☢ test - Í

ingesting prescription methadone, where it was shown the child had fallen ill for several hours before the woman sought medical attention, and where it was shown that the woman had previously given the child crushed prescription Xanax in his milk).” Oliphant v. State, 295 Ga. 597, 759 S.E.2d 821 (June 16, 2014). Evidence supported convictions for first-degree child cruelty, based on killing the children’s mother in their presence. “Contrary to Oliphant's assertion, the statute does not require evidence that the defendant had any specific awareness of a child's presence when committing the act in question. Rather, the statute requires only that the defendant commit an act with malice and, in so doing, cause a child the requisite pain. Regarding the intent component, we have stated that ‘it must be established that the mental state of the defendant has the absence of all elements of justification or excuse and the presence of an actual intent to cause the particular harm, or [that] there is the wanton and wilful doing of an act with an awareness of a plain and strong likelihood that such harm might result.’ Banta v. State, 282 Ga. 392, 397(5) (651 S.E.2d 21) (2007). Here, Oliphant was an accomplice in the malice murder of Paola, which was witnessed by all three children, who were under her care at the time. All three children testified at trial to their fright and angst during and immediately after the shooting.” Pritchett v. State, 327 Ga.App. 389, 759 S.E.2d 300 (May 30, 2014). Evidence supported convictions for first degree cruelty to children where “Pritchett repeatedly and frequently shot the children with airsoft pistols and an airsoft rifle, shooting C.W. in his groin. The pellets left welts on the children and some of pellets caused broken skin. Both children testified that the pellets caused them pain and made them cry. There was also evidence from which the jury could conclude that the children suffered mental pain. C.W. created drawings showing that he was sad and crying as Pritchett shot him, and he testified that he would hide to avoid being hit by the pellets. T.W. told her classmates and teacher that she would always have a memory of being shot with an airsoft gun for misbehaving. This evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the pain suffered by the children was cruel and excessive.” “While Pritchett is correct that implicit in the definition of cruel or excessive is an element of unreasonableness, see Allen v. State, 174 Ga.App. 206, 208(3), 329 S.E.2d 586 (1985), there was evidence from which the jury could conclude that the use of the airsoft gun to discipline the children was unreasonable discipline. Indeed, one of Pritchett's own witnesses testified that he would not use such a method to discipline children.” Dyer v. State, 295 Ga. 173, 758 S.E.2d 301 (May 5, 2014). Felony murder conviction, based on child cruelty, affirmed; evidence of child’s prior injuries was properly admitted as “part of the constellation of injuries considered by the expert medical witnesses in determining whether the baby's condition was the result of accident.” Hutchins v. State, 326 Ga.App. 250, 756 S.E.2d 347 (March 14, 2014). Evidence supported conviction for child cruelty by permitting her child to be present where meth was being manufactured, in violation of OCGA § 16-5-73(b)(1). “The jury could … infer from the evidence that Hutchins was aware that her mother was manufacturing methamphetamine, and that she intentionally permitted her three-year-old child to live in the home while that activity was occurring.” Conviction reversed based on ineffective assistance of counsel, however. White v. State, 319 Ga.App. 530, 737 S.E.2d 324 (January 15, 2013). Second-degree child cruelty, and related convictions, affirmed. Rule of lenity didn’t require reducing the charge to misdemeanor third-degree child cruelty. “Notably, the third degree of the offense does not require proof that the child victim suffered ‘cruel or excessive physical or mental pain’ or, indeed, that the victim suffered any other specific type or degree of harm, [fn] and, therefore, the statutes do not differ only with respect to their prescribed punishment. Although the jury could have found White guilty of the third degree of the offense, based on the violent attack he waged against the adult victim in the child victims' presence, the evidence authorized the jury to find the additional element required for the second degree of the offense, that is, that White's conduct caused the child victims to suffer cruel and excessive mental pain, as alleged in the indictment.” Brown v. State, 316 Ga.App. 137, 728 S.E.2d 778 (June 7, 2012). Child cruelty conviction affirmed; trial court properly admitted evidence that defendant “continued her relationship with Smith even after Smith's abuse of L.B.” The evidence “was relevant to show the State's theory as to Brown's state of mind close in time to the incident of abuse—that is, that Brown valued her relationship with Smith more than she valued the safety and well-being of her own child.” Rollf v. State, 314 Ga.App. 596, 724 S.E.2d 881 (March 5, 2012). Rule of lenity didn’t require that felony child cruelty charges be tried or sentenced as misdemeanors. “First degree cruelty to children requires proof that the perpetrator acted with malice and that the children suffered cruel or excessive physical or mental pain while third degree cruelty to children requires only that the perpetrator do an act with knowledge that a minor child is present and can see or hear the act.