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affirmative act of providing misinformation concerning a defendant’s basic parole eligibility falls outside the range of professional competence for attorneys in criminal cases, thus satisfying the first prong of the ineffective assistance test. See Smith v. Williams, 277 Ga. 778, 779(1) (596 S.E.2d 112) (2004); Rollins [ v. State, 277 Ga. 488, 491-92(2), 591 S.E.2d 796 (2004)]. Furthermore, the State conceded that, but for his trial counsel’s error, Clue would not have pled guilty to Counts 1-4, [footnote omitted] and so the second prong of the ineffective assistance test was also met as to the armed robbery and kidnapping counts. Consequently, the trial court properly granted Clue’s motion to withdraw as to Counts 1-4, as both parties to this appeal agree.” Trial court abused its discretion, however, in not allowing withdrawal of guilty pleas on two related counts. Although the erroneous advice did not deal with Counts 5 and 6, it “‘undermine[d] the voluntariness and the validity of the plea as to the [remaining] counts of the indictment.’ Shabazz v. State, 259 Ga.App. 339, 342(3) (577 S.E.2d 45) (2003) (denial of effective assistance of counsel to defendant in entering guilty plea on incest count also tainted voluntariness and validity of guilty plea on separate count of statutory rape).” “[I]n many circumstances it is appropriate to view the final negotiated plea agreement as a ‘package’ deal, the terms of which should not be treated in isolation from one another but rather as a cohesive whole.” Footnote 3: “We note that a different result might be warranted from the one reached in the instant case if the counts that were part of the plea agreement pertained to different underlying transactions or events, or if the guilty plea at issue resulted from a non-negotiated plea agreement.” Footnote 4: “Again, we note that a different result might be warranted if the faulty information received from trial counsel concerned a lesser offense, the sentence for which ran concurrently with a more serious offense carrying a longer sentence, both of which were included in the same plea agreement.” Smith v. Williams, 277 Ga. 778, 596 S.E.2d 112 (April 27, 2004). Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel when he entered his guilty plea based on counsel’s advice that he would be eligible for parole after serving five years of his fifteen year sentence, when in fact he would not be eligible until serving 90 percent of his sentence failure. “This Court has held that there is no constitutional requirement that a criminal defendant be informed of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea. [Cit.] We have recently distinguished, however, the failure to inform about those consequences from an affirmative misrepresentation about those consequences. Rollins v. State, 277 Ga. 488 (591 S.E.2d 796) (2004).” Defendant’s habeas corpus petition should have been granted. Accord, Clue (June 15, 2005), and Patel (January 30, 2006), above; Crowder v. State , 288 Ga. 739, 707 S.E.2d 78 (March 7, 2011); James v. State , 309 Ga.App. 721, 710 S.E.2d 905 (June 1, 2011). Compare Williams v. Duffy (March 1, 1999), below, and cases collected thereunder on failure to advise on parole eligibility/ineligibility. Turley v. State, 265 Ga.App. 385, 593 S.E.2d 916 (February 2, 2004). Not ineffective assistance where counsel fails to inform defendant “of the possibility of entering an Alford plea” because “a defendant has no constitutional right to enter a guilty plea, [cit.] and Turley points to no evidence that the trial court was willing to accept such a plea.” “Indeed, we find this situation analogous to an attorney’s failure to inform his client of parole eligibility, which provides no basis for an ineffective assistance claim. See Argot v. State , 261 Ga.App. 569, 569-571 (583 S.E.2d 246 (2003).” Rollins v. State, 277 Ga. 488, 591 S.E.2d 796 (January 12, 2004 ). Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel made affirmative misrepresentations about collateral consequences of entering first offender plea to VGCSA. Counsel wrongly advised defendant that first offender plea would not “negatively impact either her desire to become an attorney or her immigration status.” Distinguished from those cases where collateral consequences are simply not disclosed: “there is no constitutional requirement that a defendant be advised of collateral consequences in order for her guilty plea to be valid.” Record showed that defendant relied on incorrect advice in entering her plea and otherwise would have opted for trial. Defendant’s habeas corpus petition should have been granted and defendant allowed to withdraw her guilty plea. Accord, Smith v. Williams (April 27, 2004), above , and cases cited thereunder. Williams v. Duffy, 270 Ga. 580, 513 S.E.2d 212 (March 1, 1999). Grant of habeas petition reversed; no ineffective assistance where counsel failed to advise defendant that he would be ineligible for parole when he pled guilty to armed robbery. “‘[E]ligibility or ineligibility for parole is not a “consequence” of a plea of guilty, but a “matter of legislative grace” or a “consequence of the withholding of legislative grace.” [Cits.]’ Shanks v. State, 672 So.2d 1207, 1208 (Miss., 1996). Thus, OCGA § 17-10-6.1(c)(3) would have only a collateral effect on Duffy’s sentence for armed robbery, in no way lengthening the sentence itself, but conditioning satisfaction of that sentence upon Duffy’s incarceration for the designated 15-year period. See Fearson v. State, 662 So.2d 1225 (Ala.Crim.App., 1995); People v. Moore, 844 P.2d 1261 (Colo.App. 1992). There is no constitutional requirement that a defendant be advised of such collateral consequences in order for his guilty plea to be valid. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 55-56, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); [other cits.].” Overruling Hutchison v. State, 230 Ga.App. 143, 495 S.E.2d 618 (1998).