☢ test - Í

jurors because of their familiarity with the defendant and/or his family). Compare Ridley v. State, 235 Ga.App. 591, 592- 594(1) (510 S.E.2d 113) (1998) (physical precedent only) (striking of jurors who had same last name as defendants previously prosecuted by the state rejected when state otherwise excluded every African-American person from the jury panel). While we recognize that the prosecutor mentioned juror number 27’s race in his explanation of the strike to the court, he did so in the context of explaining his concern about the juror being potentially related to the defendant .” Moon v. State, 280 Ga.App. 84, 633 S.E.2d 418 (June 22, 2006). Trial court erred in ruling that defendant’s justifications for striking jurors were not ‘race neutral.’ Counsel said that he struck juror, an attorney, because “he had been personally acquainted with him for years and knew that he was prejudiced against persons such as his client.” Court disallowed the strike because the basis for the strike was not supported in the record. “During voir dire it was, however, established that counsel and the juror were personally acquainted with each other by reason of the fact that they were both lawyers in the community, and counsel’s reluctance to ask questions of the juror to establish his prejudice in open court is certainly understandable. ” Heller v. State, 275 Ga.App. 637, 621 S.E.2d 591 (September 28, 2005). Trial court could properly distinguish between black juror struck by State, who said she had “gone out socially” with defendant, and white jurors who knew defendant from school or work but had not socialized with her. Rakestrau v. State, 278 Ga. 872, 608 S.E.2d 216 (January 24, 2005). Fact that State used all four of its strikes against African-Americans, where panel was evenly divided between whites and African-Americans, “made a prima facie case of discrimination.” Strikes were all race-neutral, however, based on juror’s potential knowledge of defendant’s family ; juror’s “observed camaraderie with a fellow prospective juror who had previously served as a witness in an unrelated murder trial in which both prosecutors had participated.” Bell v. Austin, 278 Ga. 844, 607 S.E.2d 569 (January 10, 2005). Strikes were race-neutral and properly exercised in this civil case: “In one instance, the prospective juror’s husband current works for [defendant’s] former employer.” Bass v. State, 271 Ga.App. 228, 609 S.E.2d 386 (January 6, 2005). “‘Previous participation in a verdict of not guilty in a criminal trial is a legitimate race-neutral reason to exercise a strike ... as is acquaintance with a member of the defendant’s family. ’ [Cit.] It follows that being the lone holdout for acquittal in a criminal trial and having a familial relationship with an acquaintance of a defense witness are also race-neutral reasons for exercising strikes. Finally, ‘[a] prospective juror’s knowledge of the defendant is a legitimate explanation for a peremptory strike.’ [Cit.]” Brown v. State, 278 Ga. 724, 609 S.E.2d 312 (November 23, 2004). Acceptable race-neutral reasons for strikes: prospective juror was cousin of another prospective juror; prospective juror was acquaintance of another prospective juror; prospective juror was a former classmate of defendant; prospective juror had an unspecified relationship with one of the witnesses. Floyd v State, 263 Ga.App. 3, 587 S.E.2d 166 (August 28, 2003). Juror who knew defendant; and juror related to and friends with other defendants prosecuted by same office, were all valid race-neutral strikes Guild v. State, 255 Ga.App. 285, 564 S.E.2d 862 (May 7, 2002). State provided a race-neutral, case-related, clear and reasonable specific explanation for its decision to strike three African Americans as potential jurors, and thus the defendant, charged with armed robbery and possession of a gun while committing a crime against a person, did not suffer discrimination from the strikes; one juror lived in a housing project that was a possible basis for an alibi of the defendant, the second juror knew a prosecution witness, the third juror had previously used the same bank machine as the victim and the state feared that outside evidence would influence her decision, but a fourth, white juror that had also used that bank machine was retained because she had law enforcement relatives. Askew v. State, 254 Ga.App. 137, 564 S.E.2d 720 (February 15, 2002). Acceptable race-neutral reasons for strikes where: Juror had a personal relationship with defendant’s attorney. King v. State, 273 Ga. 258, 539 S.E.2d 783 (November 30, 2000). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed. Strikes were race- and gender-neutral: Juror “knew King’s family and … she was the minister of a church.”