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not manifestly abuse its discretion in revoking Gaddis' probation. See Cheatwood v. State, 248 Ga.App. 617, 621(2) (548 S.E.2d 384) (2001).” 2. Judicial notice of other court rulings. “Gaddis claims that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of another superior court ruling that found the drug test in question to be of verifiable certainty. The claim is without merit. … ‘Once a procedure has been recognized in a substantial number of courts, a trial judge may judicially notice, without receiving evidence, that the procedure has been established with verifiable certainty, or that it rests upon the laws of nature,’” quoting Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 525-526(1) (292 S.E.2d 389) (1982). “Furthermore, contrary to Gaddis' claim, the trial court did not err in taking judicial notice of another court's ruling. “[I]f a trial court intends to take judicial notice of any fact, it must first announce its intention to do so on the record, and afford the parties an opportunity to be heard regarding whether judicial notice should be taken.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Mann v. State, 285 Ga.App. 39, 42 (645 S.E.2d 573) (2007). Here, the trial court did just that, announcing its intention to take judicial notice of the prior court ruling in question and giving the parties an opportunity to be heard on that issue.” Fortune v. State, 304 Ga.App. 294, 696 S.E.2d 120 (June 3, 2010). Defendant’s cocaine possession and trafficking convictions affirmed; trial court properly took judicial notice of “chemical field tests of suspected cocaine,” finding that the tests “are not novel, and have been widely accepted in Georgia courts.” Potter v. State, 301 Ga.App. 411, 687 S.E.2d 653 (December 3, 2009). Defendant’s convictions for vehicular homicide and related offenses affirmed. Trial court properly admitted expert testimony estimating defendant’s blood alcohol concentration based on his serum alcohol concentration. In this case of first impression in Georgia, Court of Appeals finds that method for converting from serum alcohol concentration to blood alcohol concentration has “reached a scientific stage of verifiable certainty,” despite defense expert’s testimony to the contrary. Stroud v. State, 286 Ga.App. 124, 648 S.E.2d 476 (June 25, 2007). Trial court was authorized to infer that drug report referring to “quantitation” of drug sample as “83.2%” was stating the purity of the sample, “[a]lthough the lab reports were less than explicit on the element of purity.” Vaughn v. State, 282 Ga. 99, 646 S.E.2d 212 (June 4, 2007). 1. Trial court properly admitted evidence of “the direct sequencing method of mtDNA [mitochondrial DNA] analysis used by the FBI Crime Lab” even in the presence of “trace amounts of heteroplasmy” – “the appearance of more than one type of mtDNA in a given individual.” “Although mtDNA analysis is more applicable for exclusionary, rather than identification, purposes, the overwhelming weight of authority demonstrates that mtDNA evidence is sufficiently reliable to be admissible. … Likewise, the evidence in this case shows, without dispute, that mtDNA analysis is based on sound scientific theory and will produce reliable results if proper procedures are followed. See Caldwell v. State, 260 Ga. 278, 286(1)(b) (393 S.E.2d 436) (1990) (nDNA) [nuclear DNA].” Disagreement over interpretation of test results by expert witnesses goes to the weight of the evidence, not admissibility. 2. “‘In light of the long-standing history of Harper and its progeny, which existed when the legislature enacted [the Daubert test in] OCGA § 24-9-67.1 as a part of Georgia’s Tort Reform Act, we do not conclude that the legislature intended to abandon the Harper evidentiary test in criminal cases. Indeed, the almost verbatim re-enactment of old OCGA § 24-9-67 as new OCGA § 24-9-67 would seem to affirm Georgia’s traditional reliance upon Harper in criminal matters, and we expressly hold that new OCGA § 24-9-67, and [neither Daubert nor] OCGA § 24-9-67.1 controls the admission of evidence in [criminal proceedings]. ’ Carlson v. State, 280 Ga.App. 595, 598(1) (634 S.E.2d 410) (2006).” Carlson v. State, 280 Ga.App. 595, 634 S.E.2d 410 (June 12, 2006). Daubert still does not apply to probation revocation hearings, although some cases call them “quasi-criminal.” Rochefort v. State, 279 Ga. 738, 620 S.E.2d 803 (October 11, 2005). “[Defendant] asserts that the State failed to prove that he violated OCGA § 16-13-30.3(b)(1), because only two of the tablets were tested. Although the expert actually conducted testing on only two of the 2,329 tablets that were seized, she testified that she visually examined the remainder and determined that they all had the same logo and appearance. Thus, she offered her expert opinion, ‘[w]ithin a reasonable scientific certainty ... that all of those tablets contain[ed] pseudoephedrine.’ This evidence supports the finding that [defendant] possessed more than 300 tablets containing pseudoephedrine. See Means v. State, 188 Ga.App. 210, 211(2), 372 S.E.2d 484 (1988) (discussing probity of random testing).” (Statute prohibits possession of more than 300 tablets of pseudoephedrine.) Accord, Simmons v. State , 299 Ga.App. 21, 681 S.E.2d 712 (July 13, 2009). Verlangieri v. State, 273 Ga.App. 585, 615 S.E.2d 633 (June 9, 2005). State Crime Lab tests were performed by trainee chemist, supervised by another chemist. At trial, the supervisor testified as to the method of testing and the results, and identified the official report; the trainee did not testify. Held, trial court properly admitted supervisor’s testimony.