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court properly denied defendant’s Batson challenge. “Holloman contends that although the State proffered the criminal background check of these jurors as the reason for their dismissal, he argues that the State failed to supply evidence of the results of the check at the trial or at the hearing for the motion for new trial, which supports his argument that the proffered reason was not credible. Nevertheless, no evidence was presented by Holloman that the reason given by the State for striking these particular jurors would not also have been applied neutrally to a white juror with a similar background. See Smile [ v. State, 263 Ga. 716, 716–717(1), 438 S.E.2d 75 (1994)]. See also White [ v. State, 258 Ga.App. 546, 550(3), 574 S.E.2d 629 (2002)] (‘A neutral explanation is one based on something other than the race of the juror, and, if discriminatory intent is not inherent in the explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race-neutral. At the final stage of a Batson inquiry, the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.’) (citation and punctuation omitted). Ultimately it was Holloman's burden to provide evidence to support his argument, and Holloman failed to produce this proof during trial or at the hearing on the motion for new trial. See White, 258 Ga.App. at 549–550(3), 574 S.E.2d 629 (‘The trial court's decision on a Batson motion rests largely upon assessment of the prosecutor's state of mind and credibility; it therefore lies peculiarly within a trial judge's province. The trial court's factual findings must be given great deference and may be disregarded only if clearly erroneous.’)” Washington v. State, 310 Ga.App. 775, 714 S.E.2d 364 (July 13, 2011) State’s strikes were race neutral. The second prospective juror was struck because of her criminal history, and because she knew the public defender. State struck the third prospective juror because he had a criminal history, and because he knew the state’s investigator. State struck the fourth prospective juror because she had a criminal history, and because she worked outside of the county and therefore had fewer ties with the local community. State struck the fifth prospective juror because of his criminal history, and because his wife was a social worker. State also struck the sixth and seventh potential jurors because of their criminal histories, and because one shared the same address as another person with a criminal history, and another shared an address with a “druggie.” See also Jackson v. State , 288 Ga.App. 339, 654 S.E.2d 137 (October 3, 2007). No Batson violation: “A prospective juror’s criminal history is an adequate race-neutral reason to strike a prospective juror. Accord, Blackshear v. State , 285 Ga. 619, 680 S.E.2d 850 (June 29, 2009); Guzman v. State , 287 Ga. 759, 700 S.E.2d 340 (September 20, 2010). Hunt v. State, 288 Ga. 794, 708 S.E.2d 357 (March 18, 2011). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; asserted reasons for strikes were race-neutral: juror had a cousin in prison; she had a relative who was the victim of a murder which “involved a drug deal that went bad,” which was the scenario posited by the defense; and “she considered herself a liberal.” Accord, Tyre v. State , 323 Ga.App. 37, 747 S.E.2d 106 (July 15, 2013) (juror had a nephew convicted of murder). Willis v. State, 287 Ga. 703, 699 S.E.2d 1 (June 28, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for murder and related offenses affirmed; strike was race-neutral where State stated that it “struck [one] potential African-American juror because she indicated that she had a nephew who had been jailed after being falsely accused.” Bryant v. State, 304 Ga.App. 456, 696 S.E.2d 439 (June 17, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for rape, aggravated assault, and nine counts of burglary affirmed; trial court properly ruled that State’s strike of juror was race neutral “because she had a son who was approximately Bryant's age and who had experienced similar problems with school, discipline, and drugs as Bryant. She was the only member of the panel who had a son close to Bryant's age and, given this and her son's other similarities with Bryant, the prosecutor feared the juror would be unduly sympathetic towards Bryant.” Dixon v. State, 303 Ga.App. 517, 693 S.E.2d 900 (April 7, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for kidnapping with injury, rape and aggravated assault affirmed; State’s strike of jurors who “had close relatives who had committed felonies and had served time in prison” were race-neutral. Accord, Stovall v. State , 287 Ga. 415, 696 S.E.2d 633 (June 28, 2010). White v. State, 301 Ga.App. 837, 689 S.E.2d 120 (January 5, 2010). State’s strikes were race neutral: first juror’s “father had been wrongfully accused of rape and imprisoned pre-trial for a period of time before being released.” Second juror was struck “because he had a brother with substance abuse problems who was incarcerated for first degree arson.” Allen v. State, 299 Ga.App. 201, 683 S.E.2d 343 (July 15, 2009). Strikes were race neutral: “As to the fifth juror, the State explained that her husband had committed a murder at the same café some years ago. See Floyd [ v. State, 272 Ga. 65, 68(3), 525 S.E.2d 683 (2000)] (‘[t]he criminal history of a prospective juror's family is a sufficiently neutral reason to justify a peremptory strike’) (punctuation omitted).” Accord, Wilkins v. State , 291 Ga. 483, 731 S.E.2d 346 (September 10, 2012).