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standards’); Morrow v. State, 272 Ga. 691, 692, 532 S.E.2d 78 (2000) (explaining that an under-representation of less than ten percentage points is ‘usually constitutional’ and that a statutory violation exists only where there is ‘a wide absolute disparity’).” 2. No reversal where traverse jury list “included no persons under the age of 20. This does appear anomalous, and the record does not explain how it came about; if it appears that this situation has continued, the DeKalb County jury commission should examine it. Nevertheless, this claim does not require reversal, because Ellington made no effort to prove that persons under 20 years old were a cognizable group in DeKalb County at the time of his trial. See Jackson v. State, 270 Ga. 494, 497, 512 S.E.2d 241 (1999) (‘Whether an age group is a cognizable group depends on the time and location of the trial.’).” Bryant v. State, 288 Ga. 876, 708 S.E.2d 362 (March 18, 2011). Capital murder conviction affirmed (but sentence reversed); trial court properly denied challenge to make-up of grand jury. Defendant contended “that African-American persons who were age 55 years old or older and Hispanic persons were under-represented in the composition of the grand jury pool in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and OCGA § 15-12-40 as a result of the county's forced balancing system.” But “Bryant presented no evidence that African-American persons who were age 55 years or older comprise a separate cognizable group in Douglas County.” As to Hispanics, defendant complains that Hispanics were excluded from the grand jury pool because Douglas County uses three racial divisions – black, white, and other – and no one from the “other” list was included in the grand jury pool. However, “Bryant's expert testified at a pretrial hearing that the term ‘Hispanic’ is not a racial designation but, instead, usually refers to national origin, as is the case in the Census report. As a result, Hispanic persons would not only be represented in the ‘Other’ racial group as Bryant contends. Indeed, Bryant's expert also testified that there “absolutely” would be Hispanics on the master grand jury list who were designated as being in one of the race categories (i.e. ‘Black,’ ‘White,’ and ‘Other’), as long as there had been no deliberate effort to screen such persons out, and Bryant failed to show that such an effort was made. Bryant presented no evidence regarding the actual percentage of Hispanic persons on the master grand jury source list. Because Bryant failed to show any actual under-representation of Hispanic persons, his claim here fails. See Rice [ v. State, 281 Ga. 149, 149(1) (635 S.E.2d 707) (2006)].” See note on Rice (October 16, 2006), below . Worthy v. State, 307 Ga.App. 297, 704 S.E.2d 808 (November 4, 2010). 1. Indictment for false imprisonment, aggravated assault, and related offenses wasn’t invalid for overrepresentation of African-Americans on grand jury list. “Assuming, arguendo, that the laws pertaining to under-representation of distinctive groups on jury lists also apply to the over- representation of such groups, Worthy's argument is still without merit. The absolute disparity in over- representation on the grand jury list of 6.429 percent of African-Americans falls within a range that generally meets constitutional requirements. See Edwards v. State, 281 Ga. 108, 109 (636 S.E.2d 508) (2006) (trial court correctly found that under-representation of cognizable group by 6.04 percent is generally not unconstitutional); Cook v. State, 255 Ga. 565, 571(11) (340 S.E.2d 843) (1986).” “Notably, Worthy's asserted error states that the indictment was invalid because the grand jury list was over -represented by African-Americans. It does not include a complaint of the under-representation of any group, though Worthy mentions in the argument section of his brief that Caucasians were under-represented in the pool by 4.839 percent. [fn] It is clear from his enumeration of error and arguments in support thereof that Worthy's claim of error was not based on under-representation of Caucasians. Even if it had been, such an argument presents no basis for reversal because an absolute disparity of less than five percent is almost always constitutional,[fn] and Worthy has shown no reason why this general rule should not apply in his case.” 2. Unified Appeal Procedure, requiring “that the difference between [a cognizable] group's representation on the grand jury list and its population in the county must be less than five percent, … applies only in cases where the death penalty is sought . See OCGA § 17-10-36; Sliger v. State, 248 Ga. 316, 321(6) (282 S.E.2d 291) (1981).” Foster v. State, 288 Ga. 98, 701 S.E.2d 189 (November 1, 2010). Convictions for malice murder and related offenses affirmed; no merit to challenge to jury list based on fact that board of jury commissioners “was comprised of only five members, rather than six members as directed by OCGA § 15-12-20. However, this circumstance does not rise to ‘such disregard of the essential and substantial provisions of the statute as would vitiate the arrays.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted) Pope v. State, 256 Ga. 195, 197(1)(c) (345 S.E.2d 831) (1986), overruled on other grounds by Nash v. State, 271 Ga. 281 (519 S.E.2d 893) (1999). See also Sealey v. State, 277 Ga. 617, 619(2) (593 S.E.2d 335) (2004). To the extent that Foster argues that the failure to have the commission composed of six members as called for by OCGA § 15-12-20 constitutes a violation of the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments, he fails to show that the five-member jury commission established a jury source list that did not represent a fair cross-section of the community, or that the list was the product of intentional discrimination. See generally Al-Amin v. State, 278 Ga. 74, 80(7) (597 S.E.2d 332) (2004).”