaine was found in police car used to transport co-defendant. Vehicle in which defendant was stopped was earlier seen in apparent drug transaction, but it wasn’t defendant’s vehicle, he wasn’t seen at scene, and no drugs were actually seen. “The record does not reveal how much time elapsed between the alleged drug deal and the time the police arrested Swicord.” “Thus, even assuming that [co-defendant] Simmons possessed the cocaine at issue, the only evidence linking it to Swicord was Swicord's mere association and spatial proximity to Simmons while they were both in the Buick just prior to Swicord's arrest. As we have held, a ‘finding of constructive possession must be based upon some connection between the defendant and the contraband other than spatial proximity. Evidence of mere presence at the scene of the crime, and nothing more to show participation of a defendant in the illegal act, is insufficient to support a conviction.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hodges v. State, 277 Ga.App. 174 (626 S.E.2d 133) (2006).” Brown v. State, 294 Ga.App. 1, 668 S.E.2d 490 (September 3, 2008). Evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant’s probation revocation based on alleged possession of drugs. “None of Brown’s belongings were found inside the house; Brown did not reside at this residence; and there was no testimony that Brown had ever been inside the house. The only evidence putting Brown near the cocaine was that Brown was sitting [on porch] in front of the house where the cocaine was found.” Bryson v. State, 293 Ga.App. 392, 667 S.E.2d 170 (August 22, 2008). “Bryson argues that because he testified that he had no knowledge of the methamphetamine and the State did not present any evidence to contradict or dispute his testimony, his conviction cannot stand. However, it is well-settled that ‘[b]oth knowledge and possession may be proved, like any other fact, by circumstantial evidence.’ Riley v. State, 292 Ga.App. 202, 663 S.E.2d 835 (June 25, 2008) (quoting Abernathy v. State, 278 Ga.App. 574, 578(1) (630 S.E.2d 421) (2006)); Fernandez v. State, 275 Ga.App. 151, 154(2) (619 S.E.2d 821) (2005).” Circumstantial evidence here included fact that defendant was only occupant of his own company vehicle; drugs were found where he kept his personal items. Prather v. State, 293 Ga.App. 312, 667 S.E.2d 113 (August 15, 2008). Evidence was sufficient to show defendant’s intent to exercise control over car he borrowed: defendant possessed the car for some three months and removed everything from it that could be stolen. “Accordingly, Prather was connected to the marijuana [found therein] not only by its spatial proximity to him at the time of his arrest, but by evidence of his control over the car for an extended period of time and his intent to control the contents of the car. See Coleman v. State, 229 Ga.App. 642, 644 (494 S.E.2d 549) (1997) (evidence sufficient to show possession where defendant, as borrower of the car, had control over the vehicle, and as the driver he had control over the dashboard where contraband was found).” Navarro v. State, 293 Ga.App. 329, 667 S.E.2d 125 (August 15, 2008). Driver of vehicle was presumed in possession of meth found therein, even where driver was not owner. Evidence of equal access between owner and driver did not demand acquittal of driver. Kier v. State, 292 Ga.App. 208, 663 S.E.2d 832 (June 25, 2008). Evidence did not support defendant’s conviction for marijuana possession. After arresting driver for drug possession, officer ordered the other three passengers in the vehicle to exit. “After the passengers were outside the car, police observed a hand-rolled marijuana cigarette on the rear floorboard, just behind the center console, and observed that the same had been recently smoked. Based on this cigarette,