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2. CO-DEFENDANTS Guyton v. State, 281 Ga. 789, 642 S.E.2d 67 (February 26, 2007). A defendant “has no grounds to complain” about similar transaction evidence admitted against a co-defendant which does not implicate defendant. “Preston has no grounds to complain because the similar transaction evidence did not implicate Preston. Moreover, when the evidence was admitted the trial court gave a proper limiting instruction concerning the jury’s ability to use the similar transaction evidence against Cooper only. See generally Murphy v. State, 270 Ga. 72 (508 S.E.2d 399 (1998).” 3. CONTINUOUS TRANSACTION Branton v. State, 292 Ga.App. 104, 663 S.E.2d 414 (June 19, 2008). No similar transaction notice required where offense was part of the res gestae of the offenses charged. Here, defendant was employed servicing ATMs; evidence showed a pattern of taking money from ATMs during a single week using defendant’s computerized key. A shortage of $6,000 in one machine was questioned, and defendant replaced the money. Company officials then audited defendant’s access to other machines, disclosing other, larger shortages – the subject of the charges against defendant. Held, the $6,000 shortage was not charged, but was properly admitted in evidence as part of the res gestae. Richard v. State, 287 Ga.App. 399, 651 S.E.2d 514 (September 4, 2007). At trial for armed robbery of store, trial court properly admitted evidence that the getaway car was stolen. “Appropriate purposes for admitting evidence of another crime include showing that the crimes were part of ‘“a system of mutually dependent crimes’” or that the same articles are connected with both offenses. Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 642(2)(b) n.2 (409 S.E.2d 649) (1991). Here, where the crimes occurred on the same day, the vehicle stolen in one incident was then used to commit later crimes, the same gun was used in both crimes, and in both instances Richard brandished the gun while Jones acted as ‘lookout,’ there was sufficient evidence that the crimes were introduced for the proper purpose of showing the defendants’ bent of mind or course of conduct, rather than to demonstrate their bad character. See Carero v. State, 277 Ga. 867, 869(1) (596 S.E.2d 619) (2004); Gay v. State, 258 Ga.App. 854, 855-856(1) (575 S.E.2d 740) (2002).” Cartledge v. State, 285 Ga.App. 145, 645 S.E.2d 633 (April 18, 2007). Evidence of others in a series of robberies, for which defendant was not indicted, was admissible as res gestae. “It is well-settled that ‘surrounding circumstances constituting part of the res gestae may always be shown to the jury along with the principal fact. Hence, acts and circumstances forming a part or continuation of the main transaction are admissible as res gestae and it does not matter that the act is another criminal offense and does not tend to establish the main offense.’ (Punctuation omitted.) White v. State, 265 Ga.App. 302, 304-305(2) (596 S.E.2d 9) (2003).” Wesson v. State, 279 Ga.App. 428, 631 S.E.2d 451 (May 16, 2006). “At trial, the State, over Wesson’s objection, proffered Laurie Williams as a witness. Williams, who along with several others was arrested at Wesson’s residence the same day as Wesson, testified that it was general knowledge that Wesson and his son engaged in the manufacture of methamphetamine. Wesson argues that this testimony constituted evidence of other crimes and that the trial court erred by not conducting a hearing pursuant to Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3 to determine if the evidence was being offered for appropriate purposes. We disagree. Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3(E) provides in part: ‘Nothing in this rule is intended to prohibit the state from introducing evidence of similar transactions or occurrences which are ... immediately related in time and place to the charge being tried, as part of a single, continuous transaction.’ Indeed, ‘the State is entitled to present evidence of the entire res gestae and such evidence is not rendered inadmissible despite the fact that the character of the accused is incidentally implicated.’ Jones v. State, 236 Ga.App. 330, 334(3) (511 S.E.2d 883) (1999). Here, Williams’s testimony regarding her knowledge of Wesson’s involvement in the manufacturing of methamphetamine was not evidence of a separate crime but rather constituted evidence of a continuous transaction. See Herndon v. State, 253 Ga.App. 543, 546(2) (559 S.E.2d 749) (2002); Jones, supra, 236 Ga.App. at 334(3). Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3 therefore does not apply. See Herndon, 253 Ga.App. at 547(2); Jones, supra, 236 Ga.App. at 334(3). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in allowing the State to proffer Williams’s testimony regarding Wesson’s involvement in the manufacturing of methamphetamine.” Jones v. State, 239 Ga.App. 614, 521 S.E.2d 614 (August 10, 1999). At defendant’s trial for methamphetamine trafficking, alleged to occur on December 8, 1994, no error in admitting testimony of witness who claimed to purchase meth from defendant on prior day; first, because the date was not an essential averment of the indictment, proof of the offense the prior day was proof of the offense charged; second because the evidence impeached defendant’s testimony that he was unaware of the substance found in his garage. For both reasons, the evidence was not “similar transaction” evidence requiring prior notice and hearing.