☢ test - Í

also Sears v. State, 270 Ga. 834, 840(2) (514 S.E.2d 426) (1999). First, Allen has not presented testimony from the juror himself, and Allen’s counsel’s testimony is only hearsay. Second, Allen has not shown that if the juror had given a truthful answer he would have been dismissed for cause, as required.” Jones v. State, 282 Ga. 47, 644 S.E.2d 853 (May 14, 2007). Fact that the testimony in the trial made a juror sick to her stomach, forcing her to temporarily leave the courtroom, was not the sort of juror irregularity that would raise a presumption of prejudice to the defendant. “[T]he law is well-established that the type of ‘irregularity’ that gives rise to such a presumption of prejudice involves juror misconduct that has the potential to injure a defendant’s due process rights , e.g., making an unauthorized visit to the crime scene and then presenting the findings to the jury panel, Butler v. State, 270 Ga. 441(2) (511 S.E.2d 180) (1999); privately discussing the defendant’s guilt prior to deliberations in violation of the court’s instructions, see Sims v. State, 266 Ga. 417(3) (467 S.E.2d 574) (1996); or improperly accessing outside news sources. See Oliver v. State, 265 Ga. 653(3) (461 S.E.2d 222) (1995). Hence, in Smith v. State, 218 Ga. 216(2)(c)(3) (126 S.E.2d 789) (1962), we found no error in the continued participation in the trial of a juror who became ill after the court had recessed for the night, even though the physician who attended the ailing juror was a witness in the case, because there was no discussion by anyone of the case on trial and thus the defendant had shown only ‘“a mere trifling and immaterial irregularity in the conduct of a juror .... without opportunity for injury.”’ Id. at 223.” Lawton v. State, 281 Ga. 459, 640 S.E.2d 14 (January 8, 2007). Trial court properly excused juror who, during deliberations, revealed that he had met the defendant before and was afraid of him; but absent request from defendant, trial court was not required to declare mistrial where no manifest necessity was shown. “ In the absence of any request for a mistrial, the trial court was required to act sua sponte only if there was a manifest necessity for a mistrial. Wright v. State, 276 Ga. 419, 420(2) (577 S.E.2d 782) (2003). Lawton claims that a mistrial was required because [juror] Lewallen’s conversation with the bailiff was in front of other jury members and Lewallen was ‘ranting and raving’ so that he had to be taken from the jury room. However, contrary to such claims, there is no evidence that other jurors heard the substance of the exchange or had any idea about what may have been upsetting Lewallen. Consequently, the circumstances fall far short of demonstrating the manifest necessity for a mistrial. Id.” Denny v. State, 281 Ga. 114, 636 S.E.2d 500 (October 16, 2006). “Denny contends that the trial court erroneously denied his oral motion for a change of venue and for a mistrial made during trial. The basis of the motion was that on the first day of trial, a local newspaper published an article which detailed the defendants’ criminal pasts, and Denny’s attorney saw at least one juror eating lunch near a stand where editions of the newspaper were being sold. But, the contention of error is without merit. The trial court instructed the jurors not to read any news accounts of the case, and it is presumed that jurors follow trial courts’ instructions. Young v. State, 280 Ga. 65, 68(9) (623 SE 2d 491) (2005). Denny has made no showing that any juror failed to follow the court’s instructions. Therefore, it was not error for the trial court to not conduct further inquiry and to deny the request for a change of venue and a mistrial. Id. See also Todd v. State, 243 Ga. 539, 545(8) (255 S.E.2d 5) (1979).” Brooks v. State, 281 Ga. 14, 635 S.E.2d 723 (October 2, 2006). Trial court properly exercised its discretion by replacing a juror (who was late to court) with an alternate. “OCGA § 15-12-172 vests the trial court with the ‘“discretion to discharge a juror and replace him or her with an alternate at any time [so long as the trial court] has a sound legal basis.”’ Worthy v. State, 223 Ga.App. 612, 613 (478 S.E.2d 421) (1996) (quoting Darden v. State, 212 Ga.App. 345 (441 S.E.2d 816) (1994)).” Chenoweth v. State, 281 Ga. 7, 635 S.E.2d 730 (October 2, 2006). Premature discussions about the evidence by the jury did not require mistrial, even though two jurors “stated that they had developed a bias during the trial.” “As for the two jurors who stated that there had been some deliberations or discussions about the evidence, the jurors stated that, when the case was finally given to the jury, they would be able to set aside any prior discussions and to decide the case based solely upon their objective view of all the evidence. Moreover, all of the jurors, including the two jurors who stated that they had developed a bias, stated that they could decide the case impartially based upon all the evidence presented through the end of the trial.” “Because the juror’s answers to the trial court’s questions show that the jurors’ error in discussing the evidence was not so inherently prejudicial as to require a new trial, [cit.] we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Chenoweth’s motion for mistrial.” Accord, Saffold (March 21, 2016), above. Johnson v. State, 280 Ga.App. 341, 634 S.E.2d 134 (July 10, 2006). “Johnson contends the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial because a juror had contact with the prosecutor. The record shows that the matter Johnson