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28. STRIKES BASED ON STRATEGIC DECISIONS Adams v. State, 300 Ga.App. 608, 685 S.E.2d 402 (October 8, 2009). “While striking a particular juror in order to get to other jurors further down the list on its face appears to be a race-neutral explanation, ‘only in the context of application can we determine whether such an explanation is in fact racially-neutral.’ Covin v. State , [215 Ga.App. 3, 4, 449 S.E.2d 550 (1994).” “No improper discriminatory intent is revealed where, as here, 25 percent of the actual jury seated was African-American as compared to a venire which was 30 percent African-American. Further, the prosecutor made it clear that there had been no purposeful discrimination but ‘understood if [the trial court had] to make an adjustment’ to foreclose any appearance of impropriety.” Walker v. State, 270 Ga.App. 733, 607 S.E.2d 912 (December 2, 2004). Acceptable race-neutral reasons for strikes: counsel struck prospective juror to get to another, preferable juror, without discriminatory effect. Shell v. State, 264 Ga.App. 547, 591 S.E.2d 450 (December 4, 2003). Strike because juror was “moving out of state and was scheduled to start a job in her new city in the next week” and might therefore be “‘distracted’ or ‘preoccupied’” is not pretextual. O’Hannon v. State, 240 Ga.App. 706, 524 S.E.2d 759 (November 5, 1999). “To qualify as race-neutral, an explanation ‘need not be persuasive, plausible or even make sense.’ Smith v. State, 236 Ga.App. 122, 124(2), 511 S.E.2d 223 (1999). It ‘must simply be “based on something other than the race of the juror. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the proponent's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.”’ (Citation omitted.) Id. Applying these standards, we find that the State offered race-neutral explanations for its strikes of Carter and Johnson.” F. CHARGE See also DUI – JURY CHARGES, and DEFENSES – EQUAL ACCESS above ; for charges on a specific offense, see that offense under OFFENSES, below 1. ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT Daugherty v. State, 291 Ga.App. 541, 662 S.E.2d 318 (May 16, 2008). Trial court properly declined defendant’s request to charge on accessory after the fact. “As Daugherty was not charged with being an accessory after the fact, his requested charge was neither apt nor relevant to any principle involved in the case,” citing Hatcher v. State, 277 Ga.App. 611, 613(2) (627 S.E.2d 175) (2006). “Moreover, since the trial court fully charged the jury on parties to a crime, mere presence, mere association, intent, and knowledge, we conclude that the jury instructions, when taken as a whole, fairly presented the issues, including Daugherty’s contention that he was only an accessory after the fact. See Klinect v. State, 269 Ga. 570, 574(9) (501 S.E.2d 810) (1998); Mizell v. State, 266 Ga.App. 833, 836(2)(b) (598 Ga.App. 100) (2004).” Accord, Vergara v. State , 287 Ga. 194, 695 S.E.2d 215 (May 17, 2010); Huckabee v. State , 287 Ga. 728, 699 S.E.2d 531 (July 5, 2010). Buruca v. State, 278 Ga.App. 650, 629 S.E.2d 438 (March 14, 2006). “Buruca … contends that the trial court refused to give his requested charge that, ‘[a]n accomplice is one who was present at the commission of a crime, aiding and abetting the perpetrator, or an accessory before the fact. An accessory after the fact is not an accomplice.’ See Ford v. State, 232 Ga. 511, 516(7) (207 S.E.2d 494) (1974). Buruca claims the charge established his sole defense: ‘that he was not involved in any pre-robbery discussions or planning, and was at most a mere accessory after the fact.’ The trial court did not err in rejecting the requested charge. ‘An accessory after the fact is not a party to the crime under OCGA § 16-2-21, but the act constitutes the separate offense of obstruction of justice under OCGA § 16-10-24.’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Stewart v. State, 243 Ga.App. 860, 862(2) (534 S.E.2d 544) (2000). See also Mizell v. State, 266 Ga.App. 833, 836(2)(b) (598 S.E.2d 100) (2004). Because Buruca was neither indicted nor tried for felony obstruction of justice, the court did not err in refusing to give the requested charge.” Barnett v. State, 244 Ga.App. 585, 536 S.E.2d 263 (June 23, 2000). Armed robbery and related convictions affirmed; no error in refusing to charge jury on accessory after the fact. “‘An accessory after the fact is not considered an accomplice to the underlying crime itself, but is guilty of a separate, substantive offense in [the] nature of obstruction of justice.’ Although this charge is correct as an abstract statement of the law, see Moore v. State, 240 Ga. 210, 212(1), 240 S.E.2d 68 (1977), the defendants were not charged with obstruction of justice, and the court fully instructed the jury on when a person may be considered a party to the crime. Accordingly, it was not error to refuse to give the requested charge. See Klinect v. State, 269 Ga. 570, 575(9), 501 S.E.2d 810 (1998).”