☢ test - Í

464 S.E.2d 910 (1995) (physical precedent only); Blair v. State, 267 Ga. 166, 166, 476 S.E.2d 263 (1996); and Turner v. State, 267 Ga. 149, 151, 476 S.E.2d 252 (1996). “[T]o carry the burden of production at step two, the proponent of the strike need not offer an explanation that is ‘concrete,’ ‘tangible,’ or ‘specific.’ The explanation need not even be ‘case- related.’ The explanation for the strike only needs to be facially race-neutral. … We emphasize, however, that case- relatedness, specificity, and similar considerations remain relevant to a Batson challenge. … The trial court may conclude that a vague explanation, or one that is in no way case-related, signals an unwillingness by the proponent to provide the real reason for the strike. And the ‘proffer of [a] pretextual explanation naturally gives rise to an inference of discriminatory intent.’ [ Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 485, 128 S.Ct. 1203, 170 L.Ed.2d 175 (2008)]. ‘“At [the third] stage, implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.”’ Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Purkett [ v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995)]).” Benham concurs specially, would not disapprove the statements from other cases, but would set a higher standard than that mandated by the U.S. Supreme Court. 2. Explanation could be accepted though trial court helped prosecutor formulate the explanation. When counsel explained that the strike was based on “just a feeling” that the juror “was perhaps more sympathetic to the defense,” the court asked if the conclusion was based on “body language, facial expressions.” The prosecutor agreed. Supreme Court discourages trial courts from helping counsel formulate the reasons for their strikes, but finds that it doesn’t require that the reasons be disregarded, disapproving contrary language in Walton v. State, 267 Ga. 713, 482 S.E.2d 330 (1997). Jackson v. State, 291 Ga. 25, 727 S.E.2d 120 (April 24, 2012). Felony murder and related convictions affirmed; no Batson violation where State “explained that it struck Juror 24 because he ‘was somewhat combative [and] reluctant to answer the [State's] questions.’” Craft v. State, 309 Ga.App. 698, 710 S.E.2d 891 (May 31, 2011). Aggravated assault and related offenses affirmed; 1. fact that juror “had been ‘slumped down in his chair’ during voir dire and ‘seemed disinterested in what was going on’ … was a race-neutral explanation for exercising the strike.” “[T]he court was not required to make a finding on the juror's actual disinterest; it was required to determine, considering the totality of the circumstances, whether Craft had shown that the state was motivated by discriminatory intent in the exercise of the strike.” 2. “ That the court reinstated another juror, against whom the state used a peremptory strike for a different reason, [fn] does not demand a different result. See Kimble v. State, 301 Ga.App. 237, 247(6) (687 S.E.2d 242) (2009).” Bryant v. State, 309 Ga.App. 649, 710 S.E.2d 854 (May 23, 2011). Aggravated assault and related convictions affirmed; strike of juror “because she was evasive when questioned on voir dire and ‘did not seem to want to talk to either of us’” was race-neutral. Allen v. State, 299 Ga.App. 201, 683 S.E.2d 343 (July 15, 2009). Strikes were race neutral: “As to the fourth juror, the State explained that the 21-year-old juror was young and also inattentive ; Allen did not dispute this nor make a further showing. See Robert v. State, 227 Ga.App. 26, 488 S.E.2d 105 (1997) (age can be a race-neutral reason for striking a juror); Jackson v. State, 220 Ga.App. 98, 99, 469 S.E.2d 264 (1996). Accord, Washington v. State , 310 Ga.App. 775, 714 S.E.2d 364 (July 13, 2011) (inattentiveness of potential juror is a race-neutral reason). Blackshear v. State, 285 Ga. 619, 680 S.E.2d 850 (June 29, 2009). State’s strikes were race-neutral. The last prospective juror was struck because she made clear to the State that she ‘did not want to be [t]here.’ Each of these reasons has been held to be a race-neutral explanation and by offering no other evidence, [defendant] failed to establish ‘that the reasons given by the State were merely pretexts for purposeful racial discrimination. [Cit.]’ Dukes v. State, 273 Ga. 890(2) (548 S.E.2d 328) (2001) (juror's inclination to avoid jury service raised sufficient questions about her willingness to fully and impartially participate in proceedings). Henley v. State, 285 Ga. 500, 678 S.E.2d 884 (June 8, 2009). No Batson violation: 1. Juror “appeared to be nodding off or even sleeping during parts of voir dire, was not well educated, restricted her reading material to a single book, the Bible, and seemed to lack a broad sense of what was going on in society.” 2. Juror “closed his eyes and started talking to himself silently but conspicuously for a significant period of time while the juror next to him was standing up being questioned in voir dire. Given Juror 23's vocation as a pastor, the prosecutor assumed he was praying. She explained that the State did not object to prayer, certainly, but that this juror's conduct seemed out of place in the particular context of voir dire of a potential juror who was standing right next to him and being actively questioned.” Overton v. State, 295 Ga.App. 223, 671 S.E.2d 507 (November 26, 2008). RICO and related convictions affirmed. “[A]