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that defendant “should be held accountable for his actions … was permissible”). Pace v. State, 271 Ga. 829, 524 S.E.2d 490 (December 3, 1999). Defendant’s convictions for capital murder, rape, and related offenses affirmed; the “send a message” argument is permissible in the guilt-innocence phase of trial. Accord, Poellnitz v. State , 296 Ga. 134, 765 S.E.2d 343 (November 3, 2014). Laney v. State, 271 Ga. 194, 515 S.E.2d 610 (May 17, 1999). “ The prosecutor did not go outside the boundaries of permissible argument when she told the jury that ‘this is your community,’ nor when she said that defense counsel did ‘an excellent job’ and was ‘a very, very good attorney,’ that rap music ‘refers to women in derogatory terms,’ or that Laney had a ‘smirk’ on his face during the trial. See Morgan v. State, 267 Ga. 203, 204, 476 S.E.2d 747 (1996) (counsel are allowed considerable latitude of speech). See also McClain v. State, 267 Ga. 378, 385, 477 S.E.2d 814 (1996) (prosecutor may urge jury to convict for safety of community); Greene v. State, 266 Ga. 439, 447, 469 S.E.2d 129 (1996) (not improper to comment on defendant's courtroom demeanor), reversed on other grounds, Greene v. Georgia, 519 U.S. 145, 117 S.Ct. 578, 136 L.Ed.2d 507 (1996).” 26. CONTENT – SENTENCING/POTENTIAL SENTENCE Dix v. State, 307 Ga.App. 684, 705 S.E.2d 903 (February 1, 2011). Convictions for cocaine and marijuana possession, and related offenses, affirmed; no mistrial required based on prosecutor’s repeated comment in closing argument that defendant’s marijuana charge was a misdemeanor, where trial court both times instructed jury to disregard the improper comment. Johnson v. State, 246 Ga.App. 109, 539 S.E.2d 605 (September 22, 2000). Convictions for armed robbery and related offenses affirmed; trial court properly prohibited defense from arguing to the jury “the significant sentencing disparity between armed robbery and robbery by intimidation. The jury acts as a finder of fact. The legislature determines the range of sentences for a crime. The trial court properly refused to allow Johnson to argue to the jury that, in effect, the legislature was wrong in creating its sentencing structure.” Defendant here soaked store clerk with gasoline, then menaced him with a lit cigarette. Defendant argues here that “that a sentence imposed on one convicted of armed robbery not using a weapon capable of causing serious bodily harm is unconstitutionally disproportionate because it subjects the perpetrator to a minimum ten-year sentence for a crime in which the victim was not actually subject to serious physical injury,” an argument that would not seem to be supported by the evidence, and in any event rejected by the Court. “We note that the fear imposed on a victim who reasonably believes he or she is being threatened by a weapon capable of causing serious bodily harm, but which is not so capable, is no less real than the fear of a victim faced with an actual deadly weapon.” 27. CONTENT – VICTIM IMPACT See subheading CONTENT – GOLDEN RULE/VICTIM IMPACT, above 28. NOT EVIDENCE Griffin v. State, 291 Ga.App. 618, 662 S.E.2d 171 (May 1, 2008). Evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction for giving officers a false name. “The evidence showed that, at the time of his arrest, Griffin told the officers that his name was ‘James Edward White.’ About two hours later, the officers discovered that his name was, in fact, ‘Walter James Griffin.’ At trial, Griffin’s counsel asked one of the officers if he had ‘ever been made aware’ that Griffin had been adopted as a child and that Griffin’s ‘adopted name’ had been ‘James Edward White.’ The officer responded, ‘No.’ Counsel then suggested that there might be a birth certificate showing that Griffin had been named ‘James Edward White’ at birth, although counsel did not produce such a birth certificate at trial. Counsel later suggested to the jury that Griffin had accidentally given his ‘birth name’ to the officer. As the transcript shows, there was no evidence that ‘James Edward White’ was the name on Griffin’s original birth certificate, that Griffin ever used that name other than on the day in question, or that Griffin had, in fact, been adopted. It is axiomatic that an attorney’s questions to witnesses and arguments to the jury during trial are not evidence. See Atkins v. State, 253 Ga.App. 169, 171(2)(c) (558 S.E.2d 755) (2002) (‘what the attorneys say in their arguments does not constitute evidence, [although] attorneys’ questions provide the context for considering the witnesses’ responses, which is evidence’); see also Parker v. State, 248 Ga.App. 748, 749- 750(2) (548 S.E.2d 634) (2001). [fn: In Parker, the trial court judge gave the jury an illustration about what constitutes evidence in the case. 248 Ga.App. at 749-750(2). The judge warned the jury about how attorneys sometime use a ‘yellow rose’ technique, in which an attorney repeatedly cross-examines witnesses about whether they saw yellow roses at the scene of the incident, even though the roses never existed and were completely fabricated by the attorney. Id. Due to the attorney’s incessant questioning, however, some of the jurors become convinced that the roses were