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rather than a knife did not render that incident inadmissible. See generally Lloyd v. State, 226 Ga.App. 401(3) (487 S.E.2d 44) (1997) (similar transaction evidence admissible despite difference in weapon used during prior act).” Accord, Phillips v. State , 287 Ga. 560, 697 S.E.2d 818 (July 12, 2010). Holmes v. State, 271 Ga.App. 122, 608 S.E.2d 726 (December 16, 2004). Defendant was charged with aggravated assault for firing a gun at someone. Trial court erred in admitting, as a similar transaction, evidence of defendant “making verbal threats toward deputies in a parking lot.” Harmless error, however, given “substantial evidence of Holmes’ guilt, including eyewitness testimony.” Talley v. State, 269 Ga.App. 712, 605 S.E.2d 108 (September 23, 2004). “‘We point out that in cases of domestic violence, prior incidents of abuse against sexual partners are generally more permitted because there is a logical connection between violent acts against different persons with whom the accused had a similar emotional or intimate attachment. Prior acts can show the accused’s attitude or mindset (i.e., his bent of mind) as to how sexual partners should be treated. Prior acts can also show an accused’s course of conduct in reacting to disappointment or anger in such a relationship, evidencing a pattern. As we noted in Smith [ v. State, 232 Ga.App. 290, 295(1) (501 S.E.2d 523) (1998)], domestic violence usually occurs in the privacy of the home and is often difficult to prove. The relevance of the similar transaction evidence in this case, along with the trial court’s appropriate limiting instruction regarding the purpose of the evidence, outweighed its prejudicial impact. Woods v. State, 250 Ga.App. 164, 166(a) (550 S.E.2d 730) (2001).” McGuire v. State, 266 Ga.App. 673, 598 S.E.2d 55 (March 30, 2004). Prior offenses were sufficiently similar in that, like the present charge, they “involved attacks against adult women, who were either beaten, or threatened during a sexual assault or attempted sexual assault,” although prior offenses involved armed assaults against strangers, unlike this unarmed assault against an acquaintance. “‘The proper focus in on the similarity, not the difference, between the separate crimes and the crime in question,’ Wayne v. State , 269 Ga. 36, 39 (495 S.E.2d 34) (1998).” Collier v. State, 266 Ga.App. 345, 596 S.E.2d 795 (March 18, 2004). Despite certain dissimilarities, trial court did not err in admitting as similar transactions defendant’s other prior bar fights, which all happened at night with defendant assaulting unarmed male victims sometimes with a weapon, then hiding the weapon. Logan v. State, 265 Ga.App. 134, 593 S.E.2d 14 (December 11, 2003). In defendant’s prosecution for aggravated assault on a police officer, evidence that defendant “ran out of the trailer with guns six months earlier…. was relevant evidence that Logan ‘owned or had in his possession weapons with which the crime was or might have been committed prior to ... the commission of the crime.[Cits.] It also explained the police conduct in stationing officers at the back door. Whether it was criminal conduct is of no import.” Note, evidence to explain police conduct is not usually relevant. Davis v. State, 244 Ga.App. 708, 536 S.E.2d 596 (June 29, 2000). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted similar transaction evidence: “the prior offense was the unprovoked use of a firearm to threaten a driver who disagreed with Davis's taking of a parking space. This showed Davis's propensity to settle disagreements with a gun, to act violently and impulsively to disappointment or misunderstanding, and to resort to the use of a gun with little provocation. Regarding the present charges, this helped prove bent of mind and course of conduct, for the incident at hand involved Davis's threat and use of a firearm to intimidate and punish a person reluctant to comply with his robbery demand.” Griffin v. State, 241 Ga.App. 783, 527 S.E.2d 577 (December 30, 1999). Convictions for aggravated assault and related offenses affirmed; similar transactions were properly admitted. “All three incidents occurred in broad daylight with witnesses present. All three incidents occurred without immediate provocation, when the victims were not expecting an attack. All three incidents resulted from Griffin's anger. … Each incident showed Griffin's temper and his propensity to settle his disputes with a gun. See Willis v. State, 214 Ga.App. 479, 480(3)(a), 448 S.E.2d 223 (1994). In addition, ‘“[s]ince appellant claimed self-defense, evidence of previous unprovoked attacks was relevant to show malice, intent, motive, and bent of mind.” [Cit.]’ Farley v. State, 265 Ga. 622, 624, 458 S.E.2d 643 (1995).” Accord, Hickson v. State , 308 Ga.App. 50, 706 S.E.2d 670 (February 2, 2011) (in murder prosecution, prior incidents where defendant pulled a gun on little or no provocation properly admitted); Evans v. State , 288 Ga. 571, 707 S.E.2d 353 (February 7, 2011) (Murder and related convictions affirmed; prior aggravated assault was sufficiently similar to murder at issue: in both cases, “Evans used a handgun, committed the offenses with little or no provocation, fled the scene, and attempted to cause serious injury or death in the same immediate location.”).