☢ test - Í

Ga.App. 860, 658 S.E.2d 441 (2008) (physical precedent only): “there was insufficient evidence to show use of a deadly weapon where a woman ‘hit her husband once with the “non-business end” of a box cutter and inflicted a minor cut to his face and an injury to the inside of his mouth’ and where there was ‘no evidence that the blade or knife of the box cutter was ever exposed or that [the wife] ever threatened her husband with an exposed blade.’” As used, the box-cutter wasn’t per se a deadly weapon, unlike the large knife here. Klicka v. State, 315 Ga.App. 635, 727 S.E.2d 248 (April 13, 2012). Evidence didn’t support defendant’s probation revocation based on aggravated assault. “The evidence here did show that Klicka hit another vehicle in his attempt to elude the officer, but absent some evidence in addition to the mere collision, the State failed to prove the intent necessary to show that Klicka collided with the vehicle in an attempt to injure someone for purposes of an aggravated assault offense. See [ Montford v. State, 254 Ga.App. 524, 527(1)(a) (564 S.E.2d 216) (2002)] (‘the fact that [the defendant] was speeding, eluding police, and not paying attention does not amount to intent to harm [the alleged assault victim]’).” Santiago v. State, 314 Ga.App. 623, 724 S.E.2d 793 (February 17, 2012). Aggravated assault conviction reversed; no competent evidence showed that victim was aware defendant had a gun, or that he thus “had been placed in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. See generally Rhodes v. State, 257 Ga. 368, 370(5) (359 S.E.2d 670) (1987) (the act of pointing a firearm at another does not constitute aggravated assault where the victim is completely unaware that the firearm is pointed at him).” Cantera v. State, 289 Ga. 583, 713 S.E.2d 826 (June 27, 2011). Affirming 304 Ga.App. 289 (696 S.E.2d 354) (2010); in the context presented, trial court was not required to define simple assault in charging jury on aggravated assault. Simple assault charge wasn’t required under the facts of this case, where “a perpetrator simply shot a victim intentionally and for no apparent reason.” In this situation, “there would be no need to charge the jury on simple assault for placing an individual in reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury or attempting to cause a violent injury with a deadly weapon, because the act of aggravated assault by ‘us[ing] [a deadly weapon or a device] offensively against a person [in a manner that] is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury’ would have already been completed. OCGA § 16–5–21.” However, “‘[t]he jury must be given “an appropriate instruction as to the law on each substantive point or issue involved in the case”’ ((citation and punctuation omitted) Chase v. State, 277 Ga. 636, 639(2) (592 S.E.2d 656) (2004)), and there are certainly circumstances under which simple assault would constitute a substantive point or issue in an aggravated assault case. … For example, if a gunman intentionally shot at a victim, but missed and caused no injury to the victim, a jury would have to be informed that the perpetrator could still be found guilty of aggravated assault despite the fact that he or she did not cause any physical injury to the victim. In this regard, the jury would have to be instructed on the elements of simple assault. The charge would be required under such circumstances because the jury would need to know that the perpetrator could be found guilty of aggravated assault for having ‘[a]ttempt[ed] to commit a violent injury to the person of another[,] or ... [for having] [c]ommit[ted] an act which place[d] another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury’ through the use of a deadly weapon. OCGA §§ 16–5–20(a) and 16–5–21.” “In sum, there is a distinction between aggravated assault cases with injuries that have been intentionally inflicted based upon the evidence and those where, although there may be injuries, intent may be in question. In cases where intent is in question, a charge on simple assault must be given so the jury can see that, although no physical harm may have been done, the defendant could still be found guilty of aggravated assault if the jury finds that the defendant attempted to commit a violent injury or if the defendant performed an act which placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.” Compare Coney (March 19, 2008), below. Accord, Holloman v. State , 293 Ga. 151, 744 S.E.2d 59 (June 3, 2013); Taylor v. State , 327 Ga.App. 288, 758 S.E.2d 629 (May 7, 2014). In re: Q.S., 310 Ga.App. 70, 712 S.E.2d 99 (June 16, 2011). Evidence supported delinquency adjudication based on aggravated assault: “The evidence shows that Q.S., using her hands, grabbed the victim by the hair, pulled her to the ground, and slammed the head of the victim upon the ground. All three assailants then used their feet to kick the victim as she lay curled upon the floor. And as a result of the assault, the lip and nose of the victim were bloodied, her face was bruised and began to swell, she was missing hair that had been pulled from her scalp, she was unable to stand or walk without assistance, and she complained of a headache and dizziness. These injuries were serious enough to prompt her mother to take her to a hospital and serious enough for medical personnel to order a CT scan. The evidence is sufficient to sustain the finding of aggravated assault.” In re: D.M., 308 Ga.App. 589, 708 S.E.2d 550 (March 21, 2011). Evidence didn’t support delinquency adjudication