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what it was.” See also Tate (March 21, 2006), below, on juror testimony impeaching verdict. OCGA § 17-9-41 repealed effective January 1, 2013, and replaced by OCGA § 24-6-606(b). Boone v. State, 293 Ga.App. 654, 667 S.E.2d 880 (September 23, 2008). “[D]uring an out of court hearing, the trial court received two questions from the jury before it received the case – one asking the difference between trafficking and distribution and the other seeking the definition of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime.” Held, the notes do not indicate that jurors improperly discussed the case or prematurely deliberated. “While the record shows that at least one juror had begun thinking about the case, there is no evidence that any deliberation of the case had begun. Moreover, when the jury reentered the courtroom, the trial court gave a curative instruction as follows: ‘Let me instruct all the jurors that at the end of the trial I will explain the law to you in more detail and will explain the differences, if any, between the various offenses. And, unfortunately, at this time you'll need to listen to the facts. You'll be given the law at the end of the trial, and that's when you'll have to apply the facts to the law.’ Given the foregoing, we find no inherent prejudice inuring to Boone's detriment. The instant claim of error is therefore without merit.” Kinder v. State, 284 Ga. 148, 663 S.E.2d 711 (July 7, 2008). 1. Remedy for tainted jury panel, prior to seating a jury to hear the case, is to excuse the panel, not mistrial. “The motion for mistrial was premature, having been made before the jury had been impaneled and sworn; Kinder's alternative challenge to the poll was the appropriate motion. Sharpe v. State, 272 Ga. 684(5) (531 S.E.2d 84) (2000), citing Ferguson v. State, 219 Ga. 33(3) (131 S.E.2d 538) (1963).” 2. “In determining whether the trial court should have excused all members of the array who may have been privy to unauthorized discussions, ‘[t]he inquiry is whether the remarks were inherently prejudicial and deprived [appellant] of [his] right to begin [his] trial with a jury free from even a suspicion of prejudgment or fixed opinion. [Cit.]’ (Punctuation omitted.) Sharpe, supra at 688(5). See also Edwards v. State, 282 Ga. 259(8)(a) (646 S.E.2d 663) (2007). But ‘where the facts establish only gossamer possibilities of prejudice, [cit.] prejudice is not inherent.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Sharpe, supra at 688(5). While the members of the panel violated the court's preliminary instructions to refrain from discussing the case, the court took corrective action by questioning those jurors individually to ascertain whether they had been prejudiced by the unauthorized discussion, and by reiterating the court's previous admonitions. Based on the jurors' responses, we do not find that the conduct in the waiting area inherently prejudiced the array, or that the jurors involved had formed a fixed opinion about the outcome.” Accord, Slaughter (October 3, 2011) above. Smith v. State, 284 Ga. 17, 663 S.E.2d 142 (June 30, 2008). At defendant’s murder trial, no abuse of discretion where trial court refused to replace juror who appeared to be dozing on one occasion. “When faced with a juror sleeping during the trial, counsel has a duty to bring the matter to the attention of the trial court and the trial court has a duty to awaken the juror. Foster v. State, 255 Ga. 425(2), 339 S.E.2d 256 (1986). The trial court acted promptly when the matter was brought to its attention, even though it was disputed whether the juror in question was asleep, by asking the jury to stay awake and keep their fellow jurors awake. When it appeared the juror had dozed off, the trial court addressed that juror individually and initiated changes to accommodate the juror’s efforts to stay alert. As there is no indication that the single confirmed act of dozing was anything other than momentary, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that its remedial actions were sufficient and in denying [defendant’s] motion to remove the juror. See Williams v. State, 190 Ga.App. 361(2), 378 S.E.2d 886 (1989).” Accord, Clements (June 13, 2006), and Pope (March 30, 2004), both below; Peterson v. State , 294 Ga.App. 128, 668 S.E.2d 544 (October 20, 2008); Kollie v. State , 301 Ga.App. 534, 687 S.E.2d 869 (November 19, 2009); Mathis v. State , 293 Ga. 837, 750 S.E.2d 308 (October 21, 2013) (single act of dozing didn’t require court “to conduct an inquiry to determine whether the juror had, in fact, been sleeping or was incapacitated.”); Armstrong v. State , 325 Ga.App. 33, 752 S.E.2d 120 (November 20, 2013) (no duty to inquire into single act of sleeping, citing Mathis ). Lawrence v. State, 289 Ga.App. 163, 657 S.E.2d 250 (January 9, 2008). Juror misconduct – improper conversation with victim – did not necessitate mistrial where “the record reveals that the trial court dismissed the juror within minutes after her inappropriate contact with [victim], and it does not appear that she had much, if any, opportunity to discuss that contact with the remaining members of the jury.” Allen v. State, 286 Ga.App. 469, 649 S.E.2d 583 (July 10, 2007). Trial court properly denied new trial based on discovery that juror had a relative who was a judge in Florida, specializing in narcotics cases, information the juror did not disclose in voir dire. “Trial counsel testified that she would have used a peremptory strike if she had known. In this setting, the Supreme Court has established that to obtain a new trial, ‘ a party must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. ’ Isaacs v. State, 259 Ga. 717, 741(44)(3) (386 S.E.2d 316) (1989); see