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44 at any time during the trial, and, even if he had, we cannot say that it would have been a manifest abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny such a motion. The record before us does not demonstrate bias or a lack of impartiality on the part of Juror 44. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Allen’s motion for a new trial on this ground.” Washington v. State, 279 Ga. 722, 620 S.E.2d 809 (October 11, 2005). “At the end of the first day of Washington’s trial, the court instructed the jury not to discuss the case with anyone, but failed to tell them not to read or listen to any media accounts of the trial. The next morning, a juror brought a newspaper into the jury room that contained an article recounting the events of the first day of the trial. Each juror read or scanned part or all of the article. Upon learning of this, the court asked each juror about their ability to be fair and impartial in spite of having seen the article. Each juror affirmed that he or she had not formed any opinion regarding the case and would judge the case fairly and impartially. The jurors also stated that they did not discuss the evidence in the case among themselves, and the article showed that it contained merely a short summary of the first day’s proceedings in the case. Washington’s trial counsel moved for a mistrial, but the motion was denied. On appeal, Washington contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial. However, when jurors have been exposed to material such as the newspaper article in question, the decision whether to grant a mistrial is within the trial court’s discretion. Guess v. State, 264 Ga. 335, 338, 443 S.E.2d 447 (1994). In the present case, because the jurors stated that the article did not affect their ability to fairly and impartially decide the case, because the jurors did not discuss the evidence in the case, and because the article merely contained a summary of the first day of trial and not any prejudicial information to which the jurors had not been exposed during the first day of trial, (Compare Timberlake v. State, 246 Ga. 488, 495-496, 271 S.E.2d 792 (1980) (newspaper article found in jury room discussed prejudicial evidence that the trial court had excluded from evidence on the defendant’s motion), we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Washington’s motion for a mistrial. Guess, 264 Ga. at 338, 443 S.E.2d 477.” Brown v. State, 275 Ga.App. 281, 620 S.E.2d 394 (July 28, 2005). No mistrial required although during deliberations, “one of the jurors used his cellular phone to access Mapquest on the internet to attempt to calculate the distance between” two locations at issue in Brown’s prosecution for child molestation. “In this case, the trial court painstakingly questioned every juror to determine if the Mapquest information influenced their verdict. Of the jurors who actually recalled receiving the information, all of them testified that they were unaffected by the information. Furthermore, there was evidence that the information received from Mapquest was cumulative of that admitted at trial. Therefore, we do not find that the trial court’s denial of Brown’s motion for new trial on this ground was erroneous.” Gaines v. State, 274 Ga.App. 575, 618 S.E.2d 197 (July 26, 2005). At hearing on motion for new trial, two jurors testified that their votes to convict defendant were influenced by comments of another juror that she knew the defendant and that “he’s a mean man,” “criminally minded,” “‘a gun toting thug life living person,’ and the type of person who would commit the crime charged.” “In this case, the undisputed evidence showed that one juror interjected into the jury’s deliberations extra-judicial evidence of Gaines’ bad character which biased at least two other jurors in favor of finding Gaines’ guilty of the crime charged. Under the circumstances, there was at least a reasonable possibility that the misconduct contributed to the verdict, and the trial court abused its discretion in denying Gaines’ motion for a new trial. [Cit.]” Usual rule against a juror impeaching verdict “had to yield to the defendant’s constitutional right to have a trial by an impartial jury and to confront the witnesses against him,” citing Watkins v. State, 237 Ga. 678, 229 S.E.2d 465 (1976). Court seems to accept defendant’s argument that juror, who had denied knowing defendant in voir dire, essentially became a witness against him in the jury room. Distinguished from cases where juror’s remarks were not shown to have affected any other juror’s vote. Dorsey v. State, 279 Ga. 534, 615 S.E.2d 512 (June 30, 2005). “Counsel for a convicted defendant is entitled to the list of jurors who served in the case, if the defendant sets forth a sufficient showing to support a reasonable belief that jury misconduct occurred and that further investigation is necessary to provide the court with adequate information to rule on a motion for new trial. [Cit.] At a post-trial hearing to consider Dorsey’s request, there was no showing or even any allegation of juror misconduct.” Hence, trial court did not err in denying the defense the list of jurors: “the court engaged in an elaborate pre-qualification process for each juror, gave the jury extensive instructions on their required conduct during trial, and provided them an opportunity to be interviewed by counsel after trial (which the jurors refused).” Cotton v. State, 279 Ga. 358, 613 S.E.2d 628 (May 23, 2005). Felony murder conviction affirmed; no abuse of discretion shown in failing to excuse jurors exposed to prejudicial comment during voir dire. “A motion for mistrial is not the ‘proper procedural tool’ when an allegedly prejudicial comment is made during voir dire of prospective jurors. Sharpe v. State, 272 Ga. 684, 687(5) (531 S.E.2d 84) (2000). Moreover, even assuming that Cotton had made a proper request to