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the stolen items based upon his experience in buying them, coupled with the jury’s awareness of the value of everyday objects, is sufficient to allow the jury to consider such opinion evidence and make reasonable deductions exercising their own knowledge and ideas.” Cooper v. State, 281 Ga.App. 882, 637 S.E.2d 480 (October 13, 2006). Passenger’s conviction for theft by receiving motor vehicle reversed; although defendant fled the scene and told officers he knew the vehicle was stolen, and the ignition had been by-passed, there was no evidence that defendant “possessed or controlled” the vehicle. “‘[R]iding in a stolen van or automobile as a passenger does not support a conviction for theft by receiving unless the accused also, at some point, acquires possession of or controls the vehicle, i.e., has the right to exercise power over a corporeal thing[.] Therefore, one cannot be convicted of the crime of receiving stolen property absent exercise of control over the stolen goods, or if one is a passenger, intentionally aiding and abetting the commission of the crime under OCGA § 16-2- 20(b),’” quoting In re: C.W., 226 Ga.App. 30, 31-32, 485 S.E.2d 561 (1997) (citations omitted). Here, as in In re: C.W. , “there was no evidence that the passenger had ever exercised control of the vehicle, such as by determining where it would go or whom it would transport; nor was there any evidence that the passenger had actively aided and abetted the crime. Id. The evidence, therefore, showed nothing more than that the defendant ‘was simply along for the ride.’” Also citing Harris v. State , 247 Ga.App. 41, 543 S.E.2d 75 (2000). Distinguishing Hurston v. State , 202 Ga.App. 311, 414 S.E.2d 303 (1991) (ignition by-passed, “driver had left [defendant] alone in the car with the motor running when he went into a convenience store) and Slaughter v. State , 240 Ga.App. 758, 525 S.E.2d 130 (1999) (defendant along with his accomplices had used the truck as a getaway vehicle in a bank robbery.) Accord, Morgan (July 25, 2006), below. Compare King (July 29, 2004), below. Morgan v. State, 280 Ga.App. 646, 634 S.E.2d 818 (July 25, 2006). Defendant’s conviction for theft by receiving of stolen van reversed. Defendant was a passenger in the van when stopped by police; “there was not sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer that Morgan controlled or possessed the vehicle or aided or abetted the crime.” Accord, Tigner v. State , 332 Ga.App. 808, 775 S.E.2d 180 (July 7, 2015). Duncan v. State, 278 Ga.App. 703, 629 S.E.2d 577 (April 10, 2006). 1. “‘[V]alue is not an element of the crime of theft by receiving stolen property’ and is relevant only ‘in order to distinguish between a felony and a misdemeanor for purposes of sentencing.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Campbell v. State, 275 Ga.App. 8, 10(3) (619 S.E.2d 720) (2005). As long as ‘it ... appear[s] that the stolen property is of some value,’ the conviction can be sustained. Bryan v. State, 148 Ga.App. 428, 429(2) (251 S.E.2d 338) (1978). Furthermore, when the indictment lists specific items of stolen property, the State is not required to prove the receipt of every one of those items by the defendant to sustain a conviction. [Cits.]” Accord, Simmons v. State , 287 Ga.App. 68, 651 S.E.2d 359 (August 1, 2007); Robinson v. State , 312 Ga.App. 736, 719 S.E.2d 601 (November 21, 2011). 2. Evidence was insufficient to establish identity of stolen item as that taken from victim’s residence: “At trial, [victim] Thompson never identified the DVD player as the one that had been stolen. No identifying information, such as a brand name or serial number, linking the player found by Duncan’s uncle with the one stolen from Thompson’s home, was ever placed in evidence. Nor was the DVD player found in the trash can photographed by investigators, taken into evidence by the police, or introduced into evidence at trial. Furthermore, and most significantly, there was testimony at trial that a DVD player was also stolen as part of a previous April 22, 2004 residential break-in for which Duncan was also being tried and for which he was convicted. That DVD player likewise was never recovered by the police. Thus, the jury was left to guess as to whether the DVD player found by Duncan’s uncle was linked to the prior residential break-in that occurred on April 22nd, the break-in of Thompson’s residence, or neither. Under these circumstances, the State failed to meet its burden of showing that the DVD player was the same one that was stolen from Thompson as charged in the indictment. [Cits.]” 3. “[O]nce one item of stolen property is identified as being in the possession of the defendant, ‘any question of identity of the remainder goes to the weight of the evidence relating to identification, and the weight of the evidence is a question for the jury.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Dean v. State, 181 Ga.App. 452 (352 S.E.2d 633) (1987).” 4. “‘Unexplained possession of recently stolen property, alone, is not sufficient to support a conviction for receiving stolen property but guilt may be inferred from possession in conjunction with other evidence of knowledge. Guilty knowledge may be inferred from circumstances which would excite suspicion in the mind of an ordinary prudent man.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hurston v. State, 202 Ga.App. 311, 312(1) (414 S.E.2d 303) (1991).” Additional circumstantial evidence existed here. Naillon v. State, 276 Ga.App. 799, 625 S.E.2d 73 (December 12, 2005). Sufficient evidence supported defendant’s conviction for theft by receiving. “‘Evidence of recent, unexplained possession of stolen goods is sufficient to support a conviction for theft by taking.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Drake v. State, 274 Ga.App. 882(1), 619 S.E.2d 380 (2005). Thus, the fact that Naillon was discovered driving the van mere hours after it was reported stolen constitutes some evidence of