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had received and read the indictment and understood the charges against him. This was sufficient to show a factual basis for his plea. Brown v. State, 280 Ga. 658, 659(2) (631 S.E.2d 687) (2006). Moreover, the trial court questioned Staley and asked him specifically if he was guilty of the acts charged in the indictment, and Staley responded that he was. This was also sufficient to show that he understood the offenses with which he was charged and confessed his guilt. Thompson v. State, 240 Ga.App. 539–540(1)(b), (c) (524 S.E.2d 239) (1999).” Beaver v. State, 308 Ga.App. 380, 707 S.E.2d 590 (March 10, 2011). Denying motion to withdraw guilty pleas to two counts of cruelty to children, trial court properly found that adequate factual basis for pleas was set out. “The Georgia Supreme Court … has expressly held ‘that an indictment alone may contain enough information to establish that the facts alleged by the State actually satisfied the elements of the charges to which a defendant was pleading guilty.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Adams v. State, 285 Ga. 744, 748(4)(b) (683 S.E.2d 586) (2009).” State v. Benton, 305 Ga.App. 332, 699 S.E.2d 767 (July 21, 2010). Trial court properly rejected defendant’s guilty plea, as State failed to establish factual basis for offense of theft by conversion. “At the guilty plea hearing, the prosecutor described the facts underlying the accusation as follows: ‘Mr. Benton came to an agreement with his boss to purchase this 1991 Toyota pickup truck. He took that pickup truck and never made any payment on it, and it was actually recovered in Houston County with some other people driving it.’ The prosecutor explained that, at some point, Benton's employer realized that Benton was never going to make the payments and told Benton to return the truck instead. The trial court determined that the State had failed to identify any legal obligation to make a specified disposition of the truck and, therefore, that the State was seeking to impose criminal sanctions for Benton's failure to pay a debt, which is forbidden by Georgia's Constitution.” “To prove that Benton was under a legal obligation to make a specified disposition of the truck … the State was required to prove that Benton explicitly agreed to return the truck to his employer if he could not make the payments. … The prosecutor's recitation of the expected evidence, however, failed to show that, when Benton obtained the pickup truck from the seller, he explicitly agreed to return the truck to the seller if he failed to pay as agreed. Because the State failed to identify any factual basis for the essential element that Benton obtained the pickup truck under an agreement or other known legal obligation to make a specified disposition of the property, the trial court was authorized to reject Benton's guilty plea. Head v. State, 262 Ga. 795, 796(2), 426 S.E.2d 547 (1993).” Tate v. State, 287 Ga. 364, 695 S.E.2d 591 (June 1, 2010). Defendant’s convictions for murder, kidnapping and related offenses, and death sentence, affirmed; factual basis for defendant’s guilty pleas was properly established by the State’s “brief account of the crimes” and the trial court’s “familiarity with Tate’s videotaped interrogation,” regardless of the actual admissibility of the recording. “Whether or not … the trial court had previously ruled correctly pre-trial in concluding that the videotaped interrogation would be admissible by the State as evidence at trial is irrelevant to Tate's guilty plea, because the showing of a factual basis for a plea need not be done through admissible evidence. See, e.g., Adams, 285 Ga. at (4)(a) [September 28, 2009, below] (factual basis for a plea shown through the trial judge's familiarity with the co-defendant's case); Green v. State, 265 Ga. 263(2) (454 S.E.2d 466) (1995) (considering facts alleged in the indictment as part of a showing of the factual basis for a plea).” “[T]he requirement that a factual basis be shown for a plea ‘is to protect against someone pleading guilty when that person may know what he has done but may not know that those acts do not constitute the crime with which he is charged.’ State v. Evans, 265 Ga. 332(2) (454 S.E.2d 468) (1995). In assessing the factual basis for a plea, the trial court ‘need not make itself aware of evidence establishing the pleader's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt....’ King v. Hawkins, 266 Ga. 655, 656 (469 S.E.2d 30) (1996).” Adams v. State, 285 Ga. 744, 683 S.E.2d 586 (September 28, 2009). Trial court properly denied defendant’s motion to withdraw guilty pleas to malice murder and related offenses; although no factual basis was stated in open court for offenses of terroristic threats and simple battery, indictment itself provided adequate factual basis to demonstrate that pleas worked no “manifest injustice.” “Our review of the record reveals that it contains only the indictment, appellant's guilty plea, a plea form, the sentence and the judgment imposed thereon. While an indictment is not evidence and cannot be treated as such by the factfinder in determining guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, see generally Bostick v. Ricketts, 236 Ga. 304(1), 223 S.E.2d 686 (1976), USCR 33.9 does not require that guilt be shown beyond a reasonable doubt. King v. Hawkins, 266 Ga. 655, 656, 469 S.E.2d 30 (1996). We have recognized that an indictment alone may contain enough information to establish that the facts alleged by the State ‘actually satisfied the elements of the charges to which [a defendant] was pleading guilty.’ Green v. State, 265 Ga. 263, 265(2), 454 S.E.2d 466 (1995). See also Romano v. State, 272 Ga. 238(1), 527 S.E.2d 184 (2000) (indictment was not read into the record but sufficient factual basis established after defendant stated he had read the indictment and understood the charges levied against him). To the extent Shabazz v. State, 259 Ga.App. 339, 340(1), 577 S.E.2d 45 (2003) holds to the contrary, it is hereby overruled. In this case, the indictment set forth that appellant threatened to murder a certain named individual; that appellant communicated his threat