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Mockingbird and a biblical story involving false allegations of rape.” McKibbins v. State, 293 Ga. 843, 750 S.E.2d 314 (October 21, 2013). Murder and related convictions affirmed; prosecutor’s comment in opening statement that the murder and dismemberment of victim was “the worst case I’ve ever seen” was improper, but didn’t require mistrial. “[W]e agree, generally speaking, that a lawyer—and a prosecuting attorney especially—ought not offer comparisons in the presence of the jury between the case at hand and other cases with which the lawyer is personally familiar. See Conner v. State, 251 Ga. 113, 123(6) (303 S.E.2d 266) (1983). That said, no one reasonably could dispute that this case involves especially gruesome crimes, and it appears that the prosecuting attorney was only attempting to prepare the jury for the evidence that would be forthcoming in the trial. Moreover, the issue disputed at trial did not concern the nature of the crimes—whether they were gruesome or not—but instead concerned whether McKibbins was culpable in those crimes. We confronted a similar issue in Conklin v. State, 254 Ga. 558 (331 S.E.2d 532) (1985), where we considered the remark of the prosecuting attorney in opening statement that the crime charged was ‘one of the most vile and brutal crimes ... in recent memory.’ We held that this remark did not require a mistrial, explaining that it ‘was not so much an invocation of prosecutorial expertise as it was an apology for having to bring gruesome items of evidence to the jury's attention.’ 254 Ga. at 573(11)(b). We also noted in Conklin that, in light of the undeniably gruesome nature of the evidence adduced at trial, ‘it [was] unlikely that prosecutorial experience or expertise played a discernable role in the jury's evaluation of the vileness and brutality of [the] crime.’ Id. As in Conklin, we conclude that the first remark about which McKibbins complains did not require a mistrial.” Ellington v. State, 292 Ga. 109, 735 S.E.2d 736 (November 19, 2012). Murder convictions affirmed. Prosecutor’s argument wasn’t objectionable for referring the defendant as “the monster everyone fears” and as “a monster with a hammer.” “[A]though we have characterized arguments using metaphors for a defendant such as ‘animal’ and ‘snake’ as ‘unnecessary and undesirable,’ we have held that allowing them is not reversible error. Simmons v. State, 266 Ga. 223, 228–229, 466 S.E.2d 205 (1996). See also Brannan v. State, 275 Ga. 70, 85, 561 S.E.2d 414 (2002) (finding no reversible error in the prosecutor's characterizations of the defendant as ‘a coward, a beast, and an animal, and as wicked and evil,’ even if they had been objected to at trial).” Accord, Edenfield v. State , 293 Ga. 370, 744 S.E.2d 738 (June 17, 2013); Spears v. State , 296 Ga. 598, 769 S.E.2d 337 (February 16, 2015) (reference to defendant as a “rabid animal” was “unnecessary and undesireable,” but not basis for reversal). Davis v. State, 308 Ga.App. 7, 706 S.E.2d 710 (February 17, 2011). Convictions for burglary, aggravated assault and obstruction affirmed; no mistrial required based on prosecutor’s closing argument. Prosecutor argued that, given the number of officers killed in the line of duty in similar situations, defendant was lucky not to get shot. “[T]he prosecutor's remarks did not go so far as to insinuate that Davis had attempted to kill any of the officers that day. And, the remarks did relate, in part, to Davis's obviously precarious situation given the investigator's response to his encounter with Davis, namely, drawing his gun. Moreover, after being cautioned by the trial court that the wide latitude afforded counsel during closing argument was not boundless, the prosecutor did not revisit the point concerning police officers, but turned to the more narrow encounter between Davis and Hill involving the screwdriver, which gave rise to the aggravated assault count.” Lewis v. State, 287 Ga. 210, 695 S.E.2d 224 (May 17, 2010). “[T]he trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to declare a mistrial as the result of the prosecutor's reference during closing argument to another recent case, in an effort to illustrate the concept of implied malice. ‘[C]ounsel may make use of well-established historical facts in his argument and make full use of illustrations as long as he does not introduce “extrinsic and prejudicial matters” which have no basis in the evidence.’ (Citation omitted.) Robinson v. State, 257 Ga. 194, 196(4) (357 S.E.2d 74) (1987).” Nash v. State, 285 Ga. 753, 683 S.E.2d 591 (September 28, 2009). Closing argument was not improper: “Ladies and gentlemen, when you read about terrorists. This man was a terrorist. I'm asking you to do something about it.” “Here, the facts show that appellant brandished a gun at the victim, shot the victim, and pointed the gun at a bystander, threatening to shoot. Insofar as appellant threatened to commit a crime of violence against another, he made a terroristic threat (OCGA § 16-11-37), and it was not far afield for the prosecutor to argue that appellant was a terrorist.” Dixon v. State, 285 Ga. 312, 677 S.E.2d 76 (April 28, 2009). No error where trial court prohibited defense counsel in closing “from referring to another recent local case in which a defendant had been convicted on circumstantial evidence but later cleared after DNA testing. [Co-defendant] Holodick wished to analogize to the case to emphasize the limitations of circumstantial evidence. ‘Analogizing a defendant or a defendant's case to another well-known defendant or case is permissible during argument if the analogy is supported by facts in evidence. See Robinson v. State, 257 Ga. 194(4) (357