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Boykin rights with him or that it was her standard practice of doing so. See Green v. State, 279 Ga. 687, 620 S.E.2d 788 (2005). Finally, there is no evidence that trial counsel actually went over the plea agreement with her client or any of the information that it contained. Therefore, this record provides nothing more than the state’s speculation that Hemdani’s trial counsel might have possibly discussed his Boykin rights with him based on trial counsel's act of signing the plea agreement.” Accord, Harrelson (March 15, 2010), above . Distinguished, Brown (November 7, 2011), above. Rocha v. State, 287 Ga.App. 446, 651 S.E.2d 781 (September 7, 2007). Trial court properly denied motion to withdraw guilty plea; plea was voluntary although trial court failed to tell defendant on the record about the possible sentence for the offense, since defendant received bargained-for sentence . “Rocha contends that the State failed to show that he was aware of the consequences of his plea because he was not thoroughly and accurately advised on the record of the maximum possible sentences and any mandatory minimum sentences he was facing. [ See Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.8(c) (Before accepting a guilty plea, a judge should, inter alia, inform the defendant on the record of the terms of any negotiated plea; of the maximum possible sentence on the charges, including possible consecutive or enhanced sentences; and of the mandatory minimum sentence, if any, on the charges.). ] ‘ There is no constitutional requirement [, however,] that a defendant be advised of the length of his sentence before a court accepts his guilty plea.’ (Citation omitted.) Waye v. State, 239 Ga. 871, 876(2) (238 S.E.2d 923) (1977). A defendant’s otherwise voluntary guilty plea is not invalidated ‘merely because the range of punishment on the plea was never recited to him, when he makes no claim that he was disadvantaged by the omission or even that he was in fact unaware of the possible sentence which could be imposed.’ Hill v. Hopper, 233 Ga. 633, 634 (212 S.E.2d 810) (1975). [ Cf. Johnson v. State, 227 Ga.App. 390, 391-392(1) (489 S.E.2d 138) (1997) (where a defendant and the State did not negotiate the sentence to be requested and where the record did not show that the defendant was advised of the mandatory imposition of life sentences on the charges against him, the State failed to establish that the defendant entered the plea with ‘full knowledge of the consequences’ of the plea, including ‘information about the range of punishment he faces’) (citation and punctuation omitted). ] When a defendant enters a negotiated guilty plea and receives the sentence for which he bargained, ‘the consequence of receiving the sentence to which [the defendant] agreed can hardly be deemed unanticipated or adverse.’ (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bess v. State, 235 Ga.App. 372, 373(1) (508 S.E.2d 664) (1998) (affirming convictions on guilty pleas where, although trial court failed to advise the defendants of the mandatory minimum sentence or the lack of parole eligibility, the defendants received the bargained-for sentences and those sentences exceeded the mandatory minimum).” Accord, Belcher v. State , 304 Ga.App. 645, 697 S.E.2d 300 (June 28, 2010). Moon v. State, 286 Ga.App. 360, 649 S.E.2d 355 (July 6, 2007). “We have held that a plea statement form like the one at issue here can be used to show that a guilty plea is knowingly and voluntarily entered when the plea statement is entered into the record and accompanied by a colloquy like that between the prosecutor and Moon in this case. See Gainer v. State, 267 Ga.App. 408, 409 (599 S.E.2d 359) (2004); Wiggins v. State, 245 Ga.App. 527, 528-529 (538 S.E.2d 180) (2000). While the record does not contain a statement by a court official explicitly telling Moon that he had the right to not ‘incriminate’ himself, to have ‘assistance of counsel during trial,’ or to remain ‘silent,’ the State need not show that USCR 33.8 was recited to the letter to rebut an attack on a guilty plea. See McLendon v. State, 256 Ga. 480, 481(2) (350 S.E.2d 235) (1986). If the record permits the conclusion that ‘the accused has a full understanding of the concepts involved, the appellate courts will not invalidate a guilty plea for failure to use the precise language’ of those rights. Hawes v. State, 281 Ga. 822, 824 (642 S.E.2d 92) (2007).” See also David (May 8, 2006), below, and cases cited thereunder. Accord, Smith v. State , 298 Ga.App. 458, 680 S.E.2d 516 (June 18, 2009) ( citing Gainer ) ( affirmed, 287 Ga. 391, 697 S.E.2d 177 (June 28, 2010); Adams v. State, 285 Ga. 744, 683 S.E.2d 586 (September 28, 2009) (“the information the defendant receives about his rights does not have to be conveyed by means of any particular language and, indeed, may be conveyed in words tailored to a particular individual's vocabulary and comprehension.”); Burns (September 10, 2012), above. Patterson v. State, 284 Ga.App. 780, 645 S.E.2d 38 (March 21, 2007). Trial court could admit defendant’s prior plea of guilty to criminal trespass to show proof of notice not to contact victim without regard to whether defendant validly waived the right to counsel in entering the plea. “Patterson’s prior conviction was not used to enhance his sentence. The conviction was presented to show that he had been ordered not to have contact with the victim. A prior conviction is not required to prove aggravated stalking.” Hawes v. State, 281 Ga. 822, 642 S.E.2d 92 (February 26, 2007). Habeas court erred in denying petition; record does not show that defendant’s guilty plea was voluntary, because record does not disclose that defendant was advised of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. “ No comment by counsel or court served to convey to [defendant] the core constitutional right that he did not have to incriminate himself by entering a plea of guilty. Informing