☢ test - Í

Brannan v. State, 275 Ga. 70, 561 S.E.2d 414 (March 25, 2002). State used 7 of its 10 peremptory strikes to remove black prospective jurors from the panel. Held, Defendant failed to carry his burden of proving purposeful discrimination as the State gave valid reasons. The sixth prospective juror learned in nursing school about post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), which was to figure prominently in Defendant’s defense, and the DA’s office had previously prosecuted the prospective juror for fraud. The seventh prospective juror served four years in the Marines, including a tour in Vietnam, and said he had known Marines with PTSD who would “freak out” or “snap,” and he knew this to be PTSD because that is what the corpsman called it. The State explained that a white Vietnam veteran they did not strike was not similarly situated because he had served 21 years in the Marines, including a tour in Vietnam, and stated, “I ain’t never had the problem with [PTSD].” Loggins v. State, 225 Ga.App. 713, 484 S.E.2d 758 (March 25, 1997). Theft and related convictions affirmed; no Batson violation based on State’s strike of juror who “expressed doubts about the credibility of drug users, which was of some concern to the State because several of its witnesses had involvement with drugs. ‘A reasonable suspicion about a prospective juror's impartiality that falls short of justifying an excusal for cause might well justify the exercise of a peremptory strike.’ Hall v. State, 261 Ga. 778, 780(2)(a), 415 S.E.2d 158 (1991).” Jones v. State, 240 Ga.App. 339, 523 S.E.2d 402 (October 13, 1999). State’s strike was race-neutral where based on fear that juror “might be overly sympathetic to Jones” because of the hardships she had faced in her own life (her own disability, death of her husband and two children). “The prosecutor explained that he thought Hood's hardships might predispose her to sympathy for a criminal defendant, and the trial court-who had the better opportunity to observe the prosecutor's demeanor and assess his credibility-believed him. After reviewing the transcript, we are unable to find clear error in the trial court's conclusion that the explanation was believable.” “Although explanations for peremptory strikes must be reasonably case-specific, we have not required the proponent of the strike to draw a direct link between the characteristic of the juror that prompted the strike and particular facts in the case.” “While an explanation for a strike must bear on an individual's ability to serve impartially as a juror in the case, it need not be tightly linked to specific details in that case.” Roundtree v. State, 270 Ga. 504, 511 S.E.2d 190 (February 8, 1999). “Regardless of a prospective juror’s race, the State may reasonably base its use of a peremptory strike upon a suspected inability to follow the proceedings , a possible bias against the police or a perceived lack of community involvement. See Minor v. State, 264 Ga. 195, 197(5), 442 S.E.2d 754 (1994) (lack of commitment and dedication to the community); Jones v. State, 226 Ga.App. 428, 429(1)(c), 487 S.E.2d 62 (1997) (possible bias against police); Thompson v. State, 194 Ga.App. 163(2), 390 S.E.2d 253 (1990) (inattention).” Accord, Horne v. State , 237 Ga.App. 844, 517 S.E.2d 74 (April 29, 1999) (negative experience with police); Garcia v. State , 290 Ga.App. 164, 658 S.E.2d 904 (March 7, 2008) (recent immigrant’s lack of ties to community, knew someone falsely accused). 24. STRIKES BASED ON RACE/RACE RELATIONS Thomas v. State, 299 Ga.App. 235, 682 S.E.2d 325 (July 16, 2009). Trial court properly found that defense strike was not race-neutral: “Here, defense counsel stated as reasons for striking this juror that, having written nothing in his notes about her, he considered her ‘an unknown, a ticking time bomb.... She [is] an older woman who is a housewife. My client is a relatively young black male who is accused of drug trafficking.’ [fn] Counsel also explained that he was deferring to Thomas's wishes. The trial court ruled that counsel's reasons were not race-neutral, because other jurors that had not been challenged had not given extensive responses. … Further, ‘the decision to defer to another's desires concerning the exercise of the peremptory challenges does not constitute the required racially neutral, case-related explanation of the exercise of the challenged strike [ ],’” quoting Congdon v. State, 262 Ga. 683, 684 (424 S.E.2d 630) (1993). Fact that counsel cited defendant’s race as a justification for the strike allowed the court to find that the other stated reasons for the strike were pretextual. McCastle v. State, 276 Ga.App. 218, 622 S.E.2d 896 (November 3, 2005). Convictions for cruelty to children reversed, based on Batson violation. State’s strike was clearly not race-neutral: juror “‘has a son in an interracial marriage. His son is black, as is he. And the defendant in this case is in an interracial marriage. I feel that that might make him have a particular empathy or sympathy for this defense couple, and that is why I struck him.’” “[T]he prosecutor’s explanation was, on its face, based on the race of the juror. As the prosecutor plainly stated in her explanation for the strike, Douglas is black, his son is black, and his son is in an interracial marriage. Frankly, we are hard-pressed to understand how the trial judge could have concluded that this explanation was racially neutral.”