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and trafficking in methamphetamine, and the indictment specified that the substances were “separate and distinct,” defendant could not be convicted under both counts based upon the same substance. “The situation in this case is analogous to one where a prosecutor might find forty-eight grams of methamphetamine in one search, in two packages, one weighing twenty-nine grams and the other weighing nineteen grams, and from that evidence try to argue that the defendant could properly be charged and convicted on both trafficking and possession counts. The language of the statute, ‘28 grams or more,’ would not allow the prosecutor to divide the amount discovered during the search for the purpose of creating multiple charges. See OCGA § 16-13-31(e).” Adorno v. State, 236 Ga.App. 588, 512 S.E.2d 703 (February 22, 1999). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for cocaine trafficking: “Adorno argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for trafficking because the expert witness from the crime lab admittedly did not test the entire 849.9 gram sample of cocaine for purity. However, a similar argument was made and rejected in Covington v. State, 226 Ga.App. 484, 486 S.E.2d 706 (1997), in which the defendant challenged the sufficiency of his trafficking conviction based upon the fact that the expert witness did not test the entire sample, but rather tested representative pieces in reaching his conclusion that the cocaine was 32 percent pure. This Court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to convict for trafficking. Id. at 485(2), 486 S.E.2d 706. Likewise, in this case , the chemist ‘took a little ... from several of the pieces [of cocaine] and mixed them together’ before testing for purity. Furthermore, the expert testified that she tested enough of the individual pieces of cocaine to add up to 400 grams. Thus, as in Covington, we find the evidence sufficient to sustain Adorno’s conviction.” 16. USING COMMUNICATION FACILITY TO COMMIT DRUG OFFENSE Kimble v. State, 301 Ga.App. 237, 687 S.E.2d 242 (November 20, 2009). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for using a communication facility in committing a felony; “[w]hile the State did not present testimony from [anyone] identifying [defendant’s] voice on the recordings” of phone calls in question, circumstantial evidence allowed jury to conclude that it was defendant. Number called was identified as defendant’s number; content of calls pointed to facts known about defendant; and voice in background of recording called defendant by name, “a verbal act connecting [defendant] with the phone number called. See Weems v. State, 295 Ga.App. 680, 683-684(4) (673 S.E.2d 50) (2009).” Rogers v. State, 298 Ga.App. 895, 681S.E.2d 693 (July 10, 2009). Evidence was sufficient to prove venue for some counts of using telephone to facilitate commission of a felony, OCGA § 16-13-32.3, where location of one party to conversation was proven, but not where location of neither party was proven. Venue may lie at either end of phone conversation. As to some counts, location of informant in county was proven, but in others, was not, nor was defendant’s location proven. “The State asserts that we should apply OCGA § 17-2-2(e) to conclude that venue existed in Newton County for the phone calls made on September 24 and 25, 2003, while Rogers was traveling from Cobb or Rockdale County to deliver the drugs in Newton County. This Code section provides that ‘[i]f a crime is committed upon any ... vehicle ... traveling within this state and it cannot readily be determined in which county the crime was committed, the crime shall be considered as having been committed in any county in which the crime could have been committed through which the ... vehicle ... has traveled.’ We cannot apply this Code section to the facts before us, however, because the State could have readily determined where the crime was committed. The record shows that members of the drug task force knew the location of the informant during her phone calls with Rogers.” Capers v. State, 273 Ga.App. 427, 615 S.E.2d 126 (April 12, 2005). “OCGA § 16-13-32.3(a) provides, in relevant part, that it shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally use any communication facility in committing or in causing or facilitating the commission of any act or acts constituting a felony under the GCSA. The code section provides that the term ‘communication facility’ includes any instrument used in the transmission of signals or sounds, including the telephone and all other means of communication,” including, here, a pager. Russell v. State , 243 Ga.App. 378, 532 S.E.2d 137 (March 22, 2000). Evidence supported conviction for using “a communication device to obtain possession of more than one ounce of marijuana” where he repeatedly telephoned a friend to pick up packages containing marijuana from Federal Express. D. CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON (TITLE 16, CHAPTER 5, ARTICLES 2-8) 1. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT Hoglen v. State, A15A1755, ___ Ga.App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1203839 (March 29, 2016). Evidence didn’t support conviction for aggravated assault. Hoglen ran when sheriff’s deputies arrived at his home to arrest him on an outstanding warrant. “As Hoglen was apprehended, he began screaming, ‘Paw Paw, they’re killing me,’ and ‘They are