☢ test - Í

Scott v. State, 240 Ga.App. 50, 522 S.E.2d 535 (September 14, 1999). Juror 16, the only widow on the panel, was struck because, in the prosecutor's experience, widows ‘seem to be more sympathetic’ to defendants. See Kirksey v. State, 195 Ga.App. 379, 380(1), 393 S.E.2d 508 (1990). Hinson v. State, 237 Ga.App. 366, 515 S.E.2d 203 (March 30, 1999). Trial court properly re-seated juror, finding that counsel’s stated reason for strike was pretextual. Counsel stated strike was because juror was a housewife. “[The trial court ruled that since juror no. 15] has worked for 13 years [outside the home] she has [not] been a homemaker her entire life.... and put her back on the jury. Given counsel’s factual inaccuracy (as opposed to lack of knowledge) regarding this juror’s life experiences underlying defendant’s stated racially neutral reason, the trial court was authorized to conclude that stated reason was pretextual.” 16. STRIKES BASED ON NATIONAL/GEOGRAPHICAL ORIGIN Minor v. State, 328 Ga.App. 128, 761 S.E.2d 538 (July 10, 2014). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; State’s strike was race neutral. “The prosecutor explained that he struck Juror No. 16 because she was not from Georgia and she had been unemployed for five years.” Rose v. State, 287 Ga. 238, 695 S.E.2d 261 (June 1, 2010). Defendant’s murder and related convictions affirmed; trial court could find defense counsel’s explanation for striking juror not to be race-neutral. “[T]he trial court did not clearly err by rejecting as pretextual defense counsel's rationale of striking a juror from Texas because she wanted a geographically or culturally diverse jury.” “We assume, without deciding in this case, that geographical and cultural diversity are facially race-neutral reasons for a jury strike. However, as to explanations for juror strikes based on ‘cultural, geographic, or linguistic classifications,’ we agree with the Supreme Court of Louisiana that careful scrutiny is necessary ‘because of the ease with which such classifications may serve as a proxy for an impermissible classification.’ Louisiana v. Hobley, 752 S2d 771, 783 (La., 1999).” Trial court here was entitled to make credibility assessment of counsel’s rationale, which was vague and contradictory, especially given that counsel used all available strikes against white jurors. Nelson v. State, 289 Ga.App. 326, 657 S.E.2d 263 (January 25, 2008). “ Batson has not been extended to strikes based on national origin .” 17. STRIKES BASED ON OCCUPATION, PROFESSION, EMPLOYMENT STATUS Henderson v. State, 320 Ga.App. 553, 740 S.E.2d 280 (March 20, 2013). Convictions for sexual exploitation of children affirmed; no error in granting State’s Batson challenge to defense strike. Counsel said he struck juror because “I thought I recognized [L.C.] as being a former bailiff here at the [c]ourt. And I struck her because bailiffs see everything and hear everything.” “We agree that Henderson's explanation of his basis for striking L .C. was facially gender-neutral , and therefore, Henderson satisfied the second prong of the Batson analysis. See Toomer [ v. State, 292 Ga. 49, 54-55(2)(b) (734 S.E.2d 333) (2012)]; Sheets [ v. State, 244 Ga.App. 305-306(1) (535 S.E.2d 312) (2000)]. But, ‘although a trial judge must accept a facially [gender]-neutral explanation for purposes of determining whether the proponent has satisfied his burden of production at stage two, this does not mean that the judge is bound to believe such explanation at stage three.’ (Punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Brown v. State, 307 Ga.App. 797, 800(1) (706 S.E.2d 170) (2011). ‘The trial court observed first-hand ... [trial counsel's] demeanor as he explained the reasons for the peremptory strikes before finding, at step three of the Batson analysis,’ that the State established discriminatory intent on the part of trial counsel in striking [juror]. Toomer, 292 Ga. at 57–58(2)(d).” Washington v. State, 310 Ga.App. 775, 714 S.E.2d 364 (July 13, 2011). State’s strikes were race neutral. State struck a potential juror who had “fewer ties to the community due to working outside the county.” Juror also had a criminal history. See Minor v. State , 264 Ga. 195, 198(5), 442 S.E.2d 754 (1994) (regarding juror’s perceived lack of connections to the community). Bell v. State, 306 Ga.App. 853, 703 S.E.2d 680 (October 26, 2010). Burglary conviction affirmed; strike of juror who worked as a supervisor at the local Air Force base was race-neutral and credible. Bryant v. State, 304 Ga.App. 456, 696 S.E.2d 439 (June 17, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for rape, aggravated assault, and nine counts of burglary affirmed; trial court properly ruled that State’s strike of juror was race neutral based on her employment as a teacher. Dixon v. State, 303 Ga.App. 517, 693 S.E.2d 900 (April 7, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for kidnapping with injury,