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Ga. 115-116(1), 464 S.E.2d 371 (1995), and the right to attack it cannot be waived or destroyed by laches. Hubbard v. State, 225 Ga.App. 154, 155, 483 S.E.2d 115 (1997).” I. MUNICIPAL POLICE Criddle v. State, 310 Ga.App. 78, 712 S.E.2d 569 (June 16, 2011). Physical precedent only. DUI conviction affirmed; city officer could effect arrest where road was in city limits and defendant’s vehicle was at least partly in right-of-way, although adjoining property was outside city limits. Devega v. State, 286 Ga. 448, 689 S.E.2d 293 (February 1, 2010). Trial court properly denied motion to suppress statements of defendant obtained upon warrantless arrest of defendant for drug charges by city police officer outside city limits, where arrest was supported by probable cause. “‘Where probable cause exists, even an illegal, warrantless arrest in a suspect's home does not render inadmissible subsequent statements made outside the premises. [Cits.]’ Pittman v. State, 277 Ga. 475, 479(4) (592 S.E.2d 72) (2004). Thus, even if we assume that the warrantless arrest in this case was illegal because the officers were outside their jurisdiction, suppression of the fruits of that arrest is not required because the arrest was made with sufficient probable cause and in an office, rather than in the sanctity of the home. See State v. Giangregorio, 181 Ga.App. 324, 325 (352 S.E.2d 193) (1986) (upholding arrest and subsequent search of defendant at airport in Clayton County by DeKalb County officer who was working on multi-agency drug task force, but had not been sworn as a Clayton County deputy).” Griffis v. State, 295 Ga.App. 903, 673 S.E.2d 348 (February 10, 2009). Municipal officer had authority to make arrest for DUI and related traffic charges outside his municipal jurisdiction where he personally observed the offenses. “‘As a general rule, a municipal police officer is authorized to investigate crimes and/or arrest suspects only for those infractions that occur within that officer's territorial jurisdiction.’ State v. Gehris, 242 Ga.App. 384, 385-386 (528 S.E.2d 300) (2000) (interpreting OCGA § 40-13-30). We have held, however, that ‘[a]n officer has authority “to arrest a person accused of violating any law or ordinance governing the operation of a vehicle ... where the offense is committed in his presence” regardless of territorial limitations.’ Gehris, supra, 242 Ga.App. at 386. See also OCGA § 17-4-23(a) (‘[a] law enforcement officer may arrest a person accused of violating any law or ordinance governing the operation, licensing, registration, maintenance, or inspection of motor vehicles by the issuance of a citation, provided the offense is committed in his presence’).” Fact that county officer within his jurisdiction arrived on the scene did not deprive municipal officer of power to act. Accord, Duprel v. State , 301 Ga.App. 469, 687 S.E.2d 863 (November 19, 2009); State v. Bethel , 307 Ga.App. 508, 705 S.E.2d 860 (December 28, 2010). State v. Gehris, 242 Ga.App. 384, 528 S.E.2d 300 (January 19, 2000). In DUI prosecution, trial court erred by granting motion to suppress; fact that county officer had concluded his investigation without arresting defendant driver didn’t prevent city officers from detaining driver themselves. Defendant’s vehicle scratched city officer’s vehicle in restaurant parking lot outside city limits. City officer followed, activated emergency lights, pulled defendant over (by this time within city limits), and called county officer to handle the matter. County officer wrote an accident report but issued no citations. City officer then detained defendant further and “administered several field sobriety tests before arresting Gehris for driving under the influence.” 1. City officers had jurisdiction to stop and arrest driver for traffic violation occurring outside city limits pursuant to OCGA § 40-13-30. 2. City officials did not relinquish their authority or jurisdiction by calling county officer. “[S]eparate law enforcement agencies often work together. [fn] We see no reason for creating a rule that, by asking another agency for assistance, the officers from the first agency relinquish their authority.” 3. Distinguishing cases where same officer ends detention then begins it anew: this line of cases “does not mean, however, that when officers from multiple law enforcement agencies work together to investigate a traffic violation, and an officer from one agency releases the motorist without conducting a complete investigation, that the officers from the other agency are precluded from further investigating the motorist unless he does something new to arouse suspicion. If the Doraville officers had reasonable suspicion that Gehris was driving under the influence, the fact that [Dekalb Officer] chose not to investigate that issue does not deprive [Doraville Officers] of their independent authority to investigate.” J. ORDINANCE VIOLATIONS Focus Entertainment Int’l v. Bailey, 256 Ga.App. 283, 568 S.E.2d 183 (July 2, 2002). OCGA § 15-10-61, which requires magistrate courts to bind over county ordinance violations to state courts when a demand for jury trial is made, does not apply to municipal courts. Thus, there is no right to have municipal court violations bound over to state court for jury trial. Citing Smith v. Greene , 274 Ga. 815, 559 S.E.2d 726 (Feb. 4, 2002).