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addition to other valid race-neutral reasons, such as being previously charged with a criminal offense or having a relative currently facing criminal prosecution . Williams v. State, 253 Ga.App. 453, 559 S.E.2d 512 (January 25, 2002). Acceptable race-neutral reason for strike where prospective juror was suspected of being a defendant in another case, even though name was different. Pickren v. State , 272 Ga. 421, 530 S.E.2d 464 (May 30, 2000). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. 1. State’s jury strike was gender neutral: juror “had a relative who had been recently charged and convicted of aggravated assault, and the district attorney believed she was ‘potentially sympathetic’ to the defendant's situation.” 2. Second juror “had not responded truthfully to a question concerning the existence of relatives with criminal backgrounds and had expressed a viewpoint that led the district attorney to believe she would be sympathetic to someone with the defendant's background.” Middlebrooks v. State, 241 Ga.App. 193, 526 S.E.2d 406 (December 1, 1999). Defendant’s conviction for motor vehicle hijacking affirmed; strike based on juror’s “previous violent arrest” was race-neutral. Livingston v. State, 271 Ga. 714, 524 S.E.2d 222 (November 22, 1999). Defendant’s convictions for murder and related offenses affirmed; no Batson violation where prospective jurors “had relatives who were then in trouble with the law” and were “related to a criminal defendant whom [the prosecutor’s] office was then prosecuting.” Accord, Floyd v. State , 272 Ga. 65, 525 S.E.2d 683 (January 18, 2000); Williams v. State, 272 Ga. 335, 528 S.E.2d 518 (May 1, 2000). O’Hannon v. State, 240 Ga.App. 706, 524 S.E.2d 759 (November 5, 1999). Strike of juror who “said during voir dire that his brother and others had been arrested for theft and his brother was later acquitted,” was race-neutral. Scott v. State, 240 Ga.App. 50, 522 S.E.2d 535 (September 14, 1999). State strikes were race-neutral: “Juror 1 was struck for health reasons and because a family member had a prior conviction. See Slade v. State, 270 Ga. 305, 509 S.E.2d 618 (1998). Juror 25 was struck because she lived in what is apparently the worst drug crime area in Columbus. The trial court noted that a juror from that area may well be ‘scared to go home having convicted somebody of a drug offense.’ See Smith v. State, 264 Ga. 449, 454, 448 S.E.2d 179 (1994); Sorrells v. State, 218 Ga.App. 413, 414, 461 S.E.2d 904 (1995).” Williams v. State, 236 Ga.App. 190, 511 S.E.2d 561 (February 2, 1999). Acceptable race-neutral reasons for strikes where: “the prosecutor had specific information regarding criminal convictions of specific individuals related to the potential jurors ;” and the juror had twice received traffic tickets from one of the officer-witnesses and “had threatened [officer] was a ‘voodoo curse.’” Note, “[w]here the State has specific information that a juror’s relative has been convicted of a crime, there is no purpose in requiring the State to question the juror about the relation, since the State would be entitled to strike the juror regardless of his or her response to the question.” Distinguishing “ Ridley v. State, 235 Ga.App. 591, 510 S.E.2d 113 (1998), where the prosecutor struck two jurors simply because their last names were the same as defendants who had previously been prosecuted, without any information that there was a relationship between the jurors and such defendants.” Accord, Drane v. State , 271 Ga. 849, 523 S.E.2d 301 (November 1, 1999); Edenfield v. State , 293 Ga. 370, 744 S.E.2d 738 (June 17, 2013) (juror “had a relative in prison and previously had negative experiences with law enforcement.”). 19. STRIKES BASED ON PHYSICAL APPEARANCE Minor v. State, 328 Ga.App. 128, 761 S.E.2d 538 (July 10, 2014). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed, but case remanded for determination of Batson issue. Prosecutor struck juror based on a) theft conviction and b) the juror’s gold teeth. Trial court found the theft conviction to be a race-neutral basis for strike, although she “[was] not impressed [with] the [State's] gold teeth argument.” Court of Appeals expresses concern about “whether this explanation reflected a racial stereotype,” but the trial court refused to allow defense counsel to address the issue, finding the theft conviction to be sufficient. Remanded for consideration of this issue based on Strozier v. Clark, 206 Ga.App. 85(5), 424 S.E.2d 368 (1992). “The Georgia Supreme Court has interpreted Strozier as standing for the proposition ‘that where it can be determined that the racially neutral explanation is, in fact, pretextual since there is a racially motivated reason that can be independently determined, the jury selection process is invalid under Batson. ’ Lingo v. State, 263 Ga. 664, 667(1)(c), n. 4, 437 S.E.2d 463 (1993). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court emphasized that ‘[t]he cases cited by Strozier illustrate that there must be some indication that the “additional reason” is, in fact, racially motivated.’ (Emphasis in original.) Id.”