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2. “Another prospective juror stated that she believed reasonable doubt meant no doubt and that vulgar language from witnesses would bother her. … [T]hese reasons are also gender-neutral.” 3. “The state claims that the final prospective juror it struck was ‘not clear as to what reasonable doubt really was’ and was ‘timid and quiet’ during jury selection. The trial court did not err by accepting the state's first reason because the record provides support for it and there is no discriminatory intent inherent in the explanation. Id. Support for the state's second reason is not readily apparent in the record, but considering the totality of the circumstances, including the final composition of the jury and the existence of other valid gender-neutral reasons for this strike and other strikes by the state, we cannot conclude that the trial court's acceptance of this reason was clearly erroneous.” 21. STRIKES BASED ON PRIOR EXPERIENCES WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT (INCLUDING BEING A WITNESS) Devaughn v. State, 296 Ga. 475, 769 S.E.2d 70 (February 2, 2015). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in excusing juror who “said that his prior bad experiences with the police and prosecutors might affect his judgment in the case and that he was a minister and would not feel comfortable sitting in judgment of others.” Minor v. State, 328 Ga.App. 128, 761 S.E.2d 538 (July 10, 2014). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; 1. juror’s prior theft charge provided race-neutral basis for State’s strike; but remanded for consideration of whether additional grounds stated (juror’s gold teeth) was racially-based. 2. Strike based on juror’s experience of being held up at gunpoint was race neutral. Tyre v. State, 323 Ga.App. 37, 747 S.E.2d 106 (July 15, 2013). Rape and related convictions affirmed; strike was race neutral where “prospective black juror was struck after he testified that he had previous bad experiences with law enforcement and that he believed that minorities were treated unfairly by the criminal justice system.” Younger v. State, 288 Ga. 195, 702 S.E.2d 183 (November 8, 2010). Felony murder and firearm conviction affirmed; strike of juror who had a “very bad” experience with law enforcement was race neutral. Accord, Bryant v. State , 309 Ga.App. 649, 710 S.E.2d 854 (May 23, 2011); Edenfield v. State , 293 Ga. 370, 744 S.E.2d 738 (June 17, 2013); Tyre v. State , 323 Ga.App. 37, 747 S.E.2d 106 (July 15, 2013). Franklin v. State, 305 Ga.App. 574, 699 S.E.2d 868 (August 12, 2010). Defendant’s drug convictions affirmed; strikes based on drug involvement or prior drug conviction were race-neutral. Willis v. State, 287 Ga. 703, 699 S.E.2d 1 (June 28, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for murder and related offenses affirmed; strike was race-neutral where State stated that it “struck one potential African-American juror because he had been charged with leaving the scene of an accident and that fleeing the scene could be indicative of a mistrust of law enforcement.” Dixon v. State, 303 Ga.App. 517, 693 S.E.2d 900 (April 7, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for kidnapping with injury, rape and aggravated assault affirmed; State’s strike of juror “because she had been charged with the offense of vehicular homicide, although the charges against her had later been dismissed” was race-neutral. “The prosecutor believed she might be biased by her experience with law enforcement.” White v. State, 301 Ga.App. 837, 689 S.E.2d 120 (January 5, 2010). State’s strikes were race neutral: first juror “had failed to report to the police a crime of which he had been a victim, potentially indicating a mistrust of law enforcement ; and … his father had been wrongfully accused of rape and imprisoned pre-trial for a period of time before being released.” Second juror was struck because “because, while discussing his prior employment as a correctional officer, he mentioned being dissatisfied with the general state of affairs in the correctional facility. ” Blackshear v. State, 285 Ga. 619, 680 S.E.2d 850 (June 29, 2009). State’s strikes were race-neutral. 1. “The State explained that one prospective juror was removed because she had been a victim in a previous case and had been uncooperative with the prosecutor's office. 2. A second prospective juror was struck because she had been arrested several times by an officer involved in [defendant's] arrest and because she was known by the State to have a drug problem. Each of these reasons has been held to be a race-neutral explanation and by offering no other evidence, [defendant] failed to establish ‘that the reasons given by the State were merely pretexts for purposeful racial discrimination. [Cit.]’ Henry v. State, 265 Ga. 732(2) (462 S.E.2d 737) (1995) (citing Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834) (1995). See Oliver v. State, 276 Ga. 665(4) (581 S.E.2d 538) (2003) (strike based on