☢ test - Í

plea. Alford, supra, 400 U.S. at 37; see also McKiernan v. State, 288 Ga. 140, 142–143(2) (702 S.E.2d 170) (2010) (affirming the denial of defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea to felony murder despite the defendant’s assertion that the shooting with which he was charged was accidental, where the evidence showed he was motivated to plead guilty out of fear he might never be released from prison upon conviction, and in order to avoid putting his family through a trial). Normally, all that is required in order to meet constitutional muster is for the trial court to find that the record contains strong evidence of actual guilt, and for the accused to enter the plea voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly of the rights he was waiving by entering the plea. Alford, supra.” Storch v. State, 276 Ga.App. 789, 625 S.E.2d 70 (December 12, 2005). “Storch claims that the trial court erred in entering his guilty plea because he never admitted his guilt. Under Alford, however, the trial court may accept a guilty plea from a defendant who professes innocence ‘if the defendant has intelligently concluded that it is in his best interest to plead guilty and the court has inquired into the factual basis for the plea and sought to resolve the conflict between the plea and the claim of innocence.’ Duque v. State, 271 Ga.App. 154(1) (608 S.E.2d 738) (2004). In this case, the State described in detail the evidence that would be presented against Storch, including testimony from the victim, medical evidence, and physical evidence. The trial court found this factual presentation sufficient. And it concluded that, in pleading guilty despite claiming innocence, Storch chose to avoid a trial and a potentially harsher sentence in favor of the negotiated plea, which included a nolle prosequi on five charges. The record shows that the trial court inquired into the factual basis for the plea and resolved the conflict between Storch’s claims of innocence and his decision to plead guilty. See id. at 157(1). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in accepting the plea without an admission of guilt. See Whitesides v. State, 266 Ga.App. 181, 187(3) (596 S.E.2d 706) (2004); Brower v. State, 230 Ga.App. 125, 125-126(1) (495 S.E.2d 600) (1998). Compare Minchey v. State, 155 Ga.App. 632, 633(1) (271 S.E.2d 885) (1980) (reversing conviction entered after Alford plea because trial court failed to resolve conflict between claim of innocence and guilty plea).” Accord, Skinner v. State , 297 Ga.App. 828, 678 S.E.2d 526 (May 13, 2009) (same quote from Duque ; record established voluntariness of defendant’s Alford plea). In re: B.C., 333 Ga.App. 763, 777 S.E.2d 52 (September 3, 2015). In delinquency proceeding, juvenile court erred by ruling that new Juvenile Code doesn’t allow a juvenile to enter an Alford plea. New OCGA § 15-11-580(b) provides that a juvenile shall either admit or deny the allegations of the petition, but “nothing in the statute prohibits admissions made pursuant to an Alford plea, as long as there is a factual basis for the child’s delinquency adjudication. [Cit.] Accordingly, we presume that the General Assembly enacted OCGA § 15–11–580 with the knowledge and understanding that Alford pleas have historically been accepted in Georgia’s juvenile courts,” citing In re: J.L.B., 280 Ga.App. 556, 561, 634 S.E.2d 514 (2006); In re: L.T., 325 Ga.App. 590, 754 S.E.2d 380 (2014). Notes that “the adult arraignment statutes [OCGA § § 17-7-93, 17-7-94] make no express reference to the well-established practice of accepting Alford pleas in Georgia’s state and superior courts.” Also notes that OCGA § 15-11-1 states “that the Juvenile Code is intended to provide treatment and rehabilitation for juvenile offenders and ‘shall be liberally construed to reflect that the paramount child welfare policy of this state is to determine and ensure the best interests of its children.’ (emphasis supplied).” Argot v. State, 261 Ga.App. 569, 583 S.E.2d 246 (June 9, 2003). “‘[T]he collateral consequences flowing from an Alford plea are the same as those flowing from an ordinary plea of guilt. Were this not so, defendants pleading guilty would routinely proclaim their innocence to reap two benefits: (1) the avoidance of a trial and a possible reduction in sentence, and (2) the extinguishment of all collateral consequences of their plea. Nothing in ... Alford sanctions this distortion of the pleading process,’” quoting Blohm v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 994 F.2d 1542, 1554-1556 (11 th Cir., 1993). “There is nothing inherent in an Alford plea that constrains the sentencing court from considering any permissible factor in imposing sentence.” Ellis v. State , 243 Ga.App. 431, 533 S.E.2d 451 (April 11, 2000). Conviction for armed robbery and related offenses, based on Alford plea, affirmed. “Because the reading of ‘the indictment provided ample information from which the trial court could discern that the facts alleged by the state actually satisfied the elements of the charges to which [Ellis] was pleading guilty,’ a sufficient factual basis was presented. Green v. State, 265 Ga. 263, 265(2), 454 S.E.2d 466 (1995).” “ As to voluntariness and intelligence, Alford pleas are judged by the same standard as routine guilty pleas – ‘whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant. [Cits.]’ [ North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970)].” Record here reflected thorough review of defendant’s rights. B. COMPETENCY