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7. POSSESSION OF DRUG-RELATED OBJECTS McGhee v. State, 303 Ga.App. 297, 692 S.E.2d 864 (March 31, 2010). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for possession of drug related object, namely, a glass pipe. Defendant argues “that the State failed to prove that the glass pipe, which was found in his pocket after his arrest, was a drug related object because it was never tested to determine whether it had been used to smoke methamphetamine. … [W]e disagree. While the presence of drug residue in a pipe ‘may go to prove the element of “intent to use” under OCGA § 16-13-32.2, such residue is not, in itself, an essential element of the crime.’ Jones v. State, 237 Ga.App. 847, 850(4) (515 S.E.2d 841) (1999).” 8. POSSESSION OF IMITATION CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES Cooper v. State, 324 Ga.App. 451, 751 S.E.2d 102 (November 4, 2013). Evidence didn’t support conviction for possession of a counterfeit drug, OCGA § 16-13-30(i)(1). Although an officer thought “that the pill found in Cooper's apartment appeared to be suspected MDMA,” there was no “evidence establishing that the pill bore markings that misidentified or misrepresented it as being MDMA.[fn] Because the record contains no evidence from which the factfinder could conclude that the pill was a counterfeit controlled substance as defined in the statute, this conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence.” The pill was actually piperazine, “sometimes referred to as ‘synthetic ecstacy,’ and which has been confused with or treated as ecstacy by law enforcement.” Diaz v. State, 296 Ga.App. 589, 676 S.E.2d 252 (March 12, 2009). Rule of lenity did not require that defendant’s conviction for felony possession with intent to distribute a noncontrolled substance, OCGA § 16-13-31.1, to be sentenced as misdemeanor unlawful manufacture, distribution, possession with intent to distribute an imitation controlled substance under OCGA § 16-13-30.2. “Imitation controlled substance” is defined in OCGA § 26-24-32(12.1)(B) as “[a] product, not a controlled substance, which, by representations made and by dosage unit appearance , including color, shape, size, or markings, would lead a reasonable person to believe that, if ingested, the product would have a stimulant or depressant effect....” (Emphasis supplied.). “Notwithstanding that the noncontrolled substance was in common packaging for narcotics, the evidence did not establish that the substance appeared as a ‘dosage unit’ based on color, shape, size, or markings. See State v. Burgess, [263 Ga. 143, 146 (429 S.E.2d 252) (1993)] (brown powder wrapped in small package did not appear to be a dosage unit); Chandler v. State, 294 Ga.App. 27(3) (668 S.E.2d 510) (2008) (bag of white, powdery substance that appeared to be cocaine was not a dosage unit). Compare Brown v. State, 276 Ga. 606, 608(1) (581 S.E.2d 35) (2003) (substance appeared to be ten dollar dosage unit of crack cocaine, based on the substance's color, shape, size, texture, and overall appearance). Pretermitting whether in this case ‘a reasonable person of ordinary knowledge would not be able to distinguish the imitation from the controlled substance by outward appearances,’ as Juan Diaz argues, the evidence fails to establish that the substance in this case was ‘specifically designed or manufactured’ to resemble a controlled substance. OCGA § 16-13-21 (12.1) (A).” 9. POSSESSION OF NON-CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE Diaz v. State, 296 Ga.App. 589, 676 S.E.2d 252 (March 12, 2009). Rule of lenity did not require that defendant’s conviction for felony possession with intent to distribute a noncontrolled substance, OCGA § 16-13-31.1, to be sentenced as misdemeanor unlawful manufacture, distribution, possession with intent to distribute an imitation controlled substance under OCGA § 16-13-30.2. “Imitation controlled substance” is defined in OCGA § 26-24-32(12.1)(B) as “[a] product, not a controlled substance, which, by representations made and by dosage unit appearance , including color, shape, size, or markings, would lead a reasonable person to believe that, if ingested, the product would have a stimulant or depressant effect....” (Emphasis supplied.). “Notwithstanding that the noncontrolled substance was in common packaging for narcotics, the evidence did not establish that the substance appeared as a ‘dosage unit’ based on color, shape, size, or markings. See State v. Burgess, [263 Ga. 143, 146 (429 S.E.2d 252) (1993)] (brown powder wrapped in small package did not appear to be a dosage unit); Chandler v. State, 294 Ga.App. 27(3) (668 S.E.2d 510) (2008) (bag of white, powdery substance that appeared to be cocaine was not a dosage unit). Compare Brown v. State, 276 Ga. 606, 608(1) (581 S.E.2d 35) (2003) (substance appeared to be ten dollar dosage unit of crack cocaine, based on the substance's color, shape, size, texture, and overall appearance). Pretermitting whether in this case ‘a reasonable person of ordinary knowledge would not be able to distinguish the imitation from the controlled substance by outward appearances,’ as Juan Diaz argues, the evidence fails to establish that the substance in this case was ‘specifically designed or manufactured’ to resemble a controlled substance. OCGA § 16-13-21 (12.1) (A).” 10. POSSESSION OF SUBSTANCES WITH INTENT TO MANUFACTURE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES Hutchins v. State, 326 Ga.App. 250, 756 S.E.2d 347 (March 14, 2014). Evidence didn’t support conviction for use or