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the circumstances, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that manifest necessity required the declaration of a mistrial. Accordingly, there was no error in the denial of the plea in bar.” Hammock v. State, 277 Ga. 612, 592 S.E.2d 415 (February 2, 2004). Reversal demanded where width of the bed separating defendant and shooting victim was in issue, and verdict was influenced by a juror’s measurements of the width of her own bed. “[A] new trial will be granted if ‘there is a reasonable possibility that the improper evidence collected by jurors contributed to the conviction.’ Bobo v. State, 254 Ga. 146, 146 (327 S.E.2d 208) (1985).” Accord, Hurston (March 7, 2006), above. Headspeth v. State, 265 Ga.App. 288, 593 S.E.2d 742 (January 26, 2004). “Unbeknownst to the jury, Headspeth’s bond was revoked during trial. The following day, the court asked the jurors whether they had heard any information regarding the bond revocation. One juror responded that he had heard such information, and outside of the presence of the jury, explained that his wife had told him that ‘the lady had to go back to jail…’” Held, defendant suffered no prejudice and court did not err in allowing the juror to remain on the panel inasmuch as “(1) the juror stated that he could put what he had heard aside and that the information did not affect him in any way, (2) there was no evidence that the juror shared this information with the other jury members, and (3) the court instructed the jury that it could not consider anything it heard outside of court as such information was not evidence. ” Murphy v. State, 263 Ga.App. 62, 587 S.E.2d 223 (September 4, 2003). “‘[Q]ualified jurors under oath are presumed to follow the trial court’s instructions,’” quoting Smith v. State , 267 Ga. 372, 374, 477 S.E.2d 827 (1996). Court would not speculate that jurors might have used similar transaction evidence for an improper purpose where court gave appropriate limiting instruction (e.g., to surmise that defendant was not insane when he committed this offense, since he was found not to be insane the previous three times he committed the same offense). Thompson v. State, 260 Ga.App. 253, 581 S.E.2d 596 (March 13, 2003). “We cannot conclude that the bribery attempt of a juror on behalf of the defense, even if the other jurors learn of it, is such a fundamental violation of a defendant's right to trial by a fair and impartial jury that the only available remedy is a mistrial. To find that a new trial was absolutely required under the circumstances here would encourage improper contact with jurors on behalf of defendants. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Thompson's motions for a mistrial, to set aside the verdict, and for a new trial.” McCorkle v. State, 245 Ga.App. 505, 538 S.E.2d 161 (August 9, 2000). Aggravated child molestation convictions affirmed; defendant couldn’t allege a juror’s bias against him based on affidavits of other jurors. “As a general rule, the testimony of jurors may be taken to sustain but not to impeach a verdict. OCGA § 17–9–41. Exceptions may occur when ‘extrajudicial and prejudicial information has been brought to the jury's attention improperly, or where non-jurors have interfered with the jury's deliberations.’ Spencer v. State, 260 Ga. 640, 643(3), 398 S.E.2d 179 (1990). OCGA § 17–9–41 effectively precludes jurors from engaging in post-trial attacks on their verdict on the basis of statements uttered to one another inside the jury room. Watkins v. State, 237 Ga. 678, 685, 229 S.E.2d 465 (1976) (juror misconduct occurred when members of the jury intentionally gathered highly prejudicial, extrajudicial evidence, and communicated their findings to other jurors). Specifically, the rule precludes a juror from testifying that issues in the case were prejudged, or that a juror was motivated by irrelevant or improper personal considerations, or that racial or ethnic prejudice played a role in jury deliberations. Spencer, supra, 260 Ga. at 643(3), 398 S.E.2d 179. Because McCorkle's claims of bias are similar and do not fall into any exception, the general rule precludes this effort to attack the verdict. See Gardiner v. State, 264 Ga. 329, 332(2), 444 S.E.2d 300 (1994); Moore v. State, 224 Ga.App. 797, 801(6), 481 S.E.2d 892 (1997).” Williams v. State , 272 Ga. 335, 528 S.E.2d 518 (May 1, 2000). Murder and related convictions affirmed; no error in denying motion for mistrial where prospective juror, at beginning of voir dire, “left the courtroom crying. It appears that the juror had asked to be excused due to her advanced age.” Trial court excused the juror but denied motion for mistrial, in absence of any evidence of prejudice to defendant. Pinkins v. State , 243 Ga.App. 737, 534 S.E.2d 192 (April 28, 2000). Convictions for armed robbery and conspiracy affirmed; no error in refusing to remove and replace juror who, during deliberations, phoned a friend – an assistant district attorney not associated with the trial – to ask a question about the role of the jury. “The record before us discloses no basis upon which to conclude that the trial court's failure to excuse this juror violated Pinkins' right to an impartial jury or prejudiced his defense. According to both the assistant district attorney who received the telephone call and the juror involved, before any communication which could possibly have prejudiced Pinkins occurred, the