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Sharpe v. State , 272 Ga. 684, 531 S.E.2d 84 (May 30, 2000). Murder convictions affirmed; reasons for State’s jury strikes were race-neutral. “peremptory strikes of African–American jurors. Those reasons were that one juror knew several of the witnesses, another knew one of the Appellants, and the third juror or a member of her family had been represented by [co- defendant] Mobley's public defender.” Williams v. State, 272 Ga. 335, 528 S.E.2d 518 (May 1, 2000). That a juror was related to someone the prosecutor had prosecuted in the past is a race-neutral explanation for a strike, satisfying the requirements of Batson. Watkins v. State, 241 Ga.App. 251, 526 S.E.2d 155 (November 24, 1999). “‘A prosecutor's explanation that he used peremptory challenges to strike the prospective jurors because they knew the defendant provides a proper and racially neutral basis for the exercise of his challenges.’ Byers v. State, 212 Ga.App. 110, 113(2), 441 S.E.2d 290 (1994).” Tillman v. State, 240 Ga.App. 78, 522 S.E.2d 557 (September 15, 1999). Trial court ruled that defendant’s strikes were not race-neutral where similarly-situated jurors of different race were not struck. Strikes here were based on knowing sheriff’s investigator or status as a crime victim. Smith v. State, 236 Ga.App. 122, 511 S.E.2d 233 (January 27, 1999). “A race-neutral explanation need not be persuasive, plausible or even make sense,” citing Jackson v. State, 265 Ga. 897, 899, 463 S.E.2d 699 (1995), “but must simply be ‘based on something other than the race of the juror. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the proponent’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id .” “A familial relationship with the defendant is a racially neutral basis for exercise of a strike, Marshall v. State, 266 Ga. 304-305(2), 466 S.E.2d 567 (1996), as is acquaintance with a member of the defendant’s family. Hightower, supra at 166, 469 S.E.2d 295. An interest in a bonding company or relationship to the owner of a bonding company is race-neutral. Jackson, supra. It follows that a familial relationship with one willing to post bond on behalf of the defendant is also race- neutral.” 26. STRIKES BASED ON RESIDENCE Edenfield v. State, 293 Ga. 370, 744 S.E.2d 738 (June 17, 2013). Capital murder conviction and death sentence affirmed; no Batson violation where prosecutor struck juror who gave a residence address known to law enforcement to be a crack house. Howard v. State , 243 Ga.App. 836, 534 S.E.2d 202 (May 5, 2000). Conviction for cocaine possession affirmed; State’s strike of juror was race-neutral. “Striking a panel member solely on the basis of residence in a particular neighborhood combined with a stereotypical belief is an improper reason for exercising a peremptory strike. Congdon v. State, 262 Ga. 683, 685, 424 S.E.2d 630 (1993). But here, the State did not exercise the strike because of racial stereotyping. Rather, the prosecutor justified the strike because he knew that the panel member lived in an area where police were currently marshaling their efforts against illegal drugs, and he had experienced unfavorable results with previous jurors in similar circumstances. See Higginbotham v. State, 207 Ga.App. 424, 425(3), 428 S.E.2d 592 (1993); Smith v. State, 264 Ga. 449, 450(1), 448 S.E.2d 179 (1994) (exercise of peremptory strikes against residents of public housing project plagued by gang-related activity upheld in trial of defendant for gang-related crimes).” 27. STRIKES BASED ON SEX Odom v. State, 241 Ga.App. 361, 526 S.E.2d 646 (December 8, 1999). Convictions for child molestation and related offenses affirmed; strike of single father was gender-neutral: “The State explained that it struck juror no. 7 because of his status as a single father, not simply because he was a male as Odom contends. Apparently, the State feared that this would cause the juror to be biased in favor of Odom. This explanation does not violate the standards set forth in Batson. ” Hutchison v. State, 239 Ga.App. 664, 522 S.E.2d 56 (August 18, 1999). At defendant’s trial for rape, trial court properly sustained Batson challenges to four strikes by defense. Defense counsel acknowledged that one of the four strikes was based on gender . “This is precisely the type of stereotyping that Batson and J.E.B. prohibit. See Tedder v. State, 265 Ga. 900, 901(2), 463 S.E.2d 697 (1995); Herrin v. State, 221 Ga.App. 356, 359, 471 S.E.2d 297 (1996) (counsel's admission of gender consideration is automatically an unconstitutional strike). Although Hutchison did set forth a race/gender- neutral reason for striking the other three reinstated females, these reasons were suspect in light of his admissions. Moreover, the State in each case showed that similarly situated males were seated on the jury, a well-recognized method of demonstrating that discriminatory intent motivated a strike. See Turner [ v. State, 267 Ga. 149, 151(2), 476 S.E.2d 252 (1996)]; Ford v. State, 262 Ga. 558, 559(3), 423 S.E.2d 245 (1992).”