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scrutiny by the trial court. … Here, Scott testified that the prior incident involved self-defense when Sims tried to stab him and that he ‘won the case at a jury trial.’ [fn] The evidence of record thus demands a finding that Scott's ‘course of conduct’ was a disputed issue that the jury resolved in his favor. Consequently, the specifics of this prior difficulty [fn] were irrelevant and inadmissible, and the trial court substantively erred in admitting this evidence.” Harmless, however, in light of overwhelming evidence of guilt. VVVV. PRIVATE PAPERS Flemister v. State, 317 Ga.App. 749, 732 S.E.2d 810 (October 2, 2012). Terroristic threats and arson convictions affirmed; no ineffective assistance of counsel. Contrary to defendant’s argument, business letter and divorce decree were not “private papers” under OCGA § 17-5-21. “Significantly, … ‘private papers’ include ‘diaries, personal letters, and similar documents wherein the author's personal thoughts are recorded,’ but not mere public records or business or financial documents that do not contain personal thoughts. Smith v. State, 192 Ga.App. 298 (384 S.E.2d 459) (1989) (checks, deposit slips, and business letters were not ‘private papers’). See Ledesma v. State, 251 Ga. 885, 890(7)(a) (311 S.E.2d 427) (1984) (deposit slips, business license, and employment contract were not ‘private papers’). Hence, the business letter and divorce decree at issue here did not fall within the category of ‘private papers,’ and they would not have been suppressed even if trial counsel had filed a motion to suppress them.” Brogdon v. State, 287 Ga. 528, 697 S.E.2d 211 (July 12, 2010). Affirming 299 Ga.App. 547, 550-551 (683 S.E.2d 99) (2009), holding that hospital records are not “private papers” exempt from subpoena by the State in a criminal prosecution (such as defendant’s prosecution for DUI and related offenses). Announces new rule for determining whether documents are private papers, replacing test enunciated in Sears v. State, 262 Ga. 805 (426 S.E.2d 553) (1993) (holding that “private papers” are those covered by a privilege such as the attorney-client privilege). New interpretation: OCGA § 17-5-21(a)(5) “exempted from a search warrant’s coverage … those papers that belonged to the accused or were, at the least, in his possession” and which “constituted tangible evidence of the crime for which probable cause had been shown” but not those which were “instrumentalities of a crime” under OCGA § 17-5-21(a)(1). When the statute was enacted in 1966, “the use of a person's private papers to convict the person of a crime was seen as the equivalent of ‘forcible and compulsory extortion of a [person]'s own testimony’ and was forbidden by the Fifth Amendment's right against compulsory self-incrimination. Boyd v. United States, [116 U.S. 616, 630 (68 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746) (1886)]. The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination was ‘designed to prevent the use of legal process to force ... the accused individual ... to produce and authenticate any personal documents or effects that might incriminate him.’ United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (64 S.Ct. 1248, 88 L.Ed. 1542) (1944).” “Since the medical records that were the subject of the search warrant in the case at bar were neither the personal property of appellant nor were they seized from his possession, they did not constitute the ‘private papers’ that are exempt from coverage of a search warrant in Georgia under OCGA § 17-5-21(a)(5).” Query: is data contained on a cell phone covered by the “private papers” doctrine? Hawkins v. State , 307 Ga.App. 253, 704 S.E.2d 886 (December 1, 2010), affirmed, 290 Ga. 785, 723 S.E.2d 924 (March 23, 2012), treats the phone itself as the “instrumentality of the crime” of attempted possession of a controlled substance, for purposes of “search incident to arrest” analysis, but cautions against broad searches of cell phones: “ “ Given the volume and diverse nature of data that may be contained in a cell phone or other mobile electronic data storage device, we think courts generally should, as one prominent commentator has put it, treat such a device ‘like a container that stores thousands of individual containers in the form of discrete files.’ Kerr, ‘Searches and Seizures in a Digital World,’ 119 Harv. L.Rev. 531, 555 (2005). Just because an officer has the authority to make a search of the data stored on a cell phone (that is, just because he has reason to ‘open’ the ‘container’) does not mean that he has the authority to sift through all of the data stored on the phone (that is, to open and view all of the sub-containers of data stored therein).” See further discussion under Search and Seizure – Searches – Search Incident to Arrest, below. WWWW. PROBABLE CAUSE Smith v. State, 265 Ga.App. 756, 596 S.E.2d 13 (February 6, 2004). During deliberations, jury sent note to court asking, “‘If there was no probable cause to pull him over can Count I be thrown out.’” In response, court charged jury that “‘the issue of probable cause is not for you to decide.’” This was a correct instruction, as “[t]he question of probable cause ‘had been resolved and ruled on in the motion to suppress hearing; in such a hearing, the judge sits as the trier of fact.’ [cit.]” XXXX. PROVOCATION Talmadge v. State, 287 Ga.App. 332, 651 S.E.2d 469 (August 22, 2007). In defendant’s prosecution for disorderly conduct (using fighting words), trial court erred “by excluding evidence of provocation,” specifically, “a history of contentious confrontations between [victim] Roberts and the Talmadge family. … [T]he trial court excluded evidence of