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arraignment” is impermissible. Rather, they hold that a “mass arraignment” ... is insufficient by itself to fulfill the trial court’s responsibility to make a personal inquiry and determine that a proposed guilty plea by one who is unrepresented by counsel is in fact knowingly and voluntarily made, upon an appreciation of the nature of the charges and the consequences of the guilty plea.’ (Emphasis omitted.) King v. State, 226 Ga.App. 576, 584(4), 486 S.E.2d 904 (1997), rev’d on other grounds, 270 Ga. 367, 509 S.E.2d 32 (1998). Here, Isaac was represented by an attorney, who was at his side during the plea hearing. The court personally advised the defendants, including Isaac, of their constitutional rights and discussed with Isaac individually the charges against him and possible sentences. Under these circumstances, the trial court was authorized to conclude that Isaac’s guilty plea was freely and voluntarily made and supported by a factual basis.” 5. WAIVER OF DEFENSES/PROCEDURE Smith v. State, 335 Ga.App. 639, 781 S.E.2d 400 (January 25, 2016). Smith’s guilty pleas “did not waive his claims that the aggravated assault count to which he pled guilty was void because it failed to charge him with a crime [but it did], and that the robbery and theft by receiving stolen property counts to which he pled guilty were mutually exclusive [they were]. Wright v. Hall, 281 Ga. 318, 319, 638 S.E.2d 270 (2006); see Addison v. State, 239 Ga. 622, 624, 238 S.E.2d 411 (1977); Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62, n. 2, 96 S.Ct. 241, 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975).” Kennedy v. State, 319 Ga.App. 498, 735 S.E.2d 819 (December 21, 2012). Guilty plea to drug charges waived challenges to alleged improper stop and search. “Kennedy waived the right to challenge the stop and search by pleading guilty. See Burns v. State, 291 Ga. 547, 548(1)(c) (731 S.E.2d 681) (2012). ‘Once a defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims alleging the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. With a few limited exceptions, a plea of guilty generally waives all defenses except that based on the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea.’ (Footnotes omitted.) Harwood v. State, 303 Ga.App. 23, 24–25 (692 S.E.2d 665) (2010).” Regent v. State, 306 Ga.App. 616, 703 S.E.2d 81 (October 27, 2010). Convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated battery affirmed; defendant waived argument that the two offenses merged for sentencing by pleading guilty. Accord, Carson v. State , 314 Ga.App. 225, 723 S.E.2d 516 (February 17, 2012) (Physical precedent only); Osborne v. State , 318 Ga.App. 339, 734 S.E.2d 59 (November 5, 2012); Andrews v. State , 320 Ga.App. 816, 739 S.E.2d 445 (March 7, 2013) (physical precedent only). This line of cases overruled, Nazario v. State , 293 Ga. 480, 746 S.E.2d 109 (July 11, 2013). Lord v. State, 303 Ga.App. 378, 693 S.E.2d 533 (March 8, 2010). “‘ When a criminal defendant pleads guilty to counts of an indictment alleging multiple criminal acts, and willingly and knowingly accepts the specified sentences as to such charged counts, the defendant waives any claim that there was in fact only one act and that the resulting sentences are void on double jeopardy grounds.’ Turner v. State, 284 Ga. 494, 497(2) (668 S.E.2d 692) (2008). ‘Having pled guilty to both the [child molestation] and [incest] counts, [Lord] admitted to committing both crimes. As such, he is estopped from now claiming that any of the counts to which he pled guilty should have merged.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Sanders v. State, 282 Ga.App. 834, 836(1)(a) (640 S.E.2d 353) (2006). See Harmon v. State, 281 Ga.App. 35, 39(4) (635 S.E.2d 348) (2006). Compare Curtis v. State, 275 Ga. 576, 576-578(1) (571 S.E.2d 376) (2002) (when sentenced following a trial, a defendant does not waive the right to contend that his convictions merged as matter of fact for failure to raise the issue in the trial court).” Turner and this line of cases overruled, Nazario v. State , 293 Ga. 480, 746 S.E.2d 109 (July 11, 2013). Wilson v. State, 302 Ga.App. 433, 691 S.E.2d 308 (February 23, 2010). 1. Defendant waived right to an indictment by pleading guilty; “‘such plea would waive any defense known and unknown, and this would include any deficiency in the written waiver’ requirement. Balkcom v. McDaniel, 234 Ga. 470, 471(2) (216 S.E.2d 328) (1975). See also Sanchez v. State, 259 Ga.App. 400, 400-401 (577 S.E.2d 80) (2003).” Accord, Phelps v. State , 293 Ga. 873, 750 S.E.2d 340 (October 21, 2013). 2. Defendant also waived double jeopardy claim that he couldn’t be “convicted of three counts of being a felon in possession of a weapon based on a single instance of behavior; in other words, Wilson contends that the counts should have merged. Here again, if ‘a criminal defendant pleads guilty to counts of an indictment alleging multiple criminal acts, and willingly accepts a specified sentence as to properly charged counts, he waives any claim that there was in fact only one act and that the resulting sentence is void on double jeopardy grounds.’ (Punctuation omitted.) Carr v. State, 282 Ga.App. 134, 136 (637 S.E.2d 835) (2006). See also Glover v. State, 258 Ga.App. 527, 529 (574 S.E.2d 565) (2002).” This line of cases overruled, Nazario v. State , 293 Ga. 480, 746 S.E.2d 109 (July 11, 2013).