☢ test - Í

English v. State, 261 Ga.App. 157, 582 S.E.2d 136 (May 6, 2003). “English maintains the evidence was insufficient to find him guilty of driving without insurance in violation of OCGA § 40-6-10(b). We are constrained to agree. The UTC charged English with ‘no insurance,’ a violation of OCGA § 40-6-10. Two different violations are encompassed by OCGA § 40-6-10. Subsection (a)(1) provides, in pertinent part: ‘Until January 31, 2003, the owner or operator of a motor vehicle for which minimum motor vehicle liability insurance coverage is required under Chapter 34 of Title 33 shall keep proof or evidence of required minimum insurance coverage in the vehicle at all times during the operation of the vehicle.’ Subsection (b) provides, in pertinent part: ‘An owner or any other person who knowingly operates or knowingly authorizes another to operate a motor vehicle without effective insurance on such vehicle or without an approved plan of self-insurance shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.’ The citation did not specify which subsection of the statute English was charged with violating. This court has held, however, that when a UTC describes the crime as ‘no insurance,’ as opposed to ‘no proof of insurance,’ it is properly construed as charging a violation of OCGA § 40-6-10(b). Thompson v. State, 243 Ga.App. 878, 881(1), 534 S.E.2d 151 (2000). A material element of subsection (b) is the driver’s knowledge that the car is uninsured. The issue in this case is therefore whether the State proved that element beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree with English that it did not. Officer Jordan testified that the computer check showed ‘no insurance for vehicle.’ Jordan also testified that English ‘did not produce any insurance information.’ Although English admitted he knew that his license had been revoked and admitted he had been driving his girlfriend’s car, he made no admissions regarding any knowledge that any car he had driven was uninsured. It is true that such knowledge ‘may be inferred from other facts and circumstances.’ (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Thompson, supra at 881(2), 534 S.E.2d 151. In this case, however, we conclude that although the State may have proved that the vehicle was uninsured and that English was driving it without a license to drive, no evidence presented permits the inference beyond a reasonable doubt that English had knowledge that the car was uninsured. English’s conviction for that offense therefore must be reversed.” Accord, Lawson v. State , 313 Ga.App. 751, 722 S.E.2d 446 (January 27, 2012) (accusation alleging that vehicle had no insurance coverage charges violation of OCGA § 40-6-10(b)), citing English ). Augustin v. State, 260 Ga.App. 631, 580 S.E.2d 640 (March 27, 2003). Adequate circumstantial evidence supported defendant’s conviction for driving without insurance: “Here, the evidence shows that Augustin was involved in a collision, slowed down briefly, fled the scene, and then produced an insurance card which, in the officer’s opinion, did not appear to be authentic. When the officer contacted the insurance company, someone there verified that the card was not valid. Augustin never did produce a valid insurance card, and the victim of the collision was never given any information regarding Augustin’s insurance coverage nor ever contacted by any insurance company regarding the loss. Even where a defendant claims that he did not know he lacked effective insurance coverage, knowledge may be inferred from other facts and circumstances.” Query: what made info from insurance company admissible as part of officer’s testimony? Res gestae? Also, charge on strict liability, along with pattern charges on proof of intent were adequate, notwithstanding that knowledge of lack of insurance is an element of the offense. Thomas v. State, 253 Ga.App. 866, 560 S.E.2d 745 (February 21, 2002). Conviction for driving without insurance reversed. State must show more than that defendant could not produce insurance card upon request; must affirmatively show absence of insurance coverage and knowledge of that fact by defendant. Thompson v. State , 243 Ga.App. 878, 534 S.E.2d 151 (April 21, 2000). Conviction for driving without proof of insurance reversed. 1. UTC alleging that defendant drove with “no insurance” charges a violation of OCGA § 40-6-10(b), which makes it illegal to “knowingly operate[ ] ... a motor vehicle without effective insurance on such vehicle,” not, as State contends, “OCGA § 40-6-10(a)(1), which makes it illegal to drive with no proof of insurance.” “‘[T]he defendant has the right to rely on the specific manner of committing the crime that is alleged in the indictment,’” quoting Kevinezz v. State, 265 Ga. 78, 81(2)(b), 454 S.E.2d 441 (1995). “We note that, under Georgia law, “the description of the offense charged prevails over any Code section cited.’ (Punctuation omitted.) In re: B.C.G., 235 Ga.App. 1, 3(1), 508 S.E.2d 239 (1998). 2. Where accusation or indictment actually charges commission of an offense, defendant “‘was not required to specially demur to the indictment in order to avoid waiving her right to object to a jury charge on a method of committing the crime that was not specified in the indictment.’ Id. at 82-83(2)(c), 454 S.E.2d 441.” 3. Evidence supported conviction for driving without insurance; hence, defendant may be retried. “Thompson … argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction under OCGA § 40-6-10(b) because there was no evidence she knowingly operated the vehicle without insurance. As we have previously recognized, however, ‘[a] conviction for a violation of this Code section will not be precluded merely by a defendant's asserted lack of knowledge that his insurance policy had expired. Knowledge may be inferred from other facts and circumstances.’ Quaile v. State, 172 Ga.App. 421, 423(5), 323 S.E.2d 281 (1984). Thompson admitted to the police officer that her insurance had been cancelled three months earlier, and she failed to present any evidence that she had obtained new