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probative value the alleged crimes may have in a prosecution for a current crime. It must be noted, however, that neither Gilstrap nor Slakman creates a bright-line rule that similar transactions more than 30 years old are automatically inadmissible. The determination of the admissibility of similar transaction evidence requires a balancing of probative value and prejudice which is individualized to the facts of each specific case.” Also, both Gilstrap and Slakman involved similar transactions that were not themselves prosecuted. While the similar transaction in this case also was not prosecuted, “we find that, based on the record in this case, the trial court did not abuse it discretion in its determination that the allegation of child abuse that occurred 26 years in the past, due to its similarity to the present crime and its probative value to show the defendant's unique bent of mind, was admissible as similar transaction evidence.” Accord, Phillips v. State , 287 Ga. 560, 697 S.E.2d 818 (July 12, 2010) (18-year lapse in time between armed robberies not too remote); Lacey v. State , 288 Ga. 341, 703 S.E.2d 617 (November 8, 2010) (Murder and related convictions affirmed; prior shooting was properly admitted as similar transaction though committed 13 years earlier); Pendley v. State , 308 Ga.App. 821, 709 S.E.2d 18 (March 25, 2011) (in child molestation prosecution, prior molestations 11 and 30 years earlier not too remote, citing Pareja ); Dean v. State , 321 Ga.App. 731, 742 S.E.2d 758 (May 7, 2013) (prior molestations, approximately 18 years earlier, when defendant was 14, not too remote). Boileau v. State, 285 Ga.App. 221, 645 S.E.2d 577 (April 12, 2007). Lapse of 14 years did not make similar transaction (oral sodomy of child) inadmissible. Buckholts v. State, 283 Ga.App. 254, 641 S.E.2d 246 (January 11, 2007). “‘Mere lapse of time between the commission of any prior similar crimes and the commission of the offenses currently at trial does not render the evidence automatically inadmissible. Rather, lapse of time is a factor to be taken into consideration when balancing the probative value of the evidence against its potentially prejudicial impact. Ledford v. State, 275 Ga.App. 107, 110 (620 S.E.2d 187) (2005) (citation omitted); compare Gilstrap v. State, 261 Ga. 798, 799(1)(b) (410 S.E.2d 423) (1991) (incident 31 years in the past was too remote).” Here, 17 years between cocaine distributing offenses was not too remote. Hinton v. State, 280 Ga. 811, 631 S.E.2d 365 (June 12, 2006). Lapse of 17 years between attacks on women did not preclude use of earlier incident as a similar transaction, especially where defendant spent most of that time in federal prison. Accord, Ellis v. State , 282 Ga.App. 17, 637 S.E.2d 729 (October 2, 2006) (lapse of 15 years between burglaries not significant where defendant was only out of jail about a year between offenses ); Wallace v. State , 295 Ga.App. 452, 671 S.E.2d 911 (January 6, 2009) (evidence of similar robbery not too remote where defendant spent more than seven of the intervening eight years in prison ); Ledford v. State , 289 Ga. 70, 709 S.E.2d 239 (March 25, 2011) (most of 15 year gap between murder/sexual assault on trial, and prior rape admitted as similar transaction, “is explained by Ledford's ten-year incarceration for the rape.”); Thomas v. State , 290 Ga. 653, 723 S.E.2d 885 (March 5, 2012) (defendant was incarcerated for ten of twelve years between armed robberies); Farley v. State , 317 Ga.App. 628, 732 S.E.2d 131 (September 14, 2012) (sixteen years between offenses, but defendant was incarcerated for thirteen of those years). Johnson v. State, 275 Ga.App. 21, 619 S.E.2d 731 (August 8, 2005). In defendant’s burglary prosecution, evidence of burglary committed 14 years earlier was not too remote. Accord, Henderson v. State , 300 Ga.App. 478, 685 S.E.2d 454 (October 15, 2009) (burglaries 10 years apart not too remote, especially where defendant served time in prison between offenses). Moody v. State, 273 Ga.App. 670, 615 S.E.2d 803 (June 15, 2005). “While one of the previous [DUI] convictions occurred almost fifteen years earlier, it was the most similar, as Moody’s intoxication in that case was also discovered after he was stopped for speeding. The lapse of time was not sufficient to render this previous DUI inadmissible; instead, it went to the weight of the evidence. See Scott v. State, 240 Ga.App. 586, 588(2) (524 S.E.2d 287) (1999); Hill v. State, 230 Ga.App. 89, 90 (495 S.E.2d 333) (1998).” Swanson v. State, 269 Ga.App. 826, 605 S.E.2d 425 (October 1, 2004). Not error to admit evidence of 1973 rape at 1997 rape trial. “[T]he lapse of time generally goes to the weight and credibility of the evidence, not to its admissibility. [Cits.] This is especially true where the accused spent part of the interval incarcerated,” citing Mullins v. State , 269 Ga. 157, 496 S.E.2d 252 (1998). Accord, Nelson v. State , 242 Ga.App. 63, 528 S.E.2d 844 (January 25, 2000) (eleven years between armed robberies included unspecified time in incarceration); Zellars v. State , 278 Ga. 481, 604 S.E.2d 147 (October 12, 2004) (remoteness of prior offense mitigated where defendant spent seven of the twelve intervening years in prison); Cline v. State , 300 Ga.App. 615, 685 S.E.2d 501 (October 27, 2009) (eight of twenty years between molestation offenses spent in prison); Hight v. State , 302 Ga.App. 826, 692 S.E.2d 69 (March 12, 2010) (defendant incarcerated for 11 of 18 years between burglaries); Henderson v. State , 303 Ga.App. 527, 693 S.E.2d 896 (April 7, 2010) (ten years between