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discussed therein. Re-affirms the objective test set forth in McAllister v. State, 270 Ga. 224(1) (507 S.E.2d 448) (1998): “A person is considered to be in custody and Miranda warnings are required when a person is (1) formally arrested or (2) restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Unless a reasonable person in the suspect's situation would perceive that he was in custody, Miranda warnings are not necessary.” Remanded to apply correct test. For application, see Folsom (November 2, 2009), above. Axelburg v. State, 294 Ga.App. 612, 669 S.E.2d 439 (October 31, 2008). Trial court properly found that interrogation was non-custodial: “Axelburg's interrogation took place in an unlocked interview room at the sheriff's office, which Axelburg described as ‘real small, about ... 10 x 10’ feet. The interrogating officer was joined by a second officer who sat in a chair ‘right next to the door, or against the door.’ Axelburg believed that the second officer had a gun. The officer told Axelburg that the door was unlocked and that he was free to leave if at any point in the interview he did not like what was being asked. Axelburg responded that he understood. He did not attempt to leave during the interview.” “We … find no merit in Axelburg's argument that the officer's clearly articulated belief that he was guilty rendered him in custody for Miranda purposes. See [ Hardin v. State, 261 Ga. 1, 3(2) (494 S.E.2d 647) (1998)]; Hendrix v. State, 230 Ga.App. 604, 605 (497 S.E.2d 236) (1997). ‘Even a clear statement from an officer that the person under interrogation is a prime suspect is not, in and of itself, dispositive of the custody issue,’ but merely is a factor in determining ‘how a reasonable person would perceive his or her freedom to leave.’ Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325(II) (114 S.Ct 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293) (1994).” Citing Harmon (August 10, 2006), Bell (April 25, 2006) and Parks (May 20, 2005), all below. Distinguishing Pye (October 29, 2007), below. Accord, Rowe v. State , 302 Ga.App. 239, 690 S.E.2d 884 (February 8, 2010); Dunson (May 5, 2011), above. Dean v. State, 292 Ga.App. 695, 665 S.E.2d 406 (July 11, 2008). Trial court could find that defendant was not in custody while giving statement. “Here, the questioning took place at the OSI building on Robins Air Force Base. The detective contacted the base to facilitate questioning Dean out of customary practice when dealing with crimes involving airmen, and also because another airman, the accomplice, had been arrested for the robbery and an OSI agent had been assigned to the case. While Dean responded to a general order from his sergeant to go to the OSI building, this request was made by Air Force personnel, not by the police officers. Any lack of discretion as to whether Dean was free to disregard the order resulted from his position in the military, not from anything the police may have done. Moreover, when Dean was interviewed, only he and the detective were present; no military officials were in the room. Additionally, there is no evidence that the detective limited Dean's right to terminate the questioning and leave at any point. At the time of the first interview, the detective did not suspect Dean. The record contains no indication that Dean ‘informed the officers that he wanted the interview to end, that he wished to speak with counsel, or that he wished to leave the station. After [he] made his statements, he was [was free to leave].’ Robinson v. State, 278 Ga. 836, 837-838(2) (607 S.E.2d 559) (2005). Under this evidence, Dean was not in custody for purposes of Miranda. ” Sewell v. State, 283 Ga. 558, 662 S.E.2d 537 (June 2, 2008). Majority of Supreme Court finds that trial court’s ruling that defendant was not in custody when he made statement was not clearly erroneous. “Although Sewell was transported to the police station in a car which had a security screen between the front and back passenger seats, and a pat-down search for officer safety was performed before he entered the car, these actions do not mandate a finding that he was in custody. See Scott v. State, 281 Ga. 373, 375-376(2) (637 S.E.2d 652) (2006). At no time was Sewell handcuffed, his mother, grandmother, and step-grandfather were present during the interview, and the door to the detectives’ work area in the police station was not locked in any way that impeded exit. [fn: See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938) (2004) (the fact that the police did not transport a defendant to the station or require him to appear is a factor that weighs in favor of a finding that a finding that the defendant was not in custody). ] The detective who conducted the interview had no information regarding any prior admission on Sewell’s part, and there is no evidence that Sewell was aware that his step-grandfather had informed a responding police officer that he had admitted shooting Moore. The trial court did not err in ruling that a reasonable person in Sewell’s position would not perceive himself to be in police custody when he orally confessed to shooting Moore.” Sears, Hunstein, Carley disagree on this point, would find defendant in custody based on defendant’s prior confession to family, family’s call to police, and fact that defendant was transported in secure police vehicle. Ramirez v. State, 288 Ga.App. 249, 653 S.E.2d 837 (November 6, 2007). Involuntary manslaughter and related convictions affirmed; defendant’s statement wasn’t result of custodial interrogation. “The record reveals that Ramirez had submitted to previous interviews with law enforcement and went home after each interview. Upon the request of officers, she agreed to a polygraph examination. After Ramirez failed the polygraph examination, she began to confess her involvement in the death of the victim to the polygrapher.” “In this case, Ramirez was not in custody at the time she took