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managed a pizza restaurant; victim was a 15-year old female employee. “[Similar transaction witness] Atkins’ testimony of unwelcome touching at work, including incidents of grabbing similar to the charged crime, is highly probative of defendant's general attitude toward his female employees, and is relevant to prove that the charged crime occurred as E.T. testified. Atkins' testimony also rebuts the possibility of an unintended offense. [Similar transaction witness] K.T.'s testimony of Haska's sexual innuendo also is probative of a pattern of inappropriate conduct directed at young female employees. The trial court correctly admitted evidence as to these extrinsic acts.” Goodroe v. State, 238 Ga.App. 66, 518 S.E.2d 139 (May 12, 1999). Prior rape, more than 10 years prior, was properly admitted. “The State offered the similar transaction evidence to show Goodroe's lustful disposition and bent of mind, among other purposes. It is well settled, particularly in cases involving sexual offenses, that similar transactions may be admitted for these purposes. See, e.g., Culver v. State, 230 Ga.App. 224, 229(3), 496 S.E.2d 292 (1998) (lustful disposition); Brooks v. State, 230 Ga.App. 846, 847, 498 S.E.2d 139 (1998) (bent of mind).” Accord, Mills v. State , 319 Ga.App. 131, 735 S.E.2d 134 (November 30, 2012) (lustful disposition). Sweet v. State, 237 Ga.App. 613, 516 S.E.2d 317 (April 12, 1999). Prior acts of child molestation committed ten years and approximately 30 years earlier were not too remote to be relevant to defendant’s “bent of mind, lustful disposition, scheme and motive or intent” in his current prosecution for child molestation. Accord, Collins v. State , 310 Ga.App. 613, 714 S.E.2d 249 (July 7, 2011) (prior molestation 13 years earlier not too remote). Arnold v. State, 236 Ga.App. 380, 511 S.E.2d 219 (January 27, 1999). In defendant’s prosecution for child molestation, trial court properly admitted evidence of all acts committed during the molestation, not just those described in the indictment. “These acts were not similar transactions, but were part of the res gestae of the charged crimes, and as such, no prior notice was necessary. ‘The state is entitled to present evidence of the entire res gestae of the crime. Even though a defendant is not charged with every crime committed during a criminal transaction, every aspect of it relevant to the crime charged may be presented at trial. This is true even if the defendant’s character is incidentally placed in issue.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Branam v. State, 204 Ga.App. 205, 208(5), 419 S.E.2d 86 (1992); see also Bowman v. State, 184 Ga.App. 197-198(2), 361 S.E.2d 58 (1987).” This is true even though the evidence did not specify that that acts occurred at the same time as those charged: “A reasonable inference from the testimony was that these acts occurred at the same time as the charged offenses.” Accord, Parker v. State , 283 Ga.App. 714, 642 S.E.2d 111 (January 18, 2007). 43. SIMILARITY OF OFFENSES -- STALKING Crenshaw v. State, 237 Ga.App. 511, 515 S.E.2d 642 (April 6, 1999). At defendant’s stalking trial, testimony of other women defendant had also followed and touched inappropriately was properly admitted. “The demonstration of a similar course of conduct is a proper purpose for the admission of similar transaction evidence. See, e.g., Norris v. State, 230 Ga.App. 492, 493(1), 496 S.E.2d 781 (1998).” 44. SIMILARITY OF OFFENSES -- THEFT OFFENSES Evans v. State, 328 Ga.App. 16, 761 S.E.2d 443 (July 8, 2014). Entering an auto and related convictions affirmed; trial court properly admitted similar transaction evidence. “Notably, the similar transactions involved crimes that were almost identical to the crimes in this case— the breaking of car windows in parking lots, and the theft of a briefcase, laptop or other items from those cars. Accordingly, there is no evidence to dictate that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the similar transactions.” One included the same co-defendant as this case. Hopkins v. State, 309 Ga.App. 298, 709 S.E.2d 873 (March 29, 2011). Shoplifting conviction affirmed; trial court properly admitted similar transaction evidence of prior burglary conviction, which was more than 10 years old. As defendant’s defense was lack of intent to steal the wire, “Hopkins's credibility as to his intent was highly relevant to the jury's decision. See Cobb v. State, 302 Ga.App. 821, 825(3), 692 S.E.2d 65 (2010). Observing that both the charged offense and the burglary offense for which Hopkins was previously convicted involved intent to commit a theft, [fn: See OCGA § 16–7–1(a) (providing pertinently that burglary involves entering or remaining in a dwelling house of another or building without authority and with the intent to commit a felony or theft therein). ] the court found that Hopkins's burglary conviction had sufficient probative value for the purpose of impeachment on whether Hopkins intended to commit the charged theft, and that the probative value of the burglary conviction substantially outweighed its prejudicial effect. Under the circumstances, Hopkins has failed to show that the court abused its discretion in admitting the prior conviction. See Treadwell [ v. State, 285 Ga. 736, 743, 684 S.E.2d 244 (2009)]; Love v. State, 302 Ga.App. 106, 109– 110(2), 690 S.E.2d 246 (2010); Tate [ v. State, 289 Ga.App. 479, 481, 657 S.E.2d 531 (2008)].”