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suggests that it would have been impossible to inflict them both simultaneously with one pair of hands, the trial court did not err in concluding that the offenses did not merge. See, Jones v. State, 285 Ga.App. 114, 115-116(1) (645 S.E.2d 602) (2007) (aggravated assault with knife and aggravated assault with gun did not merge); Taylor v. State, 202 Ga.App. 671, 672-673 (415 S.E.2d 483) (1992) (aggravated assault with a knife and aggravated assault with hands and fists did not merge).” Mackey v. State, 296 Ga.App. 675, 675 S.E.2d 567 (March 17, 2009). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-20(a)(2). “Subsection (a)(2) of the assault statute “requires only the criminal intent to commit the acts which caused the victim to be reasonably apprehensive of receiving a violent injury, not any underlying intent of the accused in assaulting the victim.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Kirkland v. State, 282 Ga.App. 331, 332-333(1) (638 S.E.2d 784) (2006). In this case, the record shows that Officer Miller reasonably apprehended immediately receiving a violent injury when Mackey backed toward him.” Henderson v. State, 285 Ga. 240, 675 S.E.2d 28 (March 9, 2009). “‘“(A)ggravated assault is not a lesser included offense of armed robbery as a matter of law, and the two offenses rarely merge as a matter of fact. (Cits.)” [Cit.]’ Silvers v. State, 278 Ga. 45, 48(4) (597 S.E.2d 373) (2004).” Pointing gun at victim outside house would not merge with later crimes occurring inside house. Sims v. State, 296 Ga.App. 461, 675 S.E.2d 241 (March 5, 2009). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (his fists); Sims's argument that he only intended to escape [from the deputy/victim] and not to injure the officer is not cause for reversal. ‘Unlike an aggravated assault committed with the intent to murder, rape, or rob, aggravated assault with a[n object] which is likely to result in serious bodily injury does not require a specific criminal intent; rather, it requires only a ... general intent to injure. General intent to injure may be proven by circumstantial evidence and is a question of fact for the trier of fact to determine.’ (Citations omitted.) Maynor v. State, 257 Ga.App. 151, 153 (570 S.E.2d 428) (2002).” Accord, Walker v. State , 298 Ga.App. 265, 679 S.E.2d 814 (June 9, 2009). Taylor v. State, 296 Ga.App. 212, 674 S.E.2d 81 (February 19, 2009). Evidence supported defendant’s aggravated assault conviction arising from gang rumble. “Taylor's group and Southside Mafia members agreed to meet at the park to ‘settle’ a dispute. Taylor knowingly took part and pointed a gun out of the window as the red car approached the Southside Mafia leader, conduct certain to draw fire from Southside Mafia members in the park. Under these circumstances, a reasonable fact finder could determine that Taylor and the other participants in the gun battle shared a common criminal intent – to assault each other with guns, intent that then transferred to the innocent bystanders. [fn] And given Taylor's role in the gun battle, he is not absolved of responsibility simply because he may have fled the scene before the shots struck the victims. See Ros v. State, 279 Ga. 604, 605(1) (619 S.E.2d 644) (2005) (defendant gang member who instigated attack on rival gang criminally responsible for death of victim of attack, even though defendant fled the scene before fatal shot was fired).” Accord, Emmanuel v. State , 300 Ga.App. 378, 685 S.E.2d 361 (October 7, 2009). Paul v. State, 296 Ga.App. 6, 673 S.E.2d 551 (February 11, 2009). At defendant’s aggravated assault trial, no error in failing to charge on lesser offenses not supported by evidence. 1. Simple assault. “Here, the evidence shows that if Paul committed a simple assault, it was done with a deadly weapon, making the crime an aggravated assault. Thus, a charge on simple assault was not warranted.” 2. Pointing a pistol at another. “Under OCGA § 16-11-102, ‘[a] person is guilty of a misdemeanor when he intentionally and without legal justification points or aims a gun or pistol at another, whether the gun or pistol is loaded or unloaded.’ Evidence that [victim] tried to back up his car while nervously watching Paul extract a gun from his pocket showed an apprehension of receiving a violent injury which precluded an instruction on pointing a pistol at another.” Accord, Dailey v. State , 313 Ga.App. 809, 723 S.E.2d 43 (January 31, 2012) (victims’ reaction to having gun pointed at that prohibited jury charge on pointing a firearm at another). 3. Reckless conduct. “[T]he only inference that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence was that in pointing the gun at [victim], Paul did so intentionally, not ‘consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his act or omission [would] cause harm or endanger [Hoskins's] safety.’ Therefore, a jury instruction on reckless conduct was not warranted by the evidence.” Accord, Taylor v. State , 296 Ga.App. 212, 674 S.E.2d 81 (February 19, 2009); Hudson v. State , 296 Ga.App. 692, 675 S.E.2d 578 (March 17, 2009); Emmanuel v. State , 300 Ga.App. 378, 685 S.E.2d 361 (October 7, 2009). Bell v. State, 284 Ga. 790, 671 S.E.2d 815 (January 12, 2009). Trial court erred in sentencing defendant for both malice murder and aggravated assault, based on same beating of victim. “See Fletcher v. State, 284 Ga. 653, 670 S.E.2d 411 (November 17, 2008); Thomas v. State, 284 Ga. 540 (668 S.E.2d 711) (2008) (aggravated assault conviction