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attorney. Brady v. State, 267 Ga. App. 351, 599 S.E.2d 313 (May 11, 2004). 1. Defendant could not be convicted of theft by deception when car dealer gave him truck to drive without immediate payment, and two weeks later tendered a check for which he lacked funds in his account; or when he tendered a post-dated check. “The gravamen of theft by deception ‘lies in obtaining the property of another by intentionally creating a false impression as to an existing fact or past event. Creating a false impression as to a future event, ... by a promise of future payment, is not sufficient.’ Mathis v. State, 161 Ga.App. 251, 288 S.E.2d 317 (1982) (conviction reversed where defendant persuaded grocer to allow her to take groceries worth $47.86 based on her promise to pay for them the following Friday, a promise she failed to keep). ‘The element of a false representation must bear on an existing fact or past event and not future performance.’ Ellerbee v. State, 256 Ga.App. 848, 853(1), 569 S.E.2d 902 (2002).” “‘If ... the check is postdated, or if the giver of the check states that he has not enough money in the bank to cover it though he expects to have by the time the check is presented for payment, there can be no implied representation that there is now enough on deposit to cover the check,’” Croy v. State, 133 Ga.App. 244, 247, 211 S.E.2d 183 (1974). 2. “Brownlee’s house had a roof damaged by hail. Brady approached Brownlee, offering to repair the roof and telling Brownlee that he could get shingles at a discount price from a lumber company going out of business. On April 27, 1999, Brady and Brownlee entered into a written contract drafted by Brady, and Brownlee made out a check to Brady dated April 27, 1999, in the amount of $1,125 to purchase the shingles. Brady cashed the check that same day. Two days later, Brady told Brownlee that he had the shingles and that they were on a trailer that had a flat tire, parked outside his house. As the days passed, Brady offered various excuses why he could not do the work or deliver the shingles to Brownlee. Brownlee testified that he paid Brady $1,125 to buy roofing shingles and that Brady never gave him any shingles or refunded his money. This evidence sufficed to support Brady’s conviction for theft by deception. [Cit.]” Young v. State, 265 Ga.App. 425, 594 S.E.2d 667 (February 4, 2004). Theft by deception was not shown by: failure to perform a contract with no deadline for performance; by allowing the other party to rescind the contract; or by giving a post-dated check by agreement with the other party. 11. THEFT BY EXTORTION Taylor v. State, 302 Ga.App. 54, 690 S.E.2d 641 (January 14, 2010). Evidence supported defendant’s conviction for theft by extortion where, while holding the owner of a van at a remote location, called the person watching the van and told him that “he should abandon the van, including it keys … and ‘get the hell out of there.’” “OCGA § 16-8-16(a) provides that a person commits the offense of theft by extortion ‘when he unlawfully obtains property of or from another person by threatening to ... [i]nflict bodily injury on anyone or commit any other criminal offense.’ Here, evidence was presented that Taylor and his accomplices took the speakers from the van after Taylor threatened that Perseo would never see the victim again unless he left the van and its keys at the gas station. This evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to convict Taylor of theft by extortion. See Neal v. State, 152 Ga.App. 270, 272(1) (262 S.E.2d 561) (1979).” 12. THEFT BY RECEIVING Lindsay v. State, A15A2104, ___ Ga.App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, 2016 WL 1102611 (March 22, 2016). Evidence didn’t support defendant’s convictions for theft by receiving. Lindsay’s mistress embezzled money from her employer and used those funds to buy gifts for Lindsay. “The State presented evidence that Lindsay knew the items had been purchased with the employer’s funds.” Held, the gifts were not “stolen property,” notwithstanding the State’s theory that legal title to them vested in the mistress’s employer. “[A] sense reading of the plain language of the statute requires the State to prove that the tangible goods received by the defendant were the same goods that were taken from the owner. See Causey v. State, 139 Ga.App. 499, 500(1) (229 S.E.2d 1) (1976) (state must present evidence sufficiently identifying goods in defendant’s possession as same goods that were stolen).” Smith v. State, 335 Ga.App. 639, 781 S.E.2d 400 (January 25, 2016). Smith’s guilty pleas to robbery and theft by receiving stolen property vacated, as the offenses were mutually exclusive, a defense which the guilty pleas didn’t waive. Daughtie v. State, 297 Ga. 261, 773 S.E.2d 263 (June 1, 2015). Malice murder and related convictions affirmed, but evidence was insufficient to support conviction for theft by receiving stolen gun. “‘Knowledge that a gun was stolen cannot be inferred even when defendant bought a gun on the street at a reduced price, [Cits.], or when the gun was labeled for law enforcement use. [Cit.]’ Stacey [ v. State, 292 Ga. 838, 840 (741 S.E.2d 881) (2013)]. Nor can such knowledge be inferred when ‘there is only evidence that [defendant] found a gun that had been reported stolen.’ Id.” Evidence here included only testimony of the owner that it was stolen, and defendant’s custodial statement that he