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for aggravated stalking charge properly lay in county where victim received defendant’s letter. State v. Burke, 287 Ga. 377, 695 S.E.2d 649 (June 28, 2010). Affirming 297 Ga.App. 38 (676 S.E.2d 766) (2009), defendant’s conviction for aggravated stalking reversed; “because the State's entire prosecution was based on a single violation of the protective order, and because a single violation of a protective order does not, in and of itself, establish a pattern of harassing and intimidating conduct, the State had not proven that Burke was guilty of aggravated stalking.” Explained, Louisyr (February 4, 2011), above. Gaston v. State, 303 Ga.App. 502, 693 S.E.2d 841 (March 16, 2010). Indictment for aggravated stalking was sufficient although it didn’t identify the order which enjoined defendant from contacting victim. Notes that there was only one such order. Vaughn v. State, 301 Ga.App. 55, 686 S.E.2d 847 (November 16, 2009). No fatal variance where charge of aggravated stalking gave the wrong date for the bond which defendant violated. “In this case, there is no contention that there was more than one bond which prohibited Vaughn from having violent contact with the victim. And although the dates differ, the case number referred to in the indictment and that contained on the special condition are the same. Moreover, Vaughn's signature appears on the special condition, establishing his awareness of the imposition of the condition that he have no violent contact with [victim]. Further, the indictment clearly put Vaughn on notice that the aggravated stalking charge was based on a violation of the special condition.” Accord, Gaston (March 16, 2010), above. Reversed on other grounds, State v. Kelly , 290 Ga. 29, 718 S.E.2d 232 (November 7, 2011). Davidson v. State, 295 Ga.App. 702, 673 S.E.2d 93 (January 27, 2009). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for aggravated stalking. “Although Davidson contends there is no evidence that he contacted S.W. on September 7 for the purpose of harassing or intimidating her, ‘[i]ntent is a question of fact to be determined upon consideration of words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and all other circumstances connected with the act for which the accused is prosecuted.’ Phillips v. State, 278 Ga.App. 198, 200(1), 628 S.E.2d 631 (2006) (citation and punctuation omitted); see Thomas v. State , 276 Ga.App. 79, 80(1), 622 S.E.2d 421 (2005). ‘Furthermore, where the defendant offers an explanation of circumstantial facts or an alternative hypothesis of events, the reasonableness of that explanation is for the factfinder. Because the factfinder has heard the witnesses and observed them testify, it is considered more capable of determining the reasonableness of the hypothesis produced by the evidence or lack thereof than is an appellate court.’ Boyd [ v. State, 291 Ga.App. 528, 529-530, 662 S.E.2d 295 (2008)] (footnote omitted). Given the history of Davidson's ongoing actions, threats, and refusal to leave [victim] S.W. alone, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the contact at issue was for the purpose of harassing and intimidating S.W. See Hennessey v. State, 282 Ga.App. 857, 860, 640 S.E.2d 362 (2006); Phillips, supra; Thomas, supra.” Accord, Hervey (March 8, 2011), above. Hollis v. State, 295 Ga.App. 529, 672 S.E.2d 487 (January 13, 2009). In jury charge on aggravated stalking, trial court was not required, with or without request, to define “harassing and intimidating.” “‘The rule is that when the charge embraces a section of the Code which contains technical words or expressions, the meaning of which is probably not understood by a person unlearned in the law, the court should so define them as to convey to the jury a correct idea of their meaning, but it is unnecessary for the court, even upon request, to explain words and expressions which are of ordinary understanding and self-explanatory.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Baird v. State, 201 Ga.App. 378, 378- 379 (411 S.E.2d 332) (1991). … [W]e find that the words ‘harassing and intimidating,’ as used in OCGA § 16-5-91, ‘are not words of art but rather are words of common understanding and meaning which require no definition themselves for understanding by the jury’ Baird, supra, 201 Ga.App. at 378.” Hayles v. State, 287 Ga.App. 601, 651 S.E.2d 860 (September 19, 2007). Defendant contends that he couldn’t be convicted of aggravated stalking because he was going to his house to retrieve his tools. “ OCGA § 16-5-92 provides that ‘persons or employees of such persons lawfully engaged in bona fide business activity or lawfully engaged in the practice of a profession’ cannot be convicted of aggravated stalking under OCGA §§ 16-5-90 or 16-5-91. Even assuming that Hayles drove his work van to his house in order to retrieve some tools for use in his construction business, he could not have done so lawfully because a court had barred him from returning to the house without a police escort. The trial court correctly denied Hayles’s request to charge on OCGA § 16-5-92.” Bragg v. State, 285 Ga.App. 408, 646 S.E.2d 508 (May 16, 2007). Evidence was insufficient to support defendant’s conviction for aggravated stalking; offense requires proof that the contact be “ without the consent of the other person” (emphasis in court opinion), but evidence here showed that victim arranged the meeting between them . Accord, Wright