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complains of consisted of a juror asking for assistance from the prosecutor, in the presence of a bailiff, in resolving a child care problem . The prosecutor immediately brought this to the attention of the court, and informed the court that she had advised the juror that she needed to get the judge to address the problem, that the prosecutor could not help her, and that the defense counsel needed to be present. The trial court found that this encounter was harmless and denied the motion. We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of the court's discretion. Underwood v. State, 218 Ga.App. 530, 534(3) (462 S.E.2d 434) (1995). This brief conversation is not the kind of conduct between jurors and the prosecutor that requires the grant of a mistrial, and, under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Johnson’s motion for a mistrial. Clements v. State, 279 Ga.App. 773, 632 S.E.2d 702 (June 13, 2006). Defendant not entitled to mistrial based on sleeping juror where he failed to alert the court to the fact for 90 minutes; upon notification, the court “gave the jurors a curative instruction, cautioning them to stay awake and alert during the trial.” “‘Should a juror fall asleep during the course of a trial it is the duty of the trial judge to awaken him. Should counsel or the parties in a trial observe a sleeping juror it is their duty to bring it to the attention of the court. What a litigant may not do is observe a juror sleeping, fail to bring this to the judge’s attention at a time when corrective action may be had, take a chance on a favorable verdict, and then when the verdict is unfavorable have a mistrial or new trial because of the otiose juror.’ (Citation omitted.) Yount v. State, 249 Ga.App. 563, 566(2) (548 S.E.2d 674) (2001).” Accord, Pope (March 30, 2004), below; Smith (June 30, 2008), above. Smith v. State, 278 Ga.App. 315, 628 S.E.2d 722 (March 21, 2006). Trial court properly granted State’s motion for mistrial when it “learned that a juror …, who had known Smith ‘a long time,’ had twice been asked by Smith’s former wife to ‘help [Smith] out’ while serving on the jury. When the trial court ‘has discovered facts during a trial which indicated that one or more members of a jury might be biased ... the duty of the judge in this event is to discharge the jury and direct a retrial.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) McCrary v. State, 191 Ga.App. 336, 337 (381 S.E.2d 579) (1989).” Tate v. State, 278 Ga.App. 324, 628 S.E.2d 730 (March 21, 2006). “Tate contends he should be granted a new trial because [juror] was pressured into returning a guilty verdict. Tate concedes, however, that jurors generally may not impeach their own verdict. See Roebuck v. State, 277 Ga. 200, 206(9) (586 S.E.2d 651) (2003). Exceptions to this rule are made only when (1) prejudicial, extrajudicial information has been brought to the jury's attention; (2) non-jurors have interfered with deliberations; or (3) there has been irregular jury conduct so prejudicial that the verdict lacks due process. See Harrell v. State, 253 Ga.App. 691, 694(3) (560 S.E.2d 295) (2002). None of these grounds is alleged here. And all the cases cited by Tate in support of granting a new trial involve jurors who stated during a poll of the jury that the verdict was not theirs. See Benefield v. State, 278 Ga. 464, 465-466 (602 S.E.2d 631) (2004); Larry v. State, 266 Ga. 284, 287-288(5) (466 S.E.2d 850) (1996); Miller v. State, 265 Ga.App. 402, 403(2) (593 S.E.2d 943) (2004). Under the circumstances here – where the juror agreed to the verdict during the poll and subsequently affirmed that it was his verdict, but merely expressed reservations about the process – the trial court did not err in refusing to grant Tate a new trial. See Parker v. State, 249 Ga.App. 509, 512(2) (548 S.E.2d 475) (2001).” Hurston v. State, 278 Ga.App. 472, 629 S.E.2d 18 (March 7, 2006). Although five jurors testified that they visited the scene of the accident during trial, and one consulted a legal dictionary for the definition of reasonable doubt, all testified that these events had no effect on their verdict, and each reaffirmed the verdict convicting defendant of DUI and vehicular homicide. “The unsworn statement of a juror cannot be used to impeach a verdict. Mangrum v. State, 155 Ga.App. 334, 336(5) (270 S.E.2d 874) (1980). In view of the countervailing and unanimous affidavits of the jurors that the visits had no effect upon their verdict, we cannot say that the conduct complained of contributed to Hurston’s conviction or that it was so prejudicial as to have rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.” Allen v. State, 275 Ga.App. 826, 622 S.E.2d 54 (October 13, 2005). “Allen argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on alleged misconduct by a juror during the voir dire phase of the trial. The record reveals that Juror 44 did not respond to a general question by the trial judge as to whether any of the prospective jurors had ‘a close family member or a friend’ who had been accused of or a victim of a crime similar to that with which Allen was charged. It was later discovered that Juror 44’s nephew had been incarcerated for child molestation approximately six years prior to the trial. At the hearing on Allen’s motion for a new trial, the juror explained that she did not recall hearing the question; that she did not consider her nephew to be a close relative; and that she was not sure that she would have responded affirmatively had she heard the question. She further testified that her nephew’s conviction did not enter her mind during Allen’s trial and that it did not prejudice her in any way.” “In this case, Allen did not move to exclude Juror