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impanel new jurors, he still would not be entitled to that relief unless the remark was inherently prejudicial and deprived him of his right to a trial by an impartial jury. Sharpe v. State, supra at 688(5). Here, the record shows that the trial court specifically cautioned the other prospective jurors that [prospective juror’s] comment did not expressly identify Cotton as a disciplinary problem, but only cited that as the reason why he knew him. The trial court also asked whether anyone on the panel who overheard the remark would be prejudiced by it, and none indicated that it would.” Dunbar v. State, 271 Ga.App. 753, 610 S.E.2d 702 (February 23, 2005). “During jury selection, jurors were asked if they knew ‘Dunbar or any of his family.’ No juror responded affirmatively to the question, and [juror] ultimately was selected as a member of the jury. However, at the hearing on his motion for new trial, Dunbar noted that [juror] had previously served on a grand jury that had indicted him for an unrelated armed robbery. According to Dunbar, [juror]’s failure to reveal her previous grand jury service requires that he be granted a new trial. We disagree. ‘“In order for a defendant to secure a new trial because a juror did not give a correct response to a question posed on voir dire[,] ... the defendant must show that the juror failed to answer the question truthfully and that a correct response would have been a valid basis for a challenge for cause.”’ [Cit.] ‘A juror’s truthfulness is evaluated with due regard for the juror’s understanding of the questions and for the juror’s understanding of his or her own responses.’ [Cit.] Here, [juror] was not asked whether she had previously served on a grand jury involving Dunbar; she was asked if she knew him. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Washington recognized Dunbar’s name from her prior grand jury service, we cannot say that she was not being truthful in her response.” Accord, Dunbar v. State , 273 Ga.App. 29, 614 S.E.2d 472 (April 19, 2005) (juror did not know at time of voir dire that victim was her husband’s cousin). Rogers v. State, 271 Ga.App. 698, 610 S.E.2d 679 (February 18, 2005). “Rogers … contends that the trial court should have questioned the jurors individually to determine if prejudicial deliberations had begun prematurely before the close of evidence. The transcript shows that a juror sent the trial court a note stating that some discussion had occurred among the jurors during breaks. The trial court extensively questioned the juror, who could not recall that any specific discussion of the evidence had occurred. When the remainder of the jurors returned to the courtroom, the trial court reiterated its earlier instructions that the jury was not to begin deliberating, or talking about the case in any manner, prior to the close of the evidence. The trial court then asked the jurors ‘is there anyone who has heard or seen anything up to this point in the trial that makes you feel that you cannot be a fair and impartial juror in this case.... Heard or seen anything that means you cannot fulfill your oath as a fair and impartial juror in this case.’ No juror responded to the court’s question, and Rogers did not request that the trial court question each juror individually at that time. There is thus nothing to show that the jurors did begin deliberating in the case before the close of evidence, or that Rogers requested that the trial court question the jurors in the manner he now contends was necessary. This enumeration is thus … without merit.” Benton v. State, 271 Ga.App. 207, 609 S.E.2d 163 (January 6, 2005). Post-trial, defendant asked the trial court to release juror information so that defendant could investigate alleged juror misconduct during trial. After first receiving testimony from the juror in question, the trial court denied the request, instead sending its own questionnaire to the jurors, which revealed no basis for defendant’s allegation about improper communication. “The trial court’s compromise in sending out a questionnaire to test the accuracy of the juror’s testimony that no extrajudicial information came into the deliberations was more than reasonable and well within its discretion, especially to avoid measures more invasive to released jurors. We hold that, based on the lack of any evidence showing misconduct, the trial court justifiably denied the release of juror information to Benton.” Pope v. State, 266 Ga.App. 658, 598 S.E.2d 48 (March 30, 2004). Trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to excuse sleeping juror. Juror explained that he had a cold and had only dozed a couple of seconds during the replay of a tape recording. Court offered to have tape replayed again, but defendant declined. “Given the nature of the evidence presented, and the fact that the tape had been played earlier, it is apparent that Pope suffered no prejudice from the brief inattention of this juror.” Court properly followed its duties as set out in Foster v. State , 255 Ga. 425, 339 S.E.2d 256 (1986) (“Should a juror fall asleep during the course of a trial it is the duty of the trial judge to awaken him.”). Perez v. State, 266 Ga.App. 82, 596 S.E.2d 191 (February 19, 2004). Trial court did not abuse its discretion by declaring a mistrial where, at lunch in a restaurant, after the close of evidence, one juror made a reference to getting money from the defendant’s family when they also walked in the restaurant, then followed a family member into the restroom. The juror contended he was joking; there was no evidence that any money was ever actually asked for, offered, or changed hands. “The trial court found a manifest necessity for declaring a mistrial based on the removal of four jurors and an alternate juror because of juror misconduct. Generally, whether or not misconduct by a juror is so prejudicial as to require removal and a mistrial is in the discretion of the trial court. Cooke v. State, 230 Ga.App. 326, 327 (496 S.E.2d 337) (1998). Under