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(569 S.E.2d 620) (2002) (‘Once it is shown that goods were stolen in a robbery, absence of or unsatisfactory explanation of the possession of the goods will support a conviction for robbery based upon recent possession of the stolen goods. Whether a defendant's explanation of possession is satisfactory is a question for the jury[.]’) (citation and footnote omitted). See also In re: T.T., 282 Ga.App. 527, 528-529 (639 S.E.2d 538) (2006); Williams v. State, 205 Ga.App. 397(1) (422 S.E.2d 438) (1992). Boggs's continued involvement with [co-defendant] Sanchez, despite observing his aggressive and reckless behavior during the course of the night, further created an inference that Boggs intended to participate in the robbery. See Hawkins v. State, 292 Ga.App. 76, 78 (663 S.E.2d 406) (2008); In re: C.L ., 289 Ga.App. 377, 380(1)(b) (657 S.E.2d 301) (2008). Additionally, Boggs's flight from the crime scene and from the pursuing patrol car, and his effort to discard the stolen property during the police pursuit, served as circumstantial evidence of his guilty intent. See Collins v. State, 283 Ga.App. 188, 191(1)(a) (641 S.E.2d 208) (2007); Dennard v. State, 241 Ga.App. 794, 796 (527 S.E.2d 884) (2000).” Accord, Brown v. State , 314 Ga.App. 375, 724 S.E.2d 410 (February 27, 2012) (evidence that defendant accompanied robber and received part of the robbery proceeds sufficient to convict as party to the crime). 2. No fatal variance where no witness refered to homeless victim by first and last name. “[T]he state did present testimony reflecting that a man had his backpack taken by force on September 1, 2007, in Chatham County, Georgia, by Sanchez and Boggs. Moreover, Boggs referred to the victim by last name during the course of his own testimony. Because the testimony showed that the victim referred to at trial was the same victim identified in the indictment, no fatal variance existed in this case. See Montfort [ v. State, 281 Ga.App. 29, 30-31(2) (635 S.E.2d 336) (2006)]; Parks v. State, 246 Ga.App. 888, 889(1) (543 S.E.2d 39) (2000); Harris [ v. State, 197 Ga.App. 695, 696 (399 S.E.2d 284) (1990)].” Sweet v. State, 304 Ga.App. 474, 697 S.E.2d 246 (June 18, 2010). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for robbery by sudden snatching where defendant reached over restaurant counter and took money from cash register while employee was 10-11 feet away with her back turned. Employee testified that she heard defendant open the cash drawer. 1. Jury charge on immediate presence was correct: “Immediate presence stretches very far. It is not that the taking must necessarily be from the contact of the body, but if it is from under the personal protection of a person. A person may be deemed to protect all things belonging to the individual, within a distance, over which the influence of the personal presence extends. Immediate presence includes a taking, even out of the physical presence of a victim, if what was taken was under his or her control or responsibility.” 2. Taking was from victim’s immediate presence: “although [employee] Lopez was somewhere within ten to eleven feet of the cash register where Sweet was taking the money, she was not too far to hear the cash drawer opening and to become aware of what was happening. Thus, the jury was authorized to conclude that the robbery occurred in her immediate presence.” Harp v. State, 302 Ga.App. 17, 690 S.E.2d 424 (January 12, 2010). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for two counts or armed robbery for taking a $20 bill from two people. “Harp and another male approached P.H. and his girlfriend, D.M., outside their home. Harp pointed the gun at P.H 's face and demanded money. When P.H. responded that he had no money, Harp turned the gun on D.M. She also denied having any money. Eventually, P.H. took his ‘papers’ out of his shirt pocket, handed them to D.M., and asked her to ‘show them I don't have no money.’ D.M. rummaged through the papers and found a $20 bill, which Harp directed she give to Harp's companion.” “D.M. was in actual possession of the $20 bill and was forced to surrender the money at gunpoint, and so she was a victim of armed robbery. See, e.g., Cecil v. State, 263 Ga.App. 48, 50(2) (587 S.E.2d 197) (2003). Additionally, P.H. was a victim of armed robbery because the $20 bill was taken from his immediate presence at gunpoint. See Welch v. State, 235 Ga. 243, 245(1) (219 S.E.2d 151) (1975) (in the context of armed robbery, ‘immediate presence’ is construed broadly); Clements v. State, 84 Ga. 660, 664 (11 S.E. 505) (1890) (‘It is not necessary in a case of robbery to prove that the property was actually taken from the person of the owner, but it is sufficient if it is taken in his presence’). Clearly, both D.M. and P.H. ‘were subject to [Harp's] exercise of actual force by the use of an offensive weapon so as to induce the relinquishment of the property of another, i.e., [the $20 bill].’ Kelly v. State, 234 Ga.App. 893, 894(2) (508 S.E.2d 228) (1998).” Millender v. State, 286 Ga.App. 331, 648 S.E.2d 777 (July 5, 2007). Defendant was charged with armed robbery, but at trial the court granted a directed verdict on that charge and instead, over defendant’s objection, allowed the jury to consider the lesser-included offense of robbery by sudden snatching. Held, defendant received due process; a defendant charged with armed robbery is on notice that he may be convicted of the lesser-included offense of robbery by sudden snatching. Franklin v. State, 286 Ga.App. 288, 648 S.E.2d 746 (July 3, 2007). Evidence was insufficient to prove robbery where victim was so drunk he wasn’t aware of defendant reaching into his pocket and removing his wallet. “Under the statute, an essential element of all three methods of committing robbery is some form of force-actual physical force in the first method, or in the second method, constructive force supplied by intimidation, etc., or in the third method, force